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Introduction

It is widely recognized that in a dynamic, highly competitive economy,
the displacement of workers from their jobs has been and continues to
be an economic fact of life. An important source of this displacement
during the postwar period has been the long-term shift in employment
opportunities from manufacturing to services. Studies such as the report
of the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force on Economic Adjustment and
Worker Dislocation (1986) suggest, nevertheless, that the extent of
displacement among American workers may have increased in recent
years. In support of its conclusion, the Task Force points to the dramatic
increase in import penetration of U.S. markets; the rising proportion
of permanent separations among total job losses during the 1981-82
recession relative to earlier postwar recessions; and the greater volatility
since 1970 in exchange rates, interest rates, and energy prices. Stone
and Sawhill (1987) document the incidence of difficult labor market
adjustments arising from the increasing internationalization of the
economy, and Hamermesh (1989) and Summers (1986) provide evidence
indicating that the contribution of displaced workers to the nation©s
overall unemployment rate has recently risen. 1
Displaced workers (also termed dislocated workers) are usually
described as workers on layoff who possess a stable employment history
with their predisplacement employer. In addition to their work ex
perience, the main distinction between displaced workers and other laidoff workers is that the displaced typically have little chance of being
recalled to jobs with their old employer or even in their old industry.
At the time of layoff, however, displaced workers are likely to be
unaware that their chances of recall are slim, although alternative
employment opportunities exist elsewhere. The first step in the reemployment process is recognition of the need to engage in job search, followed
1
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by a dusting off of job search skills which may have been unused for
a number of years. Enhancing job search skills is important because
of the very real possibility that a worker displaced by a major plant
closure or mass layoff will face bleak reemployment prospects in his
or her local labor market. Beyond gearing up for job search, it may
also be necessary for some displaced workers to be retrained in the voca
tional skills required to qualify for jobs in expanding industries.
Displaced workers thus tend to differ from other unemployed workers
in that the duration of their unemployment is likely to be longer and
that their reemployment is likely to require a change in occupation or
industry. Reemployment may involve as well a willingness to accept
employment at a lower wage. In the words of the Secretary of Labor©s
Task Force report (1986:16), "[J]obs lost [by displaced workers] are
often perceived as especially good jobs, for which the individual worked
many years for one employer to achieve. Also, extraordinary emotional
adjustments are required as life plans and goals are changed abruptly."
As experienced workers with stable work histories, displaced workers
are usually eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Indeed,
the 26 weeks of income maintenance provided by UI in most states is
often the only source of financial support available to them. The UI
system has served for over 50 years as the first line of defense against
temporary income losses due to unemployment. Nevertheless, a recur
rent question about UI is whether income maintenance is the most ap
propriate form of assistance to individuals who have lost jobs in which
they had substantial human capital investments and for whom prospects
of obtaining reemployment using these skills are dim. Critics such as
Kuttner (1985b), for example, argue that the funds used to pay UI
benefits could be better spent on alternative programs designed to speed
up the reemployment of displaced workers. Reemployment programs
discussed by Kuttner include retraining courses and wage subsidies in
tended to create new job opportunities.
At the federal level, the specific adjustment problems of displaced
workers have been recognized in the Trade Adjustment Assistance pro
gram created in 1962 and 20 years later in the passage in 1982 of Title
HI of the Job Training Partnership Act. The reemployment programs
funded by these laws are summarized in useful reports provided by the
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U.S. Department of Labor (1986) and the Office of Technology Assess
ment (1986). More recently, President Reagan proposed, in the fall of
1987, a comprehensive program authorizing $980 million to be spent
in retraining workers displaced by plant closings or technological change.
This proposal became law in August 1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act.
At the state level also, a variety of reemployment initiatives are cur
rently in operation in virtually every state. These programs are generally
funded by state general tax revenues, but three states California,
Delaware, and Washington are financing their initiatives by special
earmarked payroll taxes. 2 Under the Reagan administration, the evolving
philosophy of new federalism has made the states the key intergovern
mental actor in the areas of education, economic development, welfare,
and employment and training. But despite the ingenuity, diversity, and
substantial investment of resources in displaced worker programs, no
comprehensive study of proposed and ongoing state initiatives is available
at present. The purpose of this monograph is to provide a description
and evaluation of state initiatives dealing with the problem of worker
displacement. These initiatives include the provision of programs to re
tain jobs and encourage economic development, as well as reemploy
ment assistance provided directly to workers in the form of retraining
programs and job search workshops. The focus is on newer, more in
novative state initiatives.
This chapter continues with an overview of some of the policy issues
relating to worker displacement. Considered, in particular, are the ques
tions of the incidence of displacement and whether government should
be expected to provide displaced workers with special assistance (beyond
or in place of UI). This section is followed by the introduction of half
a dozen important questions which the monograph attempts to answer.
The issue of how the various initiatives described in the study are to
be evaluated is next considered. The chapter concludes with a brief
description of how the remainder of the monograph is organized.
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Displaced Workers: How Many and Should They
Receive Special Assistance?

The Magnitude of the Problem
While it is fairly easy to describe in general terms how displaced
workers differ from other unemployed workers, it is more difficult to
pin down these distinctions with enough precision to permit an accurate
quantitative estimate of the displaced worker population. Examples of
the kinds of questions that must be answered in attempting to measure
the number of displaced workers include the following:
1. How long must an unemployed worker have held the previous job
to be counted as a displaced worker?
2. Can length of unemployment, UI eligibility, or even exhaustion
of UI benefits be used as a criterion to distinguish displaced workers
from other unemployed workers?
3. Must laid-off workers suffer a sizable decrease in wages upon
reemployment to be counted as displaced?
4. Can displaced workers be distinguished from other laid-off workers
by the reason for their layoff, or perhaps by whether the industry from
which they were laid off is declining or particularly sensitive to increased
foreign competition?
Since the answers to these and other questions can and do differ among
analysts, it is to be expected that estimates of the displaced worker
population will vary. This is indeed the case. But while there is no con
sensus in the literature on the number of displaced workers, there is
agreement that the best source of data on displaced workers is the
Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) first conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics as a supplement to the January 1984 Current Population Survey.
A second DWS data set was made available to researchers in 1986.
Both data sets are retrospective five-year surveys.
Flaim and Sehgal (1985) provide a benchmark analysis of 1984 DWS
data. As described in their article, the DWS identifies a total of 13.9
million workers 20 years of age and older as being separated from their
jobs over the January 1979 to January 1984 period. The data distinguish
the following reasons for a job separation: (1) plant or company closed
down or moved, (2) slack work, (3) position or shift abolished, and
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(4) seasonal causes or other miscellaneous reasons not easily classified.
Omitting workers on layoff for the fourth of these reasons, the estimated
population of displaced workers drops to 11.5 million. Of these workers,
Flaim and Sehgal note that a large proportion had been employed on
their jobs for a relatively short time before they were laid off. Using
three years of tenure as the cutoff point to distinguish displaced from
other laid-off workers, the population of displaced workers falls to 5.1
million. It is worth noting that the number of displaced workers is quite
sensitive to the specified years of tenure. A more liberal cutoff of two
years would raise the count to 6.9 million, while a five-year cutoff would
lower the estimate of displaced workers to 3.2 million.
Focusing on the Flaim-Sehgal estimate of 5.1 million displaced
workers, table 1.1 identifies a number of the characteristics of these
individuals. Displaced workers are seen to be primarily prime-age males
who lost blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, especially durable goods
manufacturing. Almost half of the 5.1 million reported that they lost
their jobs because their plant or business closed or moved. An interesting
finding is the number of workers who reported that they were not caught
by surprise when they received notice of layoff. About 56 percent of
all displaced workers indicated that they had received advance notice
of their dismissal, or that they had expected it. Nevertheless, only about
11 percent of these workers left their employer before their job ended.
Table 1.1 also shows that more than two-thirds of the displaced
workers drew UI benefits sometime during the five-year period covered
by the survey, and that nearly half of the UI recipients were unemployed
long enough to have exhausted their eligibility for benefits. Podgursky
and Swaim (1987c) perform an econometric analysis of the duration
of joblessness of DWS respondents displaced from full-time
nonagricultural jobs between 1979 and 1981. Their results indicate that
although nearly half of these workers found jobs within 14 weeks of
displacement, there is a high risk that a displaced worker will experience
a protracted period of joblessness. Especially noteworthy is their estimate
that the probability an average male blue-collar worker displaced from
his job would be jobless for more than one year exceeds 0.3.

Introduction
Table 1.1
Summary Information on Displaced Workers
January 1979-January 1984
Number8
(thousands)
Total
Age
20-24 years
25-54 years
55-64 years
65 years and older
Sex
Men
Women
Occupation of lost job
Blue-collar
Other occupations
Industry of lost job
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Other industries
Reason for job loss
Plant closed or company closed
down or moved
Slack work
Position or shift abolished
Notification of dismissal
Received advance notice or
expected layoff
Left before job ended
Did not leave before job ended
Did not receive advance notice
or expect layoff
Received UI benefits
Exhausted benefits

Percent

5,091
342
3,809
748
191

6.7
74.8
14.7
3.8

3,328
1,763

65.4
34.6

2,865
2,208

56.5
43.5

2,514
1,686
828
2,577

49.4
67.1
32.9
50.6

2,492
1,970
629

48.9
38.7
12.4

2,870
318
2,532

56.4
11.2
88.8

2,221
3,497
1,670

43.6
68.7
47.8
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Number8
(thousands)

Percent

3,058
2,266
357
218
1,299
733

60.1
79.7
12.6
7.7
25.5
14.4

Earnings relative to earnings
on lost jobc
20% or more below
Below, but within 20%
Equal or above, but within 20%
20% or more

621
320
571
533

30.4
15.7
27.9
26.0

Loss of group health coverage*1
Employed
Unemployed
Not in labor force

573
612
196

23.4
59.0
40.3

End-period employment status
Employedb
Full-time
Part-time
Self-employed
Unemployed
Not in labor force

SOURCE: Flaim and Sehgal (1985).
a. Subtotals may not sum to total.
b. Subtotals refer only to respondents who worked full-time in their lost job.
c. Includes only displaced full-time workers reemployed in full-time wage and salary jobs
(N=2,045).
d. Percentages calculated in relation to number of respondents in each category who were covered
by group health insurance on their lost job.

What was the labor market status of displaced workers at the end
of the survey period? Table 1.1 indicates that 60 percent were
reemployed as of January 1984, while about 26 percent were still
unemployed and 14 percent had dropped out of the labor force (mainly
into retirement). Focusing on the 3.1 million workers who were
reemployed, about 2.8 million were full-time employees in their
predisplacement jobs. Of these, about 80 percent were again employed
full time at the end of the survey period, while 12 percent were holding
part-time jobs and 8 percent were found in other types of employment
(mainly self-employment).
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Flaim and Sehgal point out that there are important differences by
age, sex, and race in the proportions of displaced workers reemployed.
In general, the younger the workers, the more likely they were to have
obtained new jobs. Furthermore, displaced women were less likely than
displaced men to have returned to work and were far more likely to
have left the labor force. Finally, the proportions of black and Hispanic
displaced workers reemployed (41.8 percent and 52.2 percent, respec
tively) were considerably lower than the proportion of whites (62.6
percent).
Another key finding concerns the number of displaced workers who
moved to a new occupation or industry to obtain reemployment (not
shown in table 1.1). Flaim and Sehgal (1985:10) point out, for exam
ple, that of the 980,000 reemployed workers who had lost jobs in durable
goods manufacturing, only about 40 percent obtained reemployment
in the same industry. Similarly, only about 35 percent of 493,000 workers
were reemployed in nondurable goods manufacturing. Despite this
evidence of substantial interindustry mobility, it is interesting to note
that only a small minority of the 5.1 million displaced workers (680,000
individuals) moved to a different city or county to look for work or
to take a new job.
The predisplacement and postdisplacement comparison of weekly earn
ings shown in table 1.1 provides additional information on the economic
well-being of displaced workers who obtained new jobs by the end of
the survey period. The table indicates considerable dispersion in relative
earnings for workers reemployed in full-time wage and salary jobs, with
30 percent of workers suffering an earnings loss of 20 percent or more
and another 26 percent of workers enjoying an increase in earnings in
excess of 20 percent. In total, about 54 percent of reemployed workers
landed on their feet in the sense that their new earnings equalled or ex
ceeded their old earnings. This percentage is likely to be on the high
side, however, since predisplacement earnings are not adjusted for the
effects of inflation and increased labor productivity to make them com
parable to postdisplacement earnings. It is almost a certainty, in addi
tion, that displaced full-time workers who are reemployed in part-time
jobs will suffer a sizable drop in earnings. Considering the situation
of reemployed part-time as well as full-time workers, it appears
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reasonable to conclude that about one-half of the displaced workers
reemployed in January 1984 were earning less than in their former jobs. 3
Also worth noting is the finding that nearly one-quarter of reemployed
workers failed to regain the group health insurance coverage they en
joyed on their lost job.
During the fall of 1986, a second survey of displaced workers was
released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As described by Horvath
(1987), use of the Flaim-Sehgal criteria for distinguishing displaced
workers from other laid-off workers resulted in exactly the same count
of 5.1 million displaced individuals for the January 1981 to January
1986 period as for the 1979-84 period. Most of the conclusions drawn
for the earlier period also hold for 1981-86. In particular, about half
of the displaced workers had lost jobs in manufacturing, mostly in
durable goods manufacturing; and about 55 percent reported that the
reason for their job loss was a plant closing or business failure. As in
the earlier period, the largest concentration of displaced workers was
found in the heavily industrialized states of the Upper Midwest. More
than half of those reemployed changed their broadly defined occupation.
The cyclical upswing in the economy during 1984-86 resulted in a
higher reemployment rate of about 67 percent in 1986 compared to 60
percent in 1984, and a lower unemployment rate of 18 percent as com
pared to 26 percent in the earlier year. Nevertheless, the 1986 DWS
indicates that there was little improvement in the proportion of displac
ed workers who were obliged to take a pay cut upon reemployment.
For 1984, table 1.1 indicates that 46.1 percent of individuals working
full time in both their predisplacement and postdisplacement jobs suf
fered a loss in earnings. The same statistic for 1986 is 44.1 percent.
Over both five-year periods, about 30 percent of those reemployed in
full-time wage and salary jobs suffered pay cuts of 20 percent or more.
Levels of reemployment among older workers were still relatively low;
in addition, reemployment rates for women, blacks, and Hispanics con
tinued to fall considerably short of those for white males.

Should Displaced Workers Receive Special Assistance?
The very real possibility of large expected losses when a displaced
worker suffers an extended period of unemployment or cannot find a
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new job offering a wage comparable to that earned earlier raises the
issue of whether special assistance should be provided these individuals.
The literature focuses on two reasons to explain why a displaced worker
may suffer a substantial economic loss: 4
1. The worker received an economic rent (i.e., a wage that is higher
than his or her best alternative wage) on the last job. An example is
the situation facing a worker displaced from a unionized job whose subse
quent job is nonunion.
2. The worker invested in specific training on the last job in the ex
pectation of a longer payout period than in fact occurred.
Concerning the first, there appears to be little justification for pro
viding special assistance to workers who previously received aboveequilibrium wages because they were sheltered from competition from
other workers. The one argument supporting assistance in this case is
that compensation may be needed to buy off politically powerful in
terests that would otherwise block socially desirable policies. A leading
example of such a compensation scheme is the creation of the Trade
Adjustment Assistance program in 1962 as a quid pro quo to organized
labor in exchange for its acquiescence to trade liberalization (see Baldwin
1987).
The more important justification for special assistance to displaced
workers is as a response to the loss of firm-specific human capital. Such
specific skills include knowledge about the firm©s operating procedures,
the specialized products it produces, and its production and marketing
arrangements. Although lost specific human capital cannot be replac
ed, assistance can still be justified in terms of both equity and economic
efficiency. The equity explanation relates to the argument just made
for compensating workers who have lost jobs which provided economic
rents. The point is that since the nation as a whole gains from socially
desirable policies such as free trade and the introduction of labor-saving
technology, it is reasonable to extend assistance to those groups that
bear the brunt of the adjustment costs associated with maintaining a
dynamic, generally open domestic economy. Writing in The Wall Street
Journal, Bhagwati (1988) argues that
[O]pen markets cannot be sustained politically without in
stitutions to soften the social impact of dramatic changes
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resulting from foreign trade and investments. If better in
tegration into the world economy means that large corpora
tions can leave small communities and that changes in com
petition can result in social-adjustment problems, political
prudence if not humanity requires that we help American
workers cope with the consequences. . . . This is part of the
grease that must be provided to let the wheel of capitalist
fortune operate.
As noted in this quotation and emphasized by other authors including
Bluestone and Harrison (1982, chap. 3), groups affected by social ad
justment problems include not only displaced workers and their im
mediate families, but also the communities in which they reside.
The efficiency argument is that if losses due to displacement are uncompensated, risk-averse workers and their employers will be discourag
ed from investing in all forms of firm-specific human capital. The result
of suboptimal investment in specific training is, in turn, a social loss
due to an inefficient organization of production.
Hamermesh, Cordes, and Goldfarb (1987) make the further point that
only workers whose loss of returns to specific training was unanticipated
should receive special assistance. As they note, demand fluctuations
occur frequently enough in some industries that periodic layoffs are a
predictable aspect of employment. Hence job losses are likely to be an
ticipated by workers and compensated through the market in the form
of a wage premium for the higher risk of a capital loss. Mass layoffs
and plant closures, in contrast, are less frequent and thus less predic
table. In the absence of predictability, job losses are more likely to be
unanticipated, and workers at risk are less likely to receive compensa
tion through the market.
The discussion of table 1.1 and the results of the second DWS in
dicate that job losses associated with plant closings and company reloca
tions are indeed an important source of displacement, and that the move
ment between occupations and industries required to locate new jobs
may well entail sizable losses of specific training. Econometric investiga
tions of 1984 DWS data by Addison and Portugal (1987a), Madden
(1988), and Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) provide evidence that a
change in industry, in particular, entails dramatic decreases in earn-
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ings. Since union coverage is not reported in the DWS, however, it
is difficult to distinguish whether the decrease in earnings associated
with interindustry mobility represents loss of economic rents or loss
of returns to specific human capital. Podgursky and Swaim deal with
this data problem by merging information on industry unionization rates
into their DWS sample. Controlling for industry unionization rates on
the former job, the authors report for blue-collar males reemployed full
time that a change in three-digit industry depresses earnings by 20 per
cent relative to the case in which a comparable displaced worker is
reemployed in the same industry. A second commonly used measure
of specific training length of tenure on the predisplacement job is
also found to significantly increase earnings losses for blue-collar males.
Further evidence which helps to distinguish between the economic
rent and specific human capital explanations is provided in an ingenious
paper by Hamermesh (1987). Rather than comparing predisplacement
and postdisplacement earnings, he uses the slope of estimated wagetenure profiles to measure the extent to which plant closings are an
ticipated by workers. If the profile flattens out as the date of job loss
approaches, the inference is that informed workers are responding to
the decrease in expected returns by cutting back their investment in
specific training.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data, Hamermesh©s em
pirical results indicate that (1) displacement is not typically anticipated
by workers and (2) earnings losses associated with unanticipated layoffs
are quite large. Under reasonable assumptions about the real interest
rate and the rate of depreciation of firm-specific human capital, he
estimates that the present value of a worker©s share of the lost returns
on investments in firm-specific training is around $7,000 (in 1980
dollars). To this estimate must also be added the value of the often
substantial periods of time displaced workers spend unemployed; the
value of lost occupation- and industry-specific training; and the value
of lost fringe benefits, particularly losses of unvested pension benefits
and group health insurance coverage.
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Major Questions to be Answered
While a case can and is being made that displaced workers are a
population group deserving of special government assistance, several
very practical issues immediately arise. What form should this assistance
take? How should displaced worker programs be designed and put into
place? Are there side effects of the programs which are unduly costly?
And how should these programs be funded?
The perspective taken in this study is that state programs to assist
displaced workers can be viewed as quasi-independent experiments
whose designs and outcomes potentially offer a wealth of useful infor
mation to policymakers and labor market analysts. As will be describ
ed in detail, displaced worker programs range from conventional retrain
ing and job search assistance programs to such unconventional initiatives
as reemployment bonuses and unemployed entrepreneur programs. Con
troversial issues that arise in discussing the operation of these programs
include "creaming" in the selection of program participants, the wisdom
of tailoring programs to the specifications of particular employers, and
the requirement that employers provide advance notice of plant clos
ings and mass layoffs.
In formulating public policy, however, it is important to move beyond
describing what has been tried to distilling what can be learned about
how to best cope with the problems faced by displaced workers. Thus
this study attempts to provide answers to the following major questions:
1. How do displaced workers differ from other unemployed workers?
2. Which forms of adjustment assistance "work" for displaced
workers?
3. How should particular adjustment assistance services be provided?
4. What are the best time and place to provide assistance?
5. Is there a role for initiatives designed to keep existing plants open?
6. How should reemployment assistance to displaced workers be
funded?
Evaluation Framework
An evaluation framework is clearly required to answer these and other
related questions. Taking account of the twin objectives of raising
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postdisplacement wages and reducing the length of unnecessary delays
in the reemployment process, the central policy question that must be
dealt with in program evaluation is whether the stream of earnings
available to program graduates is enough greater than their earnings
stream would have been in the absence of the program to justify its
cost. Ideally, as emphasized by Burtless and Orr (1986), evidence on
this question would be obtained from a classical experiment in which
the earnings of graduates are compared to the earnings of a control group,
and assignment to both groups is made randomly. Random assignment
is important because its absence is quite likely to mean that estimates
of net program effects will be biased. (The net effect of a program is
its effect on an outcome variable net of the change in the outcome variable
that would have occurred in the program©s absence.) For example, in
dividuals who choose and are chosen to participate in a training pro
gram may be more highly motivated and job-ready than nonparticipants.
If this is the case, a positive bias would be imparted to the estimated
net program effect because the same unobservable characteristics that
led to program participation also led to higher earnings. In the absence
of a controlled experiment with random assignment, the nonexperimental
approach to program evaluation focuses on differences in outcomes be
tween program participants and an externally selected comparison group,
and attempts to adjust statistically for the inherent differences between
the two groups. 5
Although controlled experiments with random assignment have been
carried out for a few of the initiatives discussed in this study, informa
tion on individual program participants that would allow program evalua
tion of either the experimental or nonexperimental variety is not available
for most state-funded initiatives. State legislators have generally not
opted to devote scarce resources to funding the data collection effort
required to conduct quantitative program evaluation. Rather, the data
available for individual state programs typically are, at best, such sum
mary statistics as placement rates, average postprogram earnings, and
average cost per placement. In the absence of a control group, these
summary statistics are of limited usefulness. With respect to postprogram
placement, for example, the real issue is not the absolute level of the
placement rate of program graduates but rather the placement rate for
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graduates as compared to the rate for a control group whose members
did not have access to the program.
Given the number and variety of existing state programs and pilot proj
ects, a three-level evaluation framework involving a mix of available
quantitative and qualitative evidence is proposed. For any particular
initiative, the first level is a consideration of existing quantitative evidence
obtained using data on individual program participants and a control
group of nonparticipants. A key example of an initiative for which ex
perimental results are available is the reemployment bonus. The Illinois
UI experiment and the New Jersey UI reemployment demonstration proj
ect examine the effectiveness of cash bonuses in speeding up the
reemployment process.
If data allowing neither an experimental nor a nonexperimental ap
proach to program evaluation are available (which is usually the case),
the next level of analysis involves the use of quantitative evidence on
similar kinds of programs provided by demonstration projects or pilot
studies. Important sources of this type of evidence are federally-funded
studies such as the Downriver project carried out over the 1980-83 period
and the six-site Dislocated Worker Demonstration project conducted
between October 1982 and September 1983.
If neither of the first two levels of the evaluation strategy can be ap
plied, the final level is a type of qualitative analysis termed "process
analysis." Rather than concentrating on program outcomes, process
analysis focuses on how the program is operating as evaluated by staff
members, participants, and outside observers. Some of the concerns
addressed by this level of analysis include program design and implemen
tation, selection of program participants and the allocation of services
across participants, and occurrence of fundamental changes in the direc
tion and funding of the program during its existence.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 focuses on state initiatives to upgrade the vocational skills
of displaced workers through classroom and on-the-job training pro
grams. Several issues relating to training programs are considered, and
three state-funded programs are examined in detail. Also briefly discuss-
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ed in this chapter are the efforts of the federal government over the
past 25 years to improve the reemployment prospects of displaced
workers.
In addition to classroom and on-the-job training, a third traditional
type of assistance to displaced workers is designed to enhance job search
skills. Chapter 3 describes the component services of a broadly defin
ed job search assistance program and discusses the results from several
demonstration projects that measure the net impact of this type of
assistance. Also considered are the reemployment bonus experiments
and two programs designed to test the effectiveness of more closely
monitoring the search activity of UI claimants.
In chapter 4 the discussion shifts from different types of adjustment
assistance initiatives to a consideration of the timing and location of
program intervention. Specifically examined are (1) state laws requir
ing advance notification of planned plant closures or mass layoffs, (2) the
new federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, and
(3) state-level programs that deliver reemployment services on-site to
displaced workers. A focal point of the discussion of on-site programs
is the highly regarded Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service (LAS)
program.
Chapter 5 includes a consideration of a number of other initiatives
not yet discussed. These include state programs providing assistance
to employee groups to save jobs by purchasing facilities that might other
wise close, enterprise zone proposals, and British and French initiatives
to assist individual unemployed workers to start up their own small
businesses. Also discussed in this chapter are several other initiatives
which are part of the sweeping displaced worker program established
by Massachusetts© Mature Industries Act.
Chapter 6 pulls together the results of the study by providing answers
to the six key policy questions posed earlier. The chapter concludes
with a consideration of what appears to be the best mix of programs
to meet the needs of displaced workers.
NOTES
1. Using data for the 1968-81 period from the University of Michigan©s Panel Study
of Income Dynamics, Hamermesh finds that the rate of displacement (where displaced
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workers are defined as those whose plants closed) showed a strong secular increase
that is independent of the business cycle. Summers examines the rise in what he terms
the "normal" unemployment rate over the past 20 years. He concludes that most of
the additional unemployment is concentrated among mature men, job losers, and the
long-term unemployed. The increased share of married women and young people in
the labor force is found to have had essentially no effect.
2. Because UI trust funds cannot be used to pay for programs other than income
maintenance, these state initiatives must be funded by earmarked payroll taxes or general
state revenues. The funding of the California, Delaware, and Washington programs
can be viewed as a diversion of UI tax revenues, however, since employers in these
states had their regular UI payroll tax rates decreased at the same time that the ear
marked payroll taxes were levied.
3. Flaim and Sehgal (1985:11) also emphasize that those displaced from high-wage
industries are most likely to suffer a decrease in earnings upon reemployment. Among
the 980,000 workers displaced from durable goods manufacturing, for example, me
dian weekly earnings dropped by 21 percent from $344 to $273 in the jobs held in
January 1984.
4. Madden (1987) considers a third explanation emphasizing that displaced workers
encounter greater discrimination (or less favoritism) in the general labor market than
on the last job. Using 1984 DWS data, she presents evidence indicating that women
suffer a greater loss from displacement than men because sex discrimination in the
labor market limits the job alternatives available to women.
5. An important controversy in the literature concerns the value of the nonexperimental
approach to program evaluation. LaLonde (1986) and Fraker and Maynard (1987) pro
vide evidence showing that nonexperimental strategies involving the selection of com
parison groups from alternative data sources and the application of available econometric
techniques fail to replicate experimentally generated results obtained by comparing the
earnings of randomly assigned treatment and control group members. They therefore
conclude that randomized experiments are necessary to reliably determine program
effects. On the other hand, Heckman, Hotz, and Dabos (1987) argue that while in prin
ciple randomized experiments represent the most desirable approach to program evalua
tion, the actual implementation of experiments typically creates new forms of sample
selection that require the application of nonexperimental econometric procedures for
making statistical adjustments.

2
Vocational Training Programs

A traditional public policy remedy to prevent long-term unemploy
ment is retraining either classroom training programs or on-the-job
training (OJT). The basic presumption of classroom training is that major
groups of displaced workers lack the transferable skills that would per
mit them to become reemployed at comparable wages in their local labor
markets. On the other hand, OJT is appropriate for displaced workers
who possess the necessary transferable skills and aptitudes to adapt to
the requirements of new jobs, but who lack firm-specific job skills.
For over 25 years, the federal government has offered vocational train
ing programs to assist the unemployed to return to work. This chapter
begins with a brief overview of federal job training programs, emphasiz
ing those programs intended to provide assistance to displaced workers.
Drawing on this background information, the next section discusses some
of the difficult issues that arise in the provision of retraining assistance.
Then, the operation of three state-funded retraining initiatives is ex
amined in the context of these issues. The three state initiatives are the
California Employment Training Panel, the Minnesota Employment and
Economic Development program, and the Illinois Prairie State 2000
Authority.
A key policy issue relating to retraining programs is the question of
whether or not they "work." Since the three state programs examined
in this chapter were not designed with program evaluation in mind, the
discussion draws mainly on the type of qualitative analysis described
in chapter 1 as process analysis. Additional quantitative evidence on
the effectiveness of retraining displaced workers is, however, available
from a handful of federally funded demonstration projects. The con
cluding section of this chapter summarizes the results of the process
analyses of the state programs considered and introduces some of the
19
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main findings obtained from relevant demonstration projects. As most
of these demonstrations involve a comparison of the net impacts of
classroom training, OJT, and job search assistance programs, the discus
sion of demonstration project results carries over into the next chapter,
which deals with job search assistance.

Federally-Funded Programs
The federal government©s first comprehensive attempt to assist displac
ed workers was the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA).
Passed in 1962, MDTA represented the response of Congress to a ris
ing national unemployment rate coupled with a growing concern over
the effects of automation and technology on the employment options
of mid-career adult workers. Originally funded at $100 million per year,
the objective of the program was the retraining of unemployed individuals
whose skills had been made obsolete by technological advancement.
Retraining programs took the form of classroom training, OJT, and
remedial education. By the mid-1960s, an improved labor market and
lessened concern over automation led to a shift in interest and funding
away from the employment problems of displaced workers and toward
the employability of disadvantaged young people and welfare recipients.
MDTA©s emphasis on job training continued throughout the remainder
of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, however.
In 1973, Congress created the Comprehensive Employment and Train
ing Act (GETA), which consolidated nine earlier programs including
MDTA. Two distinct types of programs were funded under CETA. Title
I provided disadvantaged workers a program mix including classroom
training, OJT, and "work experience" (subsidized public sector jobs
emphasizing work habits and skill development). In contrast, Titles II
and VI offered public service employment (PSE) programs to workers
who had recently lost jobs in high-unemployment geographic areas. Tide
n was intended to serve the structurally unemployed, while Title VI
was strictly a countercyclical job creation program. As unemployment
rose during the 1970s, CETA expenditures shifted away from Title I
training programs toward the provision of PSE jobs primarily funded
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under Title VI. PSE programs typically provided little or no formal
training. Amendments to the CETA legislation in the late 1970s and
early 1980s reduced PSE expenditures and finally eliminated PSE fun
ding entirely.
Two other features of CETA are worth noting. First, the responsibility
for running training programs was shifted from the federal government
to local government units called "prime sponsors." Second, the U.S.
Department of Labor (USDOL) funded, for the first time, the develop
ment of a longitudinal data base specifically designed for program evalua
tion. Baraow (1987) provides a useful survey of results of the major
CETA evaluation studies.
In addition to MDTA, the other major federal program specifically
intended to assist displaced workers was the Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) program. Also created in 1962, the objective of TAA was to
provide income support and retraining to workers who lost jobs in in
dustries adversely affected by foreign imports. For the first 12 years
of the program, only about 35,000 workers received TAA assistance.
This low rate of program participation reflected the stringent require
ment that affected workers and firms demonstrate that trade liberaliza
tion led to increased imports which, in turn, were the major cause of
reduced domestic sales and lost jobs. Most TAA participants were pro
vided income maintenance support, with only about 10 percent receiv
ing training, placement, or relocation assistance.
In 1974, Congress modified TAA requirements, making eligibility
easier and providing a generous income support package. TAA sup
port payments were allowed to supplement state UI payments during
the period of UI eligibility (typically 26 weeks), raising them to a level
of 70 percent of the previous weekly wage. In addition, benefits at that
level were allowed to continue for an additional 26 weeks. If the worker
was in a retraining program when the one-year period ended, moreover,
TAA support could be continued for up to 26 more weeks. Thus TAA
provided a maximum of 18 months of income support. With easier
eligibility and improved benefits, TAA expenditures and the number
of workers served increased rapidly over the next several years, peak
ing at $1.6 billion and 532,000 workers, respectively, in fiscal year
1980. Retraining, however, continued to receive relatively little attention.
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New legislation passed in 1981 reversed the more liberal TAA re
quirements enacted seven years earlier. Eligibility was tightened, and
income support was cut back to the level of UI payments (typically 50
percent of the previous weekly wage), with TAA payments allowed to
begin only after exhaustion of UI eligibility. Under the new regulations,
dollar outlays and number of recipients dropped substantially. Authoriza
tion for TAA lapsed in 1985, but legislation signed by President Reagan
in April 1986 extended the program to the end of fiscal year 1991. The
1986 legislation includes a requirement that receipt of allowances is
conditional on participation in a job search program, and that workers
are to be encouraged, but not required, to enter a job training program.
The CETA program expired in 1982 with the economy in the trough
of the deepest recession since the 1930s. Once again, the displacement
of experienced adult workers became an important national issue. Rather
than renewing CETA with its emphasis on public service employment,
Congress enacted a broad new program the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) intended to train and place workers in private sector jobs. l
The new law has three major titles. Title II provides training to disadvantaged youth and adults and summer jobs to disadvantaged youth.
Tide ffl funds training and other services for displaced workers. Under
these two titles, federal dollars are allocated to the states, and the states
are responsible for program design and implementation. 2 Finally, Ti
tle IV authorizes programs that are directly administered by the USDOL.
These include training programs for native Americans, seasonal and
migrant workers, and veterans. Federal appropriations from July 1984
to June 1985 for Titles II, HI, and IV were, respectively, $2.7 billion,
$221 million, and $800 million. By way of contrast, the budget for CETA
in its peak year exceeded $9 billion.
Titles H and m of JTPA differ from CETA and earlier federal pro
grams in several important respects:
1. JTPA puts strict limits on the share of funds that can be used to
provide income maintenance for trainees. As noted, the TAA program
provided very liberal income maintenance allowances to eligible
unemployed workers. Similarly, the Office of Technology Assessment
(1986:171) mentions that CETA was criticized for providing training
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allowances that were higher than the wages trainees could earn in paid
employment.
2. JTPA makes the direction of training programs the responsibility
of state governors. Under Title n, federal funding to the states is
reallocated by the governors to local units called "service delivery
areas." With respect to Title HI, governors more often have kept con
trol over JTPA expenditures by designating an existing state agency
to deliver services statewide or by appointing a state official to choose
contract operators through competitive bidding. State control of JTPA
programs allows for the possibility of substantial variation in the range
and mix of services provided in response to interstate differences in
economic conditions and the specific needs of the displaced worker
population. Under CETA, in contrast, local prime sponsors reported
directly to the USDOL.
One other significant organizational difference from earlier programs
is that JTPA gives the business community, in the form of Private In
dustry Councils, an important share of the responsibility for designing
and administering local programs. Each service delivery area is required
to appoint a Private Industry Council.
3. JTPA requires each governor to issue performance standards for
evaluating job training programs in the state. These performance stan
dards may include financial awards to programs that exceed placement
and participant cost criteria and sanctions against programs that fail to
meet the standards.
Congress slashed the fiscal 1986 budget for the Title m of JTPA to
about $96 million from $223 million in fiscal 1985. Title ffl funding
for fiscal 1987 then rebounded to about $200 million. For fiscal 1988,
President Reagan proposed a comprehensive program that would com
bine Title ffl with other dislocated worker programs including TAA.
Under the new program, funding to provide displaced workers with
retraining, job search assistance, and other forms of adjustment aid would
nearly triple to $980 million from $344 million in fiscal year 1987. The
Reagan proposal follows closely the recommendations of the Secretary
of Labor©s Task Force report (1986). As mentioned in chapter 1, the
new program is now law as part of the Omnibus Trade and Com
petitiveness Act of 1988.
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Issues in Providing Retraining Assistance
The 25 years of experience with federally-funded training programs
has raised a number of issues to be considered in evaluating state-level
initiatives. This section explores several of these issues before proceeding
to a description of particular state programs.
What Is the Appropriate Mix of Services
for Displaced Workers?
Although displaced workers are by definition experienced adult
workers, their reemployment assistance needs are likely to vary wide
ly, reflecting differences in transferable skills and aptitudes and in local
labor market conditions. Critics of JTPA suggest that Title in perfor
mance standards and the influence of the business community through
Private Industry Councils may skew the mix of services offered to
displaced workers. In particular, Title HI program planners may pay
too much attention to short-term placement rates and per participant
program costs and too little attention to the longer-term objective of
increasing participants© human capital.
To get a feel for the placement rates and per participant costs associated
with various services, table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the six
sites of the national Dislocated Worker Demonstration project. This
federally-funded project was specifically intended to assess the effec
tiveness of alternative approaches to reemploying displaced workers.
Across the six sites, over 10,000 workers enrolled in classroom train
ing, OJT, and job search assistance programs. Corson, Maynard, and
Wichita (1984:17) summarize the cost figures shown in the table, noting
that for planning purposes average cost per participant ranges from about
$400 to $1,000 for job search assistance, between $1,000 and $2,400
for OJT, and between $800 and $3,500 for classroom training.
Using the kind of information shown in table 2.1, JTPA critics sug
gest that inexpensive job search assistance will tend to be overemphasized
while classroom vocational training will be underutilized because of
its higher cost and lower immediate impact on placement rates. Similarly,
remedial education programs would also be expected to be underutiliz
ed because of relatively low placement rates. A recent evaluation of

00
1

CQ

C

w

v> «/*

^H" Z

en
g
^ ^ oo

r-.. i/-> vo

i-^ »^ ir
O
t^ ON

&&£

-H ON -H

^7

m >-H m
oo m rt

"7

< < <

"7

^~" ^-" 'CH

•i 1 t

&

i
*J

1-j

T3

°

OH

O

Q.

I

.go

u>
-S
iwaukwa:ee

^3

B

S

i

offei
service

C/3

O

u

ri

w

^

ctf

oo

^

(U

g
£

-35
U«

2

§

"O
•»

S

a

•"
0>

^3
CD
«

||
M

8 ^
'>

J3

Z

53 '«
s
S Z "^ ^

ICE:
Corson, cot
mparable

i

1 ° .i

"8 JS

"9
C

Vocational Training Programs

r«^ Tt TJ-

t^

-H" ri m"

^^ ^^ (/$

OO OO V£)

OO CT\ ^

oo in r-;

^ ^ ^

*H

ea

Z

&s fe^ fev

00

'§

O

M)

i3

.

8

e§ t

O

G

c

^ r^ es
^o t/) S^ r^
gi-,OU

u

1

W

G3

8 •§ 2 1 t
C3

.0 ^3 wj

60

t*~ f>l NO

CN -* m

^ ^ fcS
TJ- oo ^H

r^ r^ 06
rN ^ m

..^ «M.
'~H >n
ON

00

^
^
p ^ r~;

oo

O c4 ^d

C8
^

r^ oo
**! x>

1

^S ^
f^ . .0

1

V
«<» .
0> >*
C 23

1

i
S

ll

^2 ^S ^
•£

1-1

'fV
§J

I

S

OS

i
I

ON
B
tO
1

e
o

I
Ui

L.

0

^
o

ioa

flj

Disloca,te

"8CQ

••js

«**

4)

^!

**

as
•*s

i

J2
13
C

w

O

fi

U
^

8

O W r™\
G3 >—>•—> \J

S

25

26

Vocational Training Programs

JTPA Title in programs by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(1987a:46-47) reports that nearly all participants received sorne^jbrm
of job search assistance, while about 26 percent of participants receiv
ed classroom training. Only 6 percent of participants were provided
remedial training, and such remedial training programs that were
available averaged just two weeks in length. By way of contrast, the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report (1986:179) points out
that a substantial minority of displaced workers 20 percent or more
in some projects are handicapped in finding new jobs because of serious
deficiencies in basic reading and math skills.
While OJT programs tend to be more expensive than job search
assistance, the virtual guarantee of immediate placement may also lead
to an overutilization of OJT. Guaranteed placement occurs because the
subsidy to employers providing training is typically contingent on the
retention of trained workers for a period of 30 to 90 days.
How Are Program Participants to be Selected?
The same pressures on JTPA program planners to achieve high place
ment rates and low costs are also likely to affect their decisions in select
ing trainees. The danger is that displaced workers most likely to be
selected into training programs are those least in need of skill
enhancement a problem commonly known as "creaming." While some
level of basic education and aptitude is necessary for retraining to be
worthwhile, a case can be made that it is displaced workers at the low
end of the skill distribution who should be first in line for access to
retraining programs (see, for example, Blumenthal 1987). The U.S.
General Accounting Office (1987a:39-45) reports that both older and
less educated displaced workers are underrepresented in Title III pro
grams. Using 1984 DWS data, only 8 percent of Title HI enrollees were
found to be 55 years of age or older, as compared to 20 percent of the
displaced worker population. Similarly, 32 percent of all displaced
workers had less than a high school education, whereas only 22 per
cent of Title HI participants fell into this schooling category.
Another issue involving participant selection is income suppport for
trainees. Since JTPA regulations discourage the provision of living
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allowances for trainees, the basic 26 weeks of UI is usually an essen
tial part of the income-support package. The UI constraint has two ef
fects on program operators. First, they are forced to set up worthwhile
training programs that do not exceed the six months of benefits. This
means that classroom training courses may have to be truncated or com
pressed in length to conform to the benefit period. Second, program
operators are under some pressure to select program participants early
in their period of UI eligibility to avoid foreclosing classroom training
as an option to unemployed workers who have no other means of finan
cial support. 3

Forecasting Occupational Demand in Selecting Curricula
With reference to classroom vocational training, one of the most dif
ficult tasks in the retraining process is to accurately forecast the oc
cupational demand for labor so that curricula can be selected which sup
ply marketable skills. Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984:30-38)
provide a detailed discussion of the steps taken in the Downriver
demonstration project to identify growth occupations and develop ap
propriate retraining programs. Most observers, however, question the
usefulness of attempts to forecast occupational skill requirements. The
OTA report (1986:201) notes that in many states good information, even
about current openings in local labor markets, is unavailable.
Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984:16) also remark on this issue,
drawing on the experience gained from the Dislocated Worker
Demonstration project. They note that despite attempts to base course
selection on area labor market data, many successful program graduates
were unable to locate training-related jobs. Similarly, the report of the
National Academy of Sciences© Panel on Technology and Employment
concludes that there is little if any need for additional investment in
forecasting occupational demand (see Cyert and Mowery 1987:142-43).
In support of its conclusion, the Panel points to (1) the flexibility of
the highly decentralized U.S. training system and (2) the low reliabili
ty of existing manpower forecasting models. Concerning the second
point, the Panel notes that current forecasting models are weak
methodologically and provide forecasts of a high degree of uncertainty.
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JTPA©s performance standards requirement allows program planners
to shift to training vendors much of the burden of making sure that
trainees acquire marketable skills. This shifting is accomplished through
performance-based contracts. The initial decision on courses for
classroom training is typically made by project planners with the ap
proval of local Private Industry Councils. Then the training contract
is put out for bids with the proviso that the training vendor must meet
JTPA performance standards. Contracts often include the following types
of performance standards:
1. A 75 percent placement rate for program graduates in full-time
jobs, with all but 10 percent of the jobs being training-related.
2. A starting wage no lower than $4 to $5 per hour.
3. Retention of graduates on the job for at least 30 days.
Typical contracts require that these provisions be met before the train
ing contractor is entitled to receive full payment.
The OTA report (1986:253) notes that reliance on performance-based
contracting in JTPA programs appears to be growing. In a recent OTA
telephone survey described in the report, about half of the states respond
ing indicated that they make use of such contracts in their Title III pro
grams, and 11 states indicated that they use them predominantly.
Should Employers be Paid to Provide Training?
JTPA regulations permit training contractors to be involved in select
ing program participants and shaping curricula. Since contractors may
be and often are private business firms, a creaming-related issue is
whether public funds should be used to pay for training workers whom
employers would have hired and trained anyway at their own expense.
If this form of creaming should occur, the training program simply pro
vides a windfall transfer from taxpayers to employers with no net benefit
for targeted workers.
The employer windfall issue is put into even sharper focus when,
as is often the case, the training contractors are large, profitable firms.
In this situation, Blumenthal (1987) notes that some of JTPA©s harshest
critics label it "welfare for corporations."
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State-Funded Training Programs
The recent USGAO report (1987a:2) points out that through June 1986
JTPA Title HI programs assisted, at most, 7 percent of the estimated
number of eligible displaced workers. This difference between perceived
need and available federally-funded services represents a market niche
that the states are attempting to fill. In his survey of state-funded train
ing programs, Stevens (1986) reports that only six states do not com
mit funds to subsidize state initiatives offering classroom training or OJT.
State programs differ, in general, from comparable JTPA programs
in at least the following two respects:
1. State programs are not exclusively targeted to specific groups such
as displaced or disadvantaged workers. Rather, training is often made
available to currently employed workers in order to avoid layoffs and
plant closures.
2. Training is usually tailored to the needs of individual employers.
This means that state training initiatives are viewed more as a tool for
economic development than as an investment in human capital. That
is, training programs have the demand-side objective of creating jobs
as well as the traditional supply-side objective of raising the level of
workers© skills to enable them to qualify for existing jobs.
Rather than attempting to provide a survey of all state-funded train
ing programs along the lines of that furnished by Stevens (1986), this
section focuses on the programs provided by three states. California©s
innovative program is selected because it is the largest and undoubted
ly the best known state initiative. Even though it is not explicitly designed
to upgrade workers© skills, Minnesota©s program is considered next
because it offers an interesting contrast to California in terms of both
the type of subsidy and the characteristics of the population served. Final
ly, the training programs provided by Illinois are examined for three
reasons. The first is the comprehensive nature of the state©s approach
to retraining, and the second is the use made of the state©s existing educa
tional infrastructure. Third, Illinois© Prairie State 2000 Authority is an
interesting example of the recent emphasis of many industrial states on
retaining rather than creating jobs.
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California©s Employment Training Panel (ETP)4
Begun in January 1983, California©s ETP involves funding of $55
million per year to be used for retraining the following categories of
workers:
1. Those who are unemployed and collecting UI benefits.
2. Former UI recipients who exhausted their UI eligibility within the
past 12 months and are still unemployed.
3. Those who are currently employed but are likely to be laid off
and claim UI benefits.
To qualify workers for retraining while still employed, employers must
certify that in the absence of retraining, employees will be laid off and
replaced by other workers who already possess the necessary skills.
The explicit objective of the Panel is to provide access to retraining
for experienced workers who have been or are likely to be displaced
from their jobs. In meeting this objective, one of the Panel©s statutory
responsibilities is to minimize the cost of UI by putting current reci
pients and exhaustees back to work and by preventing unemployment
through retraining before workers are laid off. A second statutory respon
sibility is to foster economic development by helping to provide Califor
nia employers with a skilled workforce.
Selection of program participants, curricula, and providers. To
understand ETP©s approach to retraining, it is essential to recognize
at the outset that the program is almost entirely employer-driven. Train
ing projects are typically initiated by a telephone call from an employer
to one of ETP©s regional offices. There are no application forms to fill
out. A meeting usually follows in which representatives of the com
pany and Panel staff members discuss an outline of the retraining proj
ect. The project will not be approved unless a specific employer has
established a need for the program.
Retraining programs funded by ETP may be classroom training or
OJT; 5 and the provider of the program may be either the employer re
questing the training or an independent training institution such as a
public or private school, a joint labor-management apprenticeship com
mittee, or an employer association. Regardless of the provider, the
employer selects trainees according to its own specifications (subject
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to the eligibility conditions listed above). Similarly, the employer sets
the standards for successful program completion, and it must approve
the training curricula if an outside training agency is used. In return
for this discretion in all aspects of the retraining process, participating
employers must make a good-faith commitment to hire or retain pro
gram graduates.
Following a meeting with the interested employer, ETP staff members
develop an outline of the project which is submitted to the seven-member
Panel for review. Representatives of the employer and the training pro
vider (if the employer does not provide the training) appear at that
meeting to explain the project. Once the outline is approved, the staff
prepares a formal agreement for the Panel©s approval at its next meeting.
The formal agreement includes a negotiated fixed fee per trainee, and
all contracting is done directly with employers or training agencies. 6
The Panel takes pride in noting that its staff, not the employer, does
the paperwork, and that when speed is important the project outline
and a formal agreement can be approved within a time period as short
as one month.
Performance-based contracting. The previous section described the
use of performance-based contracts in JTPA Title in programs, and
noted that about half of the states enter into such contracts with train
ing vendors. ETP©s enabling legislation specifies an even higher level
of accountability by requiring that all contracts between the Panel and
employers and training agencies be performance-based. Moreover, a
stringent definition of performance is applied. The full negotiated pay
ment per person is withheld until trainees have completed their train
ing programs, are placed in training-related jobs at wage rates stipulated
in the contract, and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days. In
practice, training projects are typically not approved for jobs with start
ing wages of less than $5.00 per hour. Moreover, the jobs for which
workers are trained must be good jobs in the sense that they offer longterm employment security and career potential. With respect to the
withholding of full payment to contractors, only for nonprofit organiza
tions is an exception made by allowing some advance and progress
payments. For these organizations, 25 percent of the full payment is
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withheld until after the 90-day period. If all the trainees covered by
the contract do not complete the 90-day employment period, the funds
received for their training must be repaid to the Panel.
Summary statistics provided for the first four and one-half years of
ETP are shown in table 2.2. Average cost per trainee on all projects
($2,515) is within the ranges noted earlier in connection with table 2.1
for classroom training and OJT. Also shown in table 2.2 are the same
statistics broken down by target group. It is interesting to note that
relative to programs that train only potentially displaced workers, pro
grams that focus on the unemployed tend to have a higher average cost
per trainee, a longer length of training, and a lower post-training wage.
The 32 percent higher cost of training a new employee as opposed to
retraining a current employee provides support for the Panel©s philosophy
of attempting to provide training prior to layoffs.
Table 2.2
Summary Statistics for the ETP Program, June 30, 1987
Type of
project

Percentage
of projects

All projects
Projects that train
Unemployed only
Potentially
displaced only
Both groups

Avg. cost/ Post-training Avg. hours
trainee8
wageb
of training
$2,515

$8.35

329

27

3,135

6.47

503

53

2,367

234

20

2,459

9.32
8.24

333

SOURCE: ETP (1987, tables HI-D and III-E).
a. Cost is for trainees hired in training-related jobs and retained in those jobs for 90 days,
b. Post-training wage for projects for which final billing and placement information is available.
For other projects, wage is minimum stated in contract.

Placement rate information is also available as of June 30, 1986. Ap
proximately 77 percent of all trainees successfully completed their train
ing, and 83 percent of program graduates were placed in training-related
jobs and were retained in those jobs for at least 90 days at a wage
specified in the contract. Almost 94 percent of graduates found
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employment of some kind. These placement rates compare very
favorably with those reported in table 2.1, although the absence of a
control group and the possibility of creaming in the participant-selection
process make comparisons of placement rates rather dubious.
Performance-based contracting was also used in the Buffalo and
Alameda dislocated worker demonstration projects. While noting that
this form of contracting has the advantage of increasing the likelihood
of placement in training-related jobs, Corson, Maynard, and Wichita
(1984:143-47) caution that contracting agencies should be prepared to
assume several additional burdens. First, contract negotiators need to
possess a detailed knowledge of specific costs in order to negotiate suc
cessfully. Second, the agency must have the capacity to monitor con
tractor processes and program outcomes. Third, the fixed costs of con
tract negotiation and monitoring should not be underestimated. In cases
of inadequate contractor performance, finally, the agency, as an obliga
tion to participants, may have to provide the promised services.
Funding. A unique feature of ETP is its funding mechanism. As noted
in chapter 1, federal law prohibits states from using UI trust funds to
pay directly the costs of training. To fund ETP, the California legislature
therefore created a separate Employment Training Fund financed by
a 0.1 percent payroll tax assessed on all employers with a positive reserve
in their UI account. At the same time, California employers had their
regular UI tax rates reduced by 0.1 percent. The funding of ETP can
thus be viewed as a diversion of a small part of regular UI tax revenues
to finance training and economic development. California was and con
tinues to be in a favorable position to carry out this diversion because
of a surplus in its UI trust fund. State law limits the amount of funds
that can be placed in the Employment Training Fund to $55 million
per year. Any remaining funds are deposited in the state©s UI trust fund.
Since 1983, two states Delaware and Washington have followed
California©s example in establishing separate training and economic
development funds financed by an employer payroll tax. 7 Delaware©s
experience differed from that of California, however, in that Delaware
was initially deeply in debt to the federal UI loan fund. During the ear
ly 1980s, a federally imposed 0.6 percent penalty tax was levied on
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Delaware employers to repay the state©s trust fund indebtedness. When
the debt was retired in 1984, employers received a 0.5 percent (rather
than 0.6 percent) payroll tax reduction, with the incremental 0.1 per
cent dedicated to financing training and economic development pro
grams. Revenues from the tax totaled $1.5 million in 1985. Twentyfive percent of the funds raised is for services contracted out through
the Delaware Development Office, and the other 75 percent is used by
Delaware©s Private Industry Council to supplement its JTPA funds. The
state©s training program is directed toward the counseling, retraining,
and placement of actively employed workers as well as displaced
workers. 8
The Claimant Placement Project approved by the Washington state
legislature in 1985 as a two-year pilot project provides intensive job
search assistance to UI claimants judged to be readily employable. The
$4.6 million allocated to the pilot project (the program was scheduled
to end on July 1, 1987) was obtained by diverting funds from the state©s
UI trust fund. Specifically, an earmarked tax of 0.02 percent was im
posed on employer payrolls, with an offsetting reduction in UI tax rates
of 0.02 percent for most employers. Like California, Washington was
in a position to utilize the diversion approach to financing the new pro
gram because of a small UI trust fund surplus of $264 million (about
1 percent of the state©s total wage bill). As will be described in more
detail in chapter 3, a bill passed by the legislature in the spring of 1987
makes the Claimant Placement Project a permanent state program with
funding provided by an earmarked 0.02 percent payroll tax.
Evaluation studies. The ETP program differs from the other statefunded programs described here in that it has been subjected to evalua
tion by outside agencies. In the first of these evaluation studies, the
accounting firm of Arthur Young (1985) provides a descriptive analysis
of the operation of the program through January 1985. Among the
positive aspects noted in this study is ETP©s flexibility and quick response
time in meeting employers© requests and its high placement rate for pro
gram graduates. The study also comments favorably on the Panel©s role
in reducing UI costs and in encouraging employers to locate and ex
pand in California.
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The recommendations for improvement suggested in the Arthur Young
study largely represent a fine-tuning of the Panel©s operation and policies.
These recommendations include the following:
1. The need for an improved information system for tracking the
employment status of trainees.
2. The suggestion that the Panel establish program goals and priorities
in making longer-term decisions about training programs.
3. The suggestion that the Panel review policies for determining
whether workers are likely to be displaced and for calculating the
fixed fee prices paid to contractors.
4. A need to review the appropriateness of Panel policies with regard
to required minimum wages following the completion of training.
The second evaluation study is a quantitative analysis carried out by
the Training Research Corporation (see Moore, Wilms, and Bolus 1988).
Using data for 3,913 trainees enrolled in ETP programs between January
1, 1983 and December 31, 1985, this study investigates the impact of
ETP on participants© annual earnings, their annual weeks of unemploy
ment, and total UI payments. The analysis shows that, on average, an
nual earnings of unemployed workers who successfully completed the
program increased by 76 percent from $9,628 to $16,912. In addition,
their average annual weeks of unemployment fell by 56 percent from
6.2 weeks to 2.7 weeks.
These striking results should be viewed as preliminary in at least two
respects. First, as noted in the Training Research Corporation report,
there is no control group of nonparticipants against which to compare
the record of ETP participants. Thus, for example, growth in the Califor
nia economy over the period examined might have resulted in similar
gains in earnings and decreases in unemployment for nonparticipants.
Second, human capital theory leads to the expectation that a successful
training program will result in higher wages for trainees. If the higher
annual earnings are the result of lower unemployment or increased ac
cess to stable employment, however, the program©s effect may have
been to increase job search proficiency rather than to increase trainingrelated skills. In this case, the benefits to society are less than the private
benefits, since ETP participants may simply have taken jobs that other
wise would have gone to other workers. It is nevertheless interesting
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to note that ETP participants who were employed but potentially sub
ject to displacement also experienced a sizable 27 percent increase in
earnings.
ETP can also be examined in terms of the four issues raised earlier
in this chapter in connection with federally-funded training programs.
To briefly recapitulate, these issues involve (1) the appropriate mix of
services, (2) selection of program participants, (3) forecasting occupa
tional demand in selecting program curricula, and (4) subsidizing the
training expenses of private employers. The strength of the ETP ap
proach to retraining is that decisions on service mix and curricula are
made by the market, not by program planners. As has been emphasiz
ed, a training program will not receive Panel approval unless a specific
employer has asked for the program and committed itself to hiring pro
gram graduates. Entirely bypassed, therefore, is the problem that workers
will be trained in skills that are no longer demanded by employers. In
this connection, one of the recommendations in the Arthur Young report
(1985:34) appears to miss the mark. The recommendation is that the
Panel should use labor market data to set occupational and industry goals
and priorities to be sure that program funds are spent in areas that will
further the economic development of the state. One of the main advan
tages of the ETP approach is that such forecasting is unnecessary. 9
Potential concerns about the program involve the issues of partici
pant selection and subsidization of employers. With respect to the first
issue, there is little question that adherence to a performance-based con
tracting system of compensating training agents encourages creaming
in the recruiting and selection of program participants. One piece of
evidence suggesting that creaming does in fact occur is the Panel©s own
finding that only 17 percent of Panel trainees had failed to complete
at least 12 years of schooling (ETP 1987). The same statistic for the
state©s labor force as a whole is 27 percent. The report also points out
that 23 percent of trainees were women, compared to a workforce that
is 43 percent female. Blacks and Hispanics, nevertheless, are overrepresented among ETP trainees. In its early evaluation of ETP, the
Arthur Young report (1985) also observes that the intensive screening
of participants in entry-level programs contributed to what was viewed
as the slow start-up of many ETP programs.
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Moreover, ETP increasingly appears to be subsidizing training by
employers of their current workforces as opposed to supplying train
ing to unemployed workers. One reason, as noted in the study by the
National Academy of Sciences© Panel, is that the requirement that
trainees be placed in jobs for 90 days prior to payment to the training
provider discourages many potential external providers, such as com
munity colleges, from participating in the program (see Cyert and
Mowery 1987:152). A consequence of the increasing retraining of the
employed is that ETP may be substituting public funds for the training
investments that employers would have made in the program©s absence.
This implies that there is little net increase in the delivery of training
services to workers actually displaced from their jobs.
On the further assumption that large firms are better able to fund
retraining than small firms, the following evidence on the size distribution
of employers of program graduates is instructive (see ETP 1987: Table
H-A):

Firm size
0-49
50-99
100-249
250-499
500-1000
1000+

Panel trainees

Total state
employment

18%
6%
10%
14%
6%
46%

32%
11%
15%
10%
9%
23%

Firm size in this table is measured by number of employees. It is clear
that ETP trainees are underrepresented in the workforces of small
employers and overrepresented in the workforces of quite large
employers.
In defense of ETP, at least three points may be brought out in con
nection with these concerns. First, it should be noted that a minimum
level of general training is probably required before an individual can
benefit from more specialized training, and ETP is specifically prohibited
from offering remedial education. The continued active involvement
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of employers is likely to be conditional on a high degree of assurance
that program graduates will be able to perform successfully in the jobs
they have been trained for without the need for supplemental OJT.
Second, the year 1987 marked an important transition for ETP in that,
for the first time, employers© demand for training assistance exceeded
the supply of available funds forcing the rationing of funds among pro
spective contractors. This excess-demand situation has led the Panel
to impose certain priorities on its basic system of responding to the
market demand for training. In particular, the list of Panel priorities
includes expedited consideration given to proposals in which special
employment opportunities are offered to minorities, women, the disabled,
and veterans and to proposals which promise assistance to persons
already laid off or in danger of layoff due to plant closures or perma
nent mass layoffs. In addition, the Panel has committed itself to targeting
approximately 30 percent of its funds for projects retraining the
unemployed; and it is conducting a special marketing outreach to small
businesses and minority- and female-owned enterprises.
Finally and most fundamentally, ETP should be properly viewed as
an economic devleopment program to assist both employers and workers
as opposed to a jobs program to assist disadvantaged workers. From
this perspective, a major goal of the program is to provide employers
with an incentive to modernize plants and avoid layoffs by subsidizing
the costs of retraining existing employees. With respect to subsidizing
the training expenses of large employers, it should be pointed out that
large firms provide jobs that pay high wages and offer career potential
that is, the kinds of jobs that are mandated by ETP©s enabling legisla
tion. Since ETP is funded by what amounts to a portion of the UI payroll
tax, moreover, political support for the program is strengthened if every
employer who pays UI taxes, regardless of size, is permitted to benefit.
In this regard, a BusinessWeek (1985) article quotes a Bank of America
official as stating that an ETP-funded training program allowed the bank
a return on its UI tax payments that it would otherwise not have receiv
ed because of its negligible layoff rate. 10 As will be described in the
next section, Minnesota©s MEED program takes the opposite approach
of giving small employers priority in program participation.
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The Minnesota Employment and Economic
Development (MEED) Wage-Subsidy Program
MEED design and implementation. Originally titled the Minnesota
Emergency Employment Development Program, MEED was created
under circumstances quite different from the ETP program. In the case
of ETP, California officials were required by statute to lower their UI
payroll tax rate because of the large UI trust fund surplus that had ac
cumulated. Resources were thus made available to initiate a new pro
gram at no additional cost to state taxpayers. In contrast, MEED was
created in 1983 by a Minnesota state legislature faced with double-digit
unemployment rates coupled with a high percentage of unemployed
workers who had exhausted their UI eligibility. The legislature©s response
in MEED was a two-year program designed to create temporary jobs
in the public sector and permanent jobs in the private sector. The pro
gram was initially funded at a hefty $70 million for the July 1983-June
1985 biennium using general tax revenues.
As originally conceived, MEED was fundamentally an emergency
job creation program, with at least 60 percent of the created jobs ex
pected to be in the public sector. The focus on public sector job crea
tion was due to the legislature©s initial skepticism about the willingness
of private sector employers to participate in MEED. As the program
evolved, however, greater than expected participation of private sec
tor employers led to a reversal in job placement objectives. By the se
cond year of the program, 60 percent of jobs were designated to be
in the private sector (a 70 percent private sector placement rate was
actually achieved); and an additional $30 million was appropriated by
the legislature. MEED was made a permanent program in 1985. Cur
rently, a minimum of 75 percent of jobs created must be in the private
sector; 11 and $27 million was appropriated for MEED for the biennium
ending June 30, 1987. It is worth emphasizing that Minnesota continues
to devote substantial resources to MEED, even though the economic
crisis that led to its creation is past.
The private sector component of MEED is a wage-subsidy program.
Specific features of the wage-subsidy are the following:
1. Eligible job seekers are those who are unemployed and are ineligible
for or have exhausted either UI benefits or workers©compensation. Prior-
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ity is given to applicants living in households with no other source of
income, to those eligible for general assistance, to those eligible for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and to farm families
that can demonstrate severe financial need. MEED is therefore available
to assist displaced workers who have exhausted their UI eligibility, but
it is not restricted to only displaced workers.
2. MEED offers employers who hire targeted workers a subsidy of
up to $4 per hour in wages and up to $1 per hour in fringe benefits
for a period not to exceed six months. The six-month period can be
extended up to one year for workers undergoing job training. A worker©s
wage is set by the employer and must be equal to the wage paid other
employees for the same work.
3. Participating employers are given an incentive to retain targeted
workers for at least 12 months beyond the six months of subsidized
employment. Employers are required to repay 70 percent of the amount
received under the program if the employee is not continued on the job
beyond the initial six months. No repayment is expected, on the other
hand, if targeted workers are retained one year or longer beyond the
subsidy period. A prorated portion of the subsidy must be repaid for
employees retained less than one year. Employers are also prohibited
from laying off or reducing the hours of other employees in order to
hire subsidized workers.
4. Given priority for MEED participation are small businesses as well
as firms that offer the potential for long-term employment, that con
serve energy, that make use of state resources and new technology, that
operate primarily in Minnesota, and that are female- or minority-owned.
The MEED annual report (1987) covering the July 1985 to December
1986 period indicates that 85 percent of private sector participants were
employed in unsubsidized jobs at the time of a 60-day follow-up survey
after the completion of the subsidy period. Of those workers in unsub
sidized jobs, nearly 91 percent were still employed by the same firm,
while about 9 percent changed employers following the subsidy period.
Average unsubsidized hourly wages for the two groups were $5.37 and
$6.06, respectively. Most individuals employed under MEED qualify
for the full subsidy over 26 weeks. Hence, average program cost per
worker is relatively high at approximately $4,680.
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Contrasts with ETP. Beyond the difference in economic circumstances
existing at their creation, the MEED program offers an interesting con
trast to California©s ETP in three additional respects. One contrast is
in underlying philosophies. ETP©s philosophy is that updated skills are
a prerequisite for workers to obtain or retain jobs. Thus payments made
to employers providing OJT are viewed as compensation for training
costs. In contrast, the explicit philosophy of MEED is that job seekers
need employment, not retraining. If jobs are available, workers will
be found to fill them. From this perspective, wage-subsidies are primarily
viewed as a job creation device. Nevertheless, MEED-funded jobs do
appear in many cases to offer training opportunities. A survey carried
out by a coalition of state organizations, the Jobs Now Coalition, in
dicates that over 77 percent of participating private sector employers
provided an affirmative answer to the question, "Did you provide any
special training on- or off-the-job?" (See Rangan 1985.)
A second difference between the programs concerns the characteristics
of workers likely to receive assistance. The earlier discussion of ETP sug
gests that creaming is likely to be involved in the trainee-selection process.
MEED, on the other hand, targets the wage-subsidy to members of spe
cific disadvantaged groups. A more recent 1987 Jobs Now Coalition sur
vey (see Rode 1988) indicates, in fact, that MEED placements are dispro
portionately held by general assistance eligibles, women, and minorities.
Fifty-four percent of its placements during the 1985-87 biennium were
general assistance eligible, 42 piercent were women, and 25 percent were
minorities (in a state with a total minority population of only 4 to 5 percent).
A final difference is in the mix of participating employers. As noted,
relatively large California employers are more likely than smaller
employers to participate in ETP. In line with MEED©s legislative
priorities, on the other hand, small Minnesota employers are heavily
involved in the program. The 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey reports
the following information on the size distribution of participating
employers (see Rode 1988:Table 5):
Firm size
Less than 20
21-50
51-99
100 or more

Participating firms
81.1%
9.7%
4.8%
4.3%
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where firm size is again measured by number of employees. As large
firms are known to pay higher wages on average than smaller firms,
the MEED wage-subsidy represents an especially large cut in labor costs
to smaller firms.
Contrast with the Dayton wage-subsidy experiment. It is also in
teresting to contrast the experience of the MEED program to date with
the results of a federally-funded controlled experiment carried out in
Dayton, Ohio during 1980 and 1981. As described by Burtless (1985),
the purpose of the Dayton experiment was to test the effectiveness of a
targeted wage-subsidy program in increasing the labor market success of
disadvantaged workers. Program-targeted workers, who were all AFDC
or general assistance recipients, were randomly assigned to one of three
groups. The first group of workers received vouchers that entitled their
employers, upon making a hiring commitment, to a tax credit equal
to 50 percent of earnings paid during the first year of employment and
25 percent of second-year earnings. Rather than a tax credit, the vouchers
received by the second group authorized their employers to receive direct
cash payments equal to the same percentages of first- and second-year
earnings. Subsidy limits for both treatment groups were $3,000 and
$1,500, respectively, for the first two years of employment. The third
group of targeted workers served as the control group and received no
vouchers. Members of all three groups received two weeks of job search
training, which were followed by six weeks of structured job search.
The vouchers expired at the end of the six-week job search period.
The Dayton experiment was designed to address two specific research
issues. The first was to determine whether giving job seekers themselves
the responsibility of informing prospective employers of their eligibili
ty for subsidy benefits would increase the low take-up rates that have
historically plagued targeted wage-subsidy programs. The second was
the question whether firms with no tax liabilities to be reduced by a
tax credit (because their profits are low or they are suffering losses)
can still be induced to hire disadvantaged workers with the promise of
direct cash payments.
The results of the experiment were unexpected. Among the two treat
ment groups, 13.0 percent of the tax credit group and 12.7 percent of
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the direct cash payment group found employment during the eight weeks
of the experiment. Thus the direct cash payments did not increase labor
market success relative to the tax credits. More important, the place
ment rates of both treatment groups were lower than the 20.6 percent
rate obtained by the control group. Unfortunately, the evaluation of the
experiment is limited to an analysis of placement rates and initial wages
because of its premature cancellation in the spring of 1981. (There was
essentially no difference in average wages between the treatment groups
and the control group.) Subject to this qualification, Burtless interprets
the results as indicating that employers used the vouchers primarily as
a labor market signal of potentially poor job performance. This explana
tion would account for both the lower placement rates observed for the
treatment groups and the failure of the different subsidy payment
mechanisms to make a difference. The disquieting implication for cur
rent and proposed wage-subsidy policies is that vouchers have a
stigmatizing effect in the sense that rather than easing the placement
of target groups, the vouchers provide information which employers
used to discriminate against the disadvantaged.
In contrast to the Dayton experiment, the MEED wage-subsidy ap
pears to have been enthusiastically received by Minnesota employers,
particularly small and relatively new businesses, despite the priority
given to hiring hard-to-employ target groups. This is indicated by the
shift in the program©s emphasis toward private sector job creation, its
continued funding during the economic recovery following the 1981-82
recession, and surveys describing a high degree of employer satisfac
tion with MEED. The reasons for the difference in employers© reac
tions to the two programs can only be speculated upon. Nevertheless,
it is clear that MEED officials, like those of California©s ETP program,
recognize that it is critical to retain the support of the business com
munity. From this perspective, the following considerations may play
a role in MEED©s relative success.
1. MEED is promoted as a program to assist Minnesota©s small
businesses to grow and diversify. In other words * MEED is sold as an
economic development tool rather than as a program to assist the
unemployed and disadvantaged. In this connection, the 1987 Jobs Now
Coalition survey (see Rode 1988) points out that 81 percent of surveyed
employers responded affirmatively to a question that asked whether
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MEED enabled them to expand their production or scale of operations,
60 percent noted that the subsidy made it possible for them to invest
in new capital equipment, and 54 percent stated that MEED made it
possible to diversify into new areas. Among firms that reported expan
sion of their workforces, 56 percent indicated that they would not have
been able to create new jobs without MEED assistance, and another
4 percent suggested that their expansion would have been delayed without
the program. A further breakdown of these data suggests that MEED
assistance is particularly beneficial to the growth of very small and new
businesses. The same survey indicates, finally, that 86 percent of re
sponding employers responded that they were "very satisfied" with
their MEED employees, and only 23 percent mentioned that the sub
sidy failed to improve the performance of their business.
2. MEED officials have taken pains to keep their rules simple and
administrative overhead low. The 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey
reports that 92 percent of responding employers felt that they were able
to fill their jobs with a minimum of red tape, and 94 percent stated that
they found the rules easy to understand.
As noted at the beginning of this section, most state-funded training
programs pose few constraints on employers in their selection of trainees.
The MEED program demonstrates that it is possible to walk the fine
line between targeting assistance to particular groups of workers while
at the same time enjoying widespread business support. 12
Illinois© Retraining Programs
Illinois is unique among the states in offering a comprehensive threepronged approach to retraining. The Illinois programs are (1) the In
dustrial Training Program authorized in 1979; (2) the High Impact Train
ing Services program created in 1985; and (3) the Prairie State 2000
Authority, also created in 1985. The Prairie State 2000 Authority is
emphasized in this discussion because it is representative of the recent
focus by some states on retraining programs intended to retain rather
than to create jobs.
The Industrial Training and High Impact Training Services Programs.
Administered by the Illinois Department of Commerce and Communi
ty Affairs, the Industrial Training Program provides cost-sharing for
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the OJT expenses incurred by "new" or "expanding" industrial enter
prises. Expansion is defined in the enabling legislation as "a perma
nent increase in production that results in the addition of personnel
through additional work shifts and/or facilities in excess of normal growth
or turnover." Just what constitutes normal growth or turnover is not
spelled out. The program©s contribution to the costs of OJT cannot ex
ceed two-thirds of direct costs unless the trainees are unemployed, receiv
ing state welfare benefits, or enrolled in training for the handicapped.
For each of these categories of trainees, the Industrial Training Pro
gram is authorized to provide up to 100 percent of training costs.
Emphasizing classroom training rather than OJT, the High Impact
Training Services program is also administered by an existing state agen
cy in this case, the Illinois State Board of Education. This program is
intended to provide an economic development role for the state©s
vocational-technical education facilities. Private sector employers in
terested in program funding must join with a community college, area
vocational center, or comprehensive high school in putting together a
collaborative proposal. These joint proposals are then submitted to the
state Board of Education, which is obligated to respond promptly with a
decision on funding. As is the case for the Industrial Training Program,
program participation is restricted to new and expanding enterprises.
The High Impact Training Services program is similar to
Massachusetts© Bay State Skills Corporation (BSSC) in attempting to
establish cooperative relationships between employers and state educa
tional institutions. Begun in 1981, the BSSC encourages educational
institutions and other training agencies to propose new courses and pro
grams that are directly responsive to the demands of the marketplace.
But the BSSC will only fund proposals identifying one or more com
panies that will participate directly in the training. Participating firms
are required to match at least 20 percent of BSSC funds with direct
or in-kind support.
The Prairie State 2000 Authority. In contrast to the first two Illinois
programs with their job-creation emphasis, the primary mission of the
Prairie State 2000 Authority is to retain jobs already located in the state.
Job retention is accomplished by upgrading the skills of Illinois workers
so that they can adapt to advances in technology and other changes in
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the workplace. With its focus on retaining jobs, the 2000 Authority is
similar to retraining programs offered by such Upper Midwest states
as Michigan and Ohio. The programs in both of these states are primarily
intended to make use of existing systems of vocational and technical
schools and community colleges to provide skill upgrading.
The Illinois state legislature initially created the Prairie State 2000
Fund in 1983 with the objective of assisting UI recipients and employed
workers at risk of layoff to retrain themselves to meet the skill re
quirements imposed by technological change. The program did not
receive state funding, however, until the passage of an amendment in
1985 creating the Prairie State 2000 Authority as an independent state
agency. 13 The 2000 Authority has the following two components: the
Individual Training Assistance Program and the Employer Training
Assistance Program. In the Individual Training Assistance Program,
the 2000 Authority issues training vouchers to approved training in
stitutions (community colleges, school districts, and not-for-profit
organizations) on behalf of individual trainees. Upon the enrollment
of a trainee, the participating institution is permitted to redeem a voucher
to cover the individual©s tuition and related fees. Vouchers are valued
at up to $2,000 for eligible unemployed persons and up to $1,000 for
eligible employed individuals. Eligibility criteria are quite minimal.
Unemployed applicants must have worked a minimum of three years
out of the past ten in Ul-covered employment, and employed applicants
must be in need of additional skills to retain their present jobs. It is
the responsibility of each participating educational institution to admit
trainees and to assign each trainee an appropriate training curriculum.
The more important component of the 2000 Authority is the Employer
Training Assistance Program which provides qualifying employers with
a loan or grant to cover the direct costs of supplying training. Of the
agency©s fiscal 1987 budget of $3 million, about 87 percent was spent
on grants and loans under the employer assistance program. The loan
option covers 100 percent of direct training costs, and 25 percent of
the principal of the loan is forgiven if trainees are retained by the
employer for one year. The grant option covers 50 percent of direct
training costs, with half the grant amount dispersed in advance of training
and the other half paid after trainees are retained on the job 90 days
from completion of training. A third funding option is to couple a grant
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request covering 50 percent of allowable training costs with a loan re
quest to cover the remaining 50 percent. In general, funding approval
is based on a demonstration that the training cannot be internally financed
by the employer and that workers are in jeopardy of being laid off unless
additional training is made available to them.
Evidence related to the retraining vouchers provided by the Individual
Training Assistance Program is available from the income maintenance
experiments carred out between 1970 and 1978 in Seattle and Denver
(the SIME/DIME experiments). All experimental subjects were eligi
ble for free employment counseling, and a subset of subjects was eligi
ble for a training subsidy at the rate of either 50 percent or 100 percent
of direct costs incurred. The training subsidy program operated like
a voucher system in that the training provider and the curriculum chosen
were left up to the individual.
A study of the training subsidy program by Hall (1980) indicates that
participation was far short of universal. The participation rate for the
counseling treatment was 42 percent, while 22 percent and 35 percent
of those eligible for the 50 and 100 percent training subsidies, respec
tively, chose to enroll in a training program (mainly courses provided
by community colleges). Concerning postprogram wage rates, Hall ten
tatively concludes that while the point estimates indicate a small positive
training effect, the size of the associated standard errors make it im
possible to reject the null hypothesis that the effect is zero.
A secondary mission of the 2000 Authority is to investigate innovative
employment programs. In this capacity, the agency is planning a fouryear pilot project to examine the feasibility of Individual Training Ac
count (ITA) programs in Illinois. The basic idea of the ITA concept
is to provide a fund privately financed by workers, employers, or both
workers and employers that can be drawn upon to pay for additional
educational or training investments. Choate and Carey (1985) and Lovell
(1984) have presented specific proposals for implementing the ITA
concept.
In the Choate-Carey proposal, contributions by both workers and
employers would be used to create an ITA trust fund. A worker displaced
from his or her job would be entitled to receive a voucher valued at
up to $4,000 to be used to pay for retraining and/or relocation. If the
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retraining option were chosen, the type and location of training would
be left up to the worker. At the time of retirement, both workers and
employers would be refunded their unused contributions plus interest.
The Lovell proposal differs in that displaced workers who choose to
participate in the program would first be provided several weeks of
counseling and job search assistance. If these services do not result in
a satisfactory job placement, the participant is then given a voucher to
pay for a retraining program of his or her choice. With respect to both
ITA proposals, the OTA report (1986:267) makes the useful observa
tion that the training voucher system would serve best to encourage
lifetime education and retraining, as opposed to a crisis response to the
specific needs of displaced workers.

Summary
In the context of the experience gained from over 25 years of federally
funded vocational training programs, this chapter described the in
novative state-level training programs in California, Minnesota, and
Illinois. State training initiatives tend to differ from federal programs
in terms of their availability to employed workers at risk of being displac
ed and their important economic development role. As an economic
development tool, state initiatives have the demand-side objective of
creating jobs as well as the traditional supply-side objective of increas
ing workers© human capital.
Begun in 1983, California©s ETP program is the largest and best known
of state-funded training initiatives. Among the innovative features of
ETP are the following: (1) the heavy involvement of employers in
designing individual projects and choosing trainees and program pro
viders (in the case of classroom training), (2) the commitment required
of participating employers to hire program graduates, (3) the high level
of accountability imposed on training providers by the use of
performance-based contracts, and (4) the diversion of UI tax revenues
to fund the costs of training programs.
The Minnesota MEED program was created in 1983 as a temporary
job creation program mainly directed toward jobs in the public sector.
Originally conceived as a temporary two-year program, the unexpectedly
favorable response of private sector employers to MEED led to its con-
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tinuation as a permanent program emphasizing private sector job crea
tion. The private sector component of MEED provides a targeted wagesubsidy to employers. Three features of the program are especially
noteworthy. First, in contrast to most state programs, MEED is targeted
toward specific groups of hard-to-employ persons. Second, despite ques
tions raised in the literature about employers© interest in participating
in targeted wage-subsidy programs, MEED is strongly supported by
Minnesota businessmen, especially the small business community. Final
ly, MEED appears to be having a positive impact on skill upgrading
although it is primarily promoted as an economic development tool.
The final state program considered Illinois© Prairie State 2000
Authority was examined because it is representative of the recent em
phasis in heavily industrial states on retraining programs intended to
retain rather than to create jobs. The 2000 Authority has two compo
nent programs. In the first, individuals in need of retraining are assisted
through the provision of vouchers to be used at approved training in
stitutions. In the more important second component, employers seek
ing to upgrade the skills of their workers are provided grants and/or
loans to cover the direct costs of providing retraining services.
Process analyses of the California and Minnesota programs indicate
generally favorable results, particularly as viewed as an economic
development tool. As noted in the introductory section, however, neither
ETP nor MEED was designed to allow program evaluation involving
a control group comparison. The available quantitative evidence for
assessing the net impact of retraining programs comes mainly from
federally-funded demonstration projects, and this evidence indicates a
less favorable view of the effectiveness of retraining.
Two of the most influential of these federally-funded demonstrations
are the Downriver dislocated worker project and the Dislocated Worker
Demonstration project. Carried out between 1980 and 1983 in the Detroit
metropolitan area, the Downriver project provided a full range of
reemployment services (i.e., classroom training, OJT, and job search
assistance) to about 2,100 workers displaced from their jobs due to the
closure of several auto assembly and auto parts plants. The evaluation
report by Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984) points out that the
Downriver project significantly increased participants© access to train
ing opportunities over what would have been expected in the program©s
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absence. Despite the increased access to training opportunities, however,
the authors find that retraining does not yield a statistically significant
incremental gain in participants© reemployment experience above that
resulting from job search assistance (ISA) only. Average training costs
per participant were more than twice the average costs of ISA.
The Downriver project was followed in 1982 by the Dislocated Worker
Demonstration project, which was carried out to test the effectiveness
of alternative reemployment services under a wider range of operating
conditions. Although all six sites of the project offered displaced workers
a full range of reemployment services, the Buffalo program was selected
for a full impact study mainly because its evaluation design offered the
best opportunity for estimating net program impacts.
In their evaluation of the Buffalo project, Corson, Long, and Maynard
(1985) draw four important conclusions regarding retraining programs.
First, less than 20 percent of the displaced workers recruited for the
program chose to participate. The recruitment of more recently laidoff workers appears to lead to higher overall participation rates. Sec
ond, program participation had large and statistically significant effects
on reemployment and average weekly earnings. Third, both classroom
training and ISA significantly facilitated worker readjustment, with the
estimated impacts being of similar size. Given its substantially lower
cost ($851 per participant versus $2,431 per participant for classroom
training), the absence of an incremental impact for classroom training
suggests that JSA is the more cost effective of the two services. This
conclusions is reinforced by the parallel result obtained from the
Downriver project. Finally, OJT is not found to have a significant ef
fect on reemployment, suggesting that its use in the Buffalo project as
a job placement tool may have been unnecessary.
NOTES
1. Two recent books supply useful information on the design and operation of JTPA
programs. Levitan and Gallo (1988) is a comprehensive qualitative assessment of all
of JTPA©s components, while Cook (1987) contains case studies of nine operating proj
ects funded by Title HI of JTPA.
2. Title HI also requires that states match federal grants dollar for dollar. However,
the burden imposed on state treasuries is lightened by allowing (1) state matches to
be in-kind as well as in cash and (2) part or all of the match to be forgiven for states
with unemployment rates above the national average.
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3. The flip side of this argument is that early intervention is inefficient if services
are provided to workers who would have otherwise found jobs on their own, or if workers
do not yet face sufficient economic pressure to seek alternative employment or to enter
a retraining program.
4. The description of the ETP program is primarily based on Employment Training
Panel (1984, 1985, 1986, 1987) and Arthur Young (1985).
5. ETP provides funds only for the reimbursement of actual training costs incurred
by employers or training agencies. Funds may not be spent to subsidize the wages paid
to trainees or to pay income maintenance allowances. Similarly, ETP does not support
remedial education.
6. During its early years, the Panel used "master contracts" with state agencies and
business and training organizations as an administrative tool to carry out the dual ob
jectives of providing training and fostering economic development. For example, under
a master contract with the Los Angeles Community College District, the Panel authorized
a variety of training projects to meet the needs of Los Angeles employers. More recently,
however, the Panel has determined that master contracts are ineffective and their use
has been abandoned.
7. In January 1987, a third state North Carolina passed legislation to cut employers©
UI payroll taxes and simultaneously assess a new payroll tax earmarked to finance a
worker training trust fund. A commission has been appointed to study how best to utilize
the trust fund.
8. Planning information for the Delaware program was provided by a randomized
experiment carried out between late January and early July 1983 by the Delaware Depart
ment of Labor. The design and results of the experiment are discussed in chapter 3.
9. On the other hand, Stevens (1986:29) makes the point that employers are quickly
learning that the states are serious about sharing in training expenses without being
intrusive in the trainee-selection process. He goes on to suggest that states must move
quickly to assess their priorities in preparing to formalize criteria to be used in
distinguishing between employers applying for limited training funds.
10. Although the employer makes the actual contribution, Hamermesh (1977:10-15)
provides an interesting discussion of the possibility that the source of funds used to
pay the UI tax may be consumers if the tax can be shifted forward, or employees if
the tax is shifted backward.
11. Temporary public sector employment is currently viewed as a method for allowing
the most disadvantaged to acquire the work experience that will lead to eventual private
sector MEED placement.
12. Stevens (1986:25) makes the same point in connection with Massachusetts© Bay
State Skills Corporation. This is a training program which attempts to foster partner
ships between state postsecondary schools and employers with skill-training re
quirements. Targeted populations are displaced workers, minorities, and the economical
ly disadvantaged.
13. The only source of funding for the 2000 Fund was voluntary contributions by
business firms in exchange for a credit on the state corporate income tax. Not surpris
ingly, the tax credit incentive proved insufficient to encourage substantial business con
tributions to the program.

3
Job Search Assistance Programs

As noted at the beginning of chapter 2, the basic presumption of
retraining programs is that displaced workers lack the vocational skills
either transferable or firm-specific that would qualify them to com
pete for vacant jobs in their local labor markets. The presumption
underlying job search assistance (ISA) programs, in contrast, is that
displaced workers already possess the necessary vocational skills to com
pete. Rather, their reemployment is delayed for one of three reasons:
(1) lack of knowledge about how to go about searching for a job, (2) lack
of motivation to engage in search, or (3) lack of interest in the jobs
that are available. Lack of knowledge is a problem for many displaced
workers because, as long-term employees in their previous jobs, their
job search skills were largely unused and have become rusty. Lack of
motivation to search may occur because of the work disincentive
associated with the UI system. Finally, as emphasized in chapter 1, the
unattractive prospect for some displaced workers of having to accept
sharply reduced wages and benefits reduces the odds of an early accep
tance of a job offer.
The work disincentive factor is the topic of a large body of literature.
As originally pointed out by Feldstein (1974), the provision of UI in
come support reduces the cost of not working, which tends to increase
the length of recipients© job search. More recently, Kingston, Burgess,
and St. Louis (1986) and St. Louis, Burgess, and Kingston (1986) pro
vide evidence that many UI recipients substantially overreport their actual
job search effort in order to comply with the UI "work test" (i.e., the
requirement that UI claimants be actively seeking employment). This
evidence suggests that for some workers, UI benefits may actually be
subsidizing leisure and nonmarket pursuits rather than job search.
Burgess and Kingston (1987) discuss in detail the adverse incentives
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built into the UI system, along with the problems of program complex
ity and ineffective claimant monitoring, and offer a number of sugges
tions for reforming the existing system.
In connection with JTPA Title HI programs, chapter 2 also pointed
out that program developers are under considerable pressure to reduce
per participant costs while attempting to maintain high placement rates.
This pressure, as well as questions about the effectiveness of retrain
ing and the desire of many program participants to get back to work
as quickly as possible, has led most Title III projects to place substan
tially more emphasis on ISA than vocational training. The first section
of this chapter outlines the component services commonly found in ISA
programs including those funded by Title HI. This discussion provides
the background information needed for understanding the details of par
ticular JSA programs.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into three substantive sec
tions, which are distinguished by the type of JSA program considered.
The first of these sections outlines five experimental programs intend
ed to increase job search skills. Available for four of these programs
is evaluation evidence drawn from a comparison of randomly selected
treatment and control groups. The other two sections investigate two
alternative approaches to JSA, both of which have the objective of in
creasing the motivation to engage in active job search. The reemployment bonus experiments carried out in Illinois and New Jersey are ex
amined first. Then considered are demonstration projects in Charleston,
South Carolina and Washington state which were intended to test the
effectiveness of more closely monitoring the search activity of UI
claimants. The chapter concludes with a summary section.

Components of JSA Programs
In describing the individual services typically provided in JSA pro
grams, JSA will be defined broadly so that the services discussed range
from initial outreach to terminal job placement activities. Such a broadly
defined JSA program is included, for example, as the first of three
treatments in the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment
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Demonstration Project initiated in October 1985.© It should be noted,
however, that the term JSA is often defined more narrowly to include
only individual job search training services and job development and
job matching (items 4 and 6 discussed below). The services are discussed
in roughly the sequential order in which they are generally offered.
1. Outreach. The first problem is to make known to displaced workers
the services offered by a JSA program. With respect to workers af
fected by a plant closing or mass layoff, the surest means of making
contact is to offer assistance at the plant site before layoffs begin. Chapter
4 goes into more detail on site-specific services, including a discussion
of advance notification requirements and early warning systems. For
other unemployed workers, outreach depends more on media campaigns,
word of mouth, and referrals from local Job Service offices of state
Employment Service (ES) agencies.
2. Orientation. Orientation plays the key role of informing prospec
tive participants about the services offered by the program, what these
services can and cannot be expected to deliver, and what is expected
of the participants themselves. The objective is to help unemployed
workers arrive at a sensible decision regarding program participation.
In particular, unemployed workers anticipating recall and those who
can reasonably be expected to find satisfactory jobs without assistance
should be discouraged from continuing further. Helpful in this regard
is the clear acknowledgement by project staff members that there is no
guarantee that jobs available to program graduates will offer prelayoff
levels of pay and benefits. Potential participants should especially be
cautioned that not everyone benefits from relatively costly and timeconsuming retraining programs.
3. Assessment and testing. In many JSA programs, the next service
provided is an assessment intended to determine whether a participant
already possesses locally marketable skills or whether retraining is
necessary for reemployment. Formal testing is often used to determine
the participant©s vocational interests and his or her aptitude for under
taking particular retraining programs. In some cases, testing may reveal
that remedial education is a prerequisite for retraining. For example,
Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984:46) point out in their evaluation
of the Downriver demonstration project that despite fairly high levels
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of educational attainment (close to 60 percent of program-eligible
workers had completed high school), some 20 percent of participants
scored below sixth grade levels on standardized reading and math tests
administered by the program. The report also notes that the two-week
assessment and job search training sequence used in the Downriver proj
ect served the purpose, among other objectives, of screening out those
participants who lacked the motivation to actively pursue reemployment.
4. Job search workshops. Based on the assessment results, participants
are typically channeled into either a classroom training or OJT pro
gram or enrolled in a job search workshop. Job search workshops
generally last about 20 hours spread over four or five days. Workshop
content usually consists of two primary elements. First, specific job
search skills are taught, including resume preparation, techniques for
locating job leads, and effective application and interviewing practices.
Second, motivational activities and exercises are provided to raise the
low self-esteem that many displaced workers suffer after being laid off.
Following the job search workshop, most programs make available
a "resource center" which participants can use as a base of operation
for their self-directed job search. Resource centers are typically outfit
ted with a telephone bank, telephone and business directories, newspaper
help-wanted ads, and listings of job openings from the local Job Ser
vice office. An important objective of resource centers is to create an
atmosphere of mutual encouragement and support by encouraging job
searchers to operate out of a common location.
A second logical follow-up to the job search workshop is the forma
tion of a job club in which club members meet on a regular basis to
telephone employers for job leads. Job clubs allow for the supervised
application of recently acquired job search skills and offer the oppor
tunity for developing a group support system during the search period.
Drawing on the experience of the Dislocated Worker Demonstration
project, Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984:132-34) describe a suc
cessful implementation of the job club concept in the Lehigh Valley
program. A key feature of this program was a fixed membership per
club of about 15 participants that was unchanged until all club members
obtained jobs. The reduction in the number of club members as
placements occurred had a positive rather than a negative effect on
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remaining members and the project staff since job club moderators took
pride in watching the club "close-out." The authors also caution, never
theless, that because of the highly personal interaction likely to be
generated in job clubs, they may not be appropriate for all clients or
in all areas.
5. Counseling. Most ISA programs provide some form of follow-up
counseling at regular intervals. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita
(1984:134) note that counseling at the six sites of the Dislocated Worker
Demonstration project ranged on a continuum from informal, occasional
counseling largely consisting of job interview advice to sophisticated
case-management systems which assigned clients to particular counselors
who were given full responsibility for the client©s progress through the
program. Whatever form the counseling takes, its primary goal is to
insure that program participants are making satisfactory progress in their
job search. Particular services a counselor can provide include
(1) serving as a "sounding board" for participants, (2) providing job
information and arranging for support services, (3) urging clients to
make use of resource center facilities, (4) providing coordination with
job development activities, and (5) encouraging participants to persevere
in their search.
6. Job development and job matching. In addition to training the in
dividual unemployed worker to locate his or her own job, some ISA
programs also offer the service called job development of utilizing
the informal contacts of staff members to turn up job openings that are
not advertised. That is, the function of a job developer is to uncover
job vacancies that would be unlikely to come to the attention of displaced
workers searching on their own. The OTA report (1986:249) notes that
job development is successful when job developers earn the confidence
of local employers by carefully screening workers for job openings.
With program staff doing the screening, employers need interview on
ly a few well-qualified applicants. Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer
(1984:44) provide the following description of the dynamic nature of
the job development process:
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the DCC [Downriver
Community Conference] program©s job development strategy
was its continued intensity. Program staff kept an ever-
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expanding file of employers and contacted each one every
month to inquire whether their hiring needs had changed or
whether the program could assist them in any way. Even if
an employer had already hired participants, staff made the
contact to ask if there were additional openings. Such efforts
in some instances resulted in placement of several workers
within one firm. Such continuous monitoring of employers©
situations also enhanced the likelihood that Downriver staff
would be in the right place at the right time, should an
employer develop a vacancy.
Job matching typically involves storing participant information (e.g.,
test scores, vocational interests, and background) organized by occupa
tional code. When a job order is produced by a job developer, the par
ticipant file is accessed to identify appropriate referrals. Files of pro
spective candidates are then reviewed, often in consultation with the
counselors responsible for particular individuals. Once a tentative selec
tion is made, the participants are notified, and, if they are interested,
an interview is arranged.

Programs to Enhance Job Search Skills
The OTA report (1986:248) remarks that training in job search skills
is valuable because many displaced workers do not know how or where
to look for employment. Often, the report points out, displaced workers
have had only one job in their lives, and they got it by just showing
up at the plant gate. Five state-sponsored experiments intended to test
the effectiveness of alternative JSA services in enhancing the job search
skills of displaced workers are examined in this section.

The Delaware Dislocated Worker Pilot Program
Between late January and early July 1983, the Delaware Department
of Labor conducted a randomized experiment to assess the impact of
alternative services in increasing the earnings of displaced workers and
in reducing their need for UI benefits. The four basic services were
job search workshops, individual counseling, job development, and
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retraining. Information from the program was to be used in planning
Delaware©s JTPA displaced worker program. As noted in chapter 2,
a statewide program in Delaware was begun in 1984.
Although the pilot program achieved the quite high placement rate
of 80 percent for program participants, the econometric analysis reported
by Bloom (1987) indicates that there is no significant difference be
tween the treatment and control groups in either UI benefit payments
or short-run earnings. An extremely small sample size only 65 per
sons in the treatment group and 110 in the control group leads to large
standard errors, however, making it unlikely that precise program im
pacts would be detected.
Of perhaps more interest than his empirical results are Bloom©s recom
mendations based on qualitative evidence regarding the three JSA ser
vices (job search workshops, counseling, and job development) included
in the Delaware pilot program. Using information gained from site visits
and discussions with program staff members, he draws the following
conclusions.
1. Staff members frequently complained that some participants lack
ed motivation to engage in job search. Program changes suggested by
Bloom thus include (1) more detailed interviews by program staff and
(2) more motivational hurdles at the outset of the program (e.g., fur
ther individual assessment and required participation in more preliminary
orientation activities). The more comprehensive initial screening of par
ticipants would hopefully have the effect of restricting program ser
vices to those who really need them and are likely to benefit.
2. The four to five half-day job search workshops were perceived
by both participants and staff as quite valuable. Given the amount of
material covered (i.e., assessment of individual career goals, putting
together a resume, interview preparation, uses of media and other job
information, and self-directed job finding approaches), Bloom recom
mends that the workshops be continued and extended in length.
3. The counseling and job development roles were performed by
separate groups of persons on loan from area high schools and com
munity colleges. The provision of both of these services would be
strengthened if (1) counselors and job developers devoted more of their
time to the program and (2) the counseling and job development ser-
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vices were more closely linked. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita
(1984:134) reinforce this conclusion, pointing out that the absence of
coordination means that job developers work with little detailed
knowledge of the employment strengths and weaknesses of individual
participants. At the same time, counselors and participants operate
without detailed information on area employers and specific job
openings.

The Wisconsin ERP Pilot Project
In contrast to the Delaware program, the Wisconsin ERP Pilot Proj
ect concentrated on just one ISA service job search workshops. 2 As
described by Jaggers et al. (1984), the objective of the project was to
determine the effect on UI benefit expenditures of mandatory attendance
at a one-day, six-hour workshop. The project involved a sample of4,276
indefinitely separated UI claimants who were randomly assigned to treat
ment and control groups (the treatment group consisted of 1,999 in
dividuals). Workshops were conducted at six sites between March and
August 1983. Unfortunately, the design of the pilot project does not
allow for an assessment of the impact of differences in workshop con
tent and methodologies between sites.
The principal result of the ERP project is that the treatment group
is found to have received on average 0.62 fewer weeks of UI benefits
than the control group. Spread over the entire sample of claimants, the
0.62-week difference amounts to a gross saving of $164,837 in UI benefit
expenditures. Of this figure, $11,438 is due to the denial of one week
of benefits to treatment group claimants who failed to attend a workshop.
The implication is that the remaining saving of $153,399 can be attributed
to workshop attendance. Total project costs were approximately $50,000.
As was the case for the Delaware program, the qualitative reaction
to the ERP workshops was highly favorable. Nearly all of the claimants
who attended a workshop reported that they benefited from the ex
perience. Similarly, district Job Service directors at the project sites
and workshop staff members were unanimous in supporting the con
tinuation of this JSA service. Jaggers et al. (1984:5) conclude that in
a period of high unemployment and ES understaffing due to federal cut
backs, job search workshops represent an efficient use of UI resources
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in terms of both the effective utilization of ES employment assistance
expertise and the preservation of the state©s UI trust fund.

JSA Services in the New Jersey UI Reemployment
Demonstration Project
Possibly the most ambitious experiment designed to measure the ef
fectiveness of JSA services (as well as other types of reemployment
assistance) is the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration Proj
ect. The U.S. Department of Labor initiated the project, and it is operated
as a joint venture by the USDOL and the New Jersey Department of
Labor. Implementation began in July 1986.
An overview of the demonstration. The New Jersey demonstration
has two primary objectives. The first is to assess the feasibility of an
"early intervention" strategy. At issue are the questions of whether
and how it is possible to use the UI system to identify early in the claim
period unemployed workers who are likely to exhaust benefits but are
unlikely to return to their old or similar jobs. "Early" is defined opera
tionally as the fifth week of claiming UI benefits. The second objective
is to empirically measure the effectiveness of three alternative packages
of reemployment services in accelerating the return to work. JSA, which
is designated Treatment 1, is the first of the three. Treatments 2 and
3 are, respectively, JSA plus an offer of either training or relocation
assistance and JSA plus an offer of a reemployment bonus.
Concerning the first objective, the basic problem is to distinguish
displaced workers from those who are unemployed for other (cyclical,
frictional, or seasonal) reasons so that appropriate services can be pro
vided early in the spell of unemployment. The Unemployment Insurance
Service report (1986:6) describing the New Jersey demonstration points
out that the clearest way to make this distinction is by looking at the
length of completed unemployment spells. The longer the spell, the more
likely it is that the unemployed worker is truly displaced. But, as the
report notes, ex post information on length of spells is not very helpful
in making ex ante decisions on which claimants should be targeted for
assistance.
The approach taken in the demonstration project is to apply five
"screens" during the fourth week of claiming benefits. The cumulative
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effect of these screens is to define displaced workers as unemployed
workers on permanent layoff who are 25 years of age and older and
who had at least three years of tenure with their last employer prior
to being laid off. Over 7,000 claimants who passed through these screens
were randomly selected for the experiment and offered demonstration
services.
Turning to the second objective of the demonstration, a full range
of ISA services is included as part of Treatment 1. These services in
clude orientation, testing, a job search workshop, a resource center,
an assessment/counseling interview, and job referral. Following the
assessment/counseling interview, participants are expected to have a
specific job goal, an "employability plan" directed at achieving that
goal, and a working knowledge of how to effectively use a resource
center. Periodic follow-up contacts are scheduled following the assess
ment interview.
It should be emphasized that these ISA services are above and beyond
those currently provided to unemployed New Jersey residents. That is,
unemployed workers assigned to both the treatment group and the con
trol group would be eligible for JTPA Title III services, they would
be referred to the ES for placement assistance, and they would par
ticipate in the UI work search process. The demonstration services dif
fer from those currently offered in that claimants in the demonstration
have a considerably higher chance of receiving the (JSA or retrain
ing/relocation) services, and the demonstration services are generally
provided earlier in the unemployment spell. In each of 10 demonstra
tion sites, current and demonstration services are provided by four-person
teams consisting of three ES staff members and a JTPA staff member
from the local Service Delivery Area.
Preliminary results. An interim report by Corson and Kerachsky
(1987) discusses preliminary results for the first six months of program
operation following its implementation in July 1986. Regarding the
demonstration©s first objective, the report notes that it is not yet possi
ble to determine whether the five screens satisfactorily identify claimants
who, in the absence of additional employment services, would experience
difficulty in becoming reemployed. Nevertheless, the screens do ap
pear to restrict the demonstration-eligible population to persons whose
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attributes are usually associated with displaced workers and reemployment difficulty. For example, sizable fractions of the demonstration
population are male, displaced from jobs in manufacturing, and black
or Hispanic. Cases in which the screening procedure tended to break
down include individuals from growing industries like services, and
claimants who eventually returned to their former employer and
presumably did not require reemployment services.
Preliminary evidence on the net impact of the three treatments on
weeks and amount of UI benefits is presented in table 3.1. (Later reports
are to include estimates of treatment effects on employment and earn
ings.) Estimates shown are the treatment group mean minus the con
trol group mean. The ISA-only treatment is seen to decrease length of
UI benefits by slightly over half a week and amount of benefits by nearly
$88. The estimated effect on weeks of UI benefits is quite comparable
to the estimate of 0.62 of a week obtained for job search workshops
only in the Wisconsin ERP project.
Table 3.1
Estimated Treatment Effects for the New Jersey
UI Reemployment Demonstration

JSA
only

JSA plus
training/
relocation

Weeks of UI paid

-0.54

-0.49

-0.64

Dollars of UI paid

-$87.55

-$69.42

-$171.72

Outcome
measure

JSA plus
reemployment
bonus

SOURCE: Corson and Kerachsky (1987, Table 4, p. 21).

Looking across treatments, the results in the table are generally con
sistent with a priori expectations. In particular, the reemployment bonus
is expected to have the largest impact because of the substantial reemploy
ment incentive created by the bonus. (This result will be discussed in
more detail later in the chapter.) Corson and Kerachsky (1987:21) note
that the estimated differences between the bonus treatment and the JSA-

64

Job Search Assistance Programs

only treatment are statistically significant. It is also expected that the
training/relocation treatment will have the smallest immediate effect on
UI receipt, since individuals undergoing training continue to receive
UI benefits. The benefit of training in terms of economizing on UI costs
should occur in the longer run as retrained individuals enjoy more stable
employment. The small differences seen in table 3.1 between the ISAonly and the ISA plus training/relocation treatments are not statistical
ly significant. Also contributing to the small estimated differences is
the low participation rate of 14 to 16 percent of those offered the train
ing/relocation option. 3
The Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration (WAD) Projects
It is useful to compare the preliminary results from the ongoing New
Jersey demonstration to the findings of the completed Texas WAD proj
ects. Carried out during 1983-85 by the Texas Department of Com
munity Affairs, WAD involved some 2,250 Title ffl JTPA program
participants in two projects in El Paso and one in Houston. It is impor
tant to note that the Texas demonstration projects represent the first
attempt to apply an experimental design methodology to an evaluation
of continuing Title HI programs.
As described in the report by Bloom and Kulik (1986), the experimen
tal design of the WAD projects included random assignment of Title
HI program participants to either of two treatment groups or to a con
trol group. The first treatment group received JSA services only (Tier
I). Core JSA services provided at all three sites included orientation,
job search workshops, assessment, and job development and placement.
Members of the second treatment group received JSA followed, if
necessary, by more expensive classroom or OJT retraining (the Tier
I/II sequence). The control group was supplied all non-Title III ser
vices available in Texas.
In addition to the Tier I and Tier I/II distinction, there were also im
portant differences between sites. In Houston, participants tended to
be prime-age white males, while Hispanic females were heavily
represented in the two El Paso sites. Overall, nearly 40 percent of WAD
participants were women. Only for the Houston site could the differential
effect of the additional services in the Tier I/TJ sequence be distinguished
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from the Tier I ISA-only services. The available comparison for the
El Paso sites is limited to the Tier I/n sequence and the control group.
The WAD demonstration yielded three main results. As summariz
ed in table 3.2, the first is that program participants experienced shortrun positive impacts on earnings and weeks worked as well as a decrease
in dollars received in UI benefits. (The ambiguous findings for female
participants in Houston appear to be due to the small sample size.) Sec
ond, these impact estimates tended to be larger and more pronounced
for women than for men. In particular, female participants in El Paso
experienced a program-induced gain in annual earnings of $1,070. The
gain in annual earnings for men in Houston and El Paso ranged from
$750 to $770. Since the mostly male Houston participants earned more
than twice as much as the mostly female El Paso participants prior to
WAD enrollment, the gender difference in estimated earnings gains is
even more striking when expressed in percentage terms.
Table 3.2
Estimated Program Effects for the Texas WAD Projects
Men

Women

Outcome measure

Houston

El Paso

Houston

El Paso

Annual earnings for the year
after random assignment

$750

$770

0

$1,070

2.1

0.7

1.7

3.1

-$210

-$170

$200

-$130

Weeks worked for postassignment quarters 3 and 4
Total UI benefits for 30 weeks
after random assignment

SOURCE: Bloom and Kulik (1986, Exhibit 7.2, p. 171).

The third result (not shown in table 3.2) involved the differential ef
fect of Tier I versus Tier I/IE services. For males in Houston, the effect
of retraining services (which were almost exclusively classroom train
ing) was to decrease both earnings and employment relative to the ef
fect of ISA-only. For example, the earnings gain for the year after
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random assignment was $860 for Tier I-only participants as compared
to only $680 for Tier I/n participants. Bloom and Kulik (1986:173)
take considerable pains to qualify this result. Most important, they note
that the technical-vocational classroom training provided in Houston
was of limited interest to participants, who were predominantly highlypaid former petrochemical workers. This mismatch between partici
pant interests and available retraining options resulted in low participation
in the training component of the Tier I/n sequence, and it undoubtedly
contributed to the negative incremental effect estimated for classroom
training. For future Title in programs, Bloom and Kulik (1986:181)
conclude that (1) JSA should be the core service provided and (2) skill
training should be used sparingly for well-specified needs and only where
adequate local training resources are present.
The Washington Claimant Placement Project
The final JSA program summarized in this section is the Claimant
Placement Project first authorized in 1985 as a two-year pilot project
by the Washington state legislature. One important feature of this pro
gram is its funding. As described in chapter 2, funding is provided
through an earmarked tax of 0.02 percent on employer payrolls, with
an offsetting reduction in UI tax rates of 0.02 percent for most employers.
Also worth noting is the project©s explicit goal of protecting the solvency
of the state©s UI trust fund by reducing the average length of claimants©
unemployment spells. The method by which this objective is to be ac
complished is individualized JSA services provided early in the period
of UI eligibility.
To provide some assurance that sufficient job openings will be
available to match up with unemployed workers, the project selected
20 Job Service offices located in local labor markets identified as hav
ing the greatest potential for claimants to return to work quickly. From
each of these 20 offices, project staff members work with claimants
from the onset of their UI claims through approximately the tenth week
of unemployment. A full mix of JSA services is offered including skill
assessment and testing, job search workshops, job matching, and job
development.
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Two JSA services of particular interest are the comprehensive
employability plan worked out for each claimant and the First Source
Hire Program. A recent report of the Washington State ES Department
(1987) details the elements of an employability plan as including (1) a
listing of the claimant©s skills and experience, (2) notice of any factors
hindering job search (e.g., lack of child care), (3) identification of
suitable occupations and a reasonable expected wage rate, (4) a plan
consisting of specific action steps leading to employment, (5) recognition
of any additional social services necessary to overcome barriers to
employment, and (6) a signed commitment by a project staff member
and the claimant to follow through with the plan.
The First Source Hire Program allows a claimant to try out a job
for 30 days while continuing to draw UI benefits. The idea behind the
program is to provide the employer a chance to assess a claimant©s job
performance before putting him or her on the payroll. The ES depart
ment report notes that the JSA service making the most difference for
project claimants is the employability plan. Unfortunately, there is cur
rently no quantitative evaluation evidence publicly available.
In the spring of 1987, the Washington state legislature took action
to permanently fund the Claimant Placement Project but with an in
teresting change in emphasis. Whereas services provided by the pilot
project were available to almost any UI claimant on permanent layoff,
the 1987 legislation gives priority to older workers and the long-term
unemployed. The former group is defined as UI claimants 50 years of
age and older. The ES department is delegated the responsibility of iden
tifying the latter group subject to the guideline that the long-term
unemployed are to include those demographic groups of UI claimants
with the highest percentages of persons who have either drawn at least
15 weeks of UI benefits or exhausted their UI eligibility. The enabling
legislation singles out these two groups to receive special JSA services
because they are thought to be less likely than the general population
of claimants to find new employment at wages comparable to their
prelayoff earnings.
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The Reemployment Bonus Concept
While the previous section focused on programs designed to enhance
job search skills, the introduction to this chapter pointed out that the
reemployment of displaced workers may also be delayed by a lack of
motivation to engage in search or by the natural reluctance to accept
a new job offering considerably lower wages and benefits. This sec
tion describes two experiments designed to test the impact of a reemploy
ment bonus in stimulating the intensity of job search and the willingness
to accept offered jobs. Since the reemployment bonus is a new con
cept, the results of these experiments are being closely studied by
policymakers interested in innovative approaches for reducing UI outlays
and the length of insured unemployment spells.

The Illinois UI Experiment
Between mid-1984 and mid-1985, the Illinois ES department con
ducted a controlled experiment involving two types of reemployment
bonuses. In the Claimant Bonus Experiment, a random sample of new
UI claimants was told that they would receive a cash bonus of $500
upon reemployment. 4 The intent of this experiment was to encourage
more intensive job search and faster reemployment. In the Employer
Bonus Experiment, another random sample of new UI claimants was
told that, once a hiring commitment was made, the employer of each
newly hired claimant would be eligible for a $500 cash bonus. Here
the intent was to test the effect of a marginal wage-bill subsidy (or training
subsidy) in reducing the duration of insured unemployment.
Bonuses in both experiments were paid only if hiring (of 30 hours
or more per week) occurred within 11 weeks of the initial claim and
if the job lasted at least four months. The 11-week period was chosen
because it was one to two weeks less than the median duration of in
sured unemployment in the state. The four-month job duration require
ment was imposed to reduce the possibility that a claimant would ac
cept a temporary or seasonal job simply to obtain the bonus. Roughly
4,000 UI claimants between the ages of 20 and 55 were randomly assign
ed to each of the two treatment groups and to the control group.

Job Search Assistance Programs

69

As reported by Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), the main results
of the Illinois UI experiments include the following:
1. Important differences were found in claimants© willingness to par
ticipate in the two experiments. About 84 percent of those eligible for
the Claimant Experiment agreed to participate, as opposed to just 65
percent of those offered the chance to participate in the Employer Ex
periment. A similar difference in actual use of the programs was also
detected. Only 3 percent of Employer Experiment enrollees were respon
sible for a bonus payment to their employers, whereas 14 percent of
Claimant Experiment enrollees earned a bonus for themselves.
2. Comparing the entire Employer Experiment treatment group to
the entire control group, there is no significant difference in either UI
benefits paid or weeks of insured unemployment, where both outcome
variables are measured over the full benefit year. This result is not sur
prising, given the limited participation in the program and the very small
percentage of employers who actually received bonuses.
When white women are analyzed separately, however, enrollment
in the Employer Experiment is found to unambiguously reduce both
UI benefit payments and weeks of insured unemployment. White female
enrollees received $164 less in UI benefits and experienced one full
week less of insured unemployment (over the full benefit year) than
did white women randomly assigned to the control group. White women
were the only race-sex group that experienced a statistically significant
effect in this experiment.
3. In contrast to the generally insignificant Employer Experiment
results, the Claimant Experiment is found on average to have reduced
UI benefits by $158 and duration of insured unemployment by 1.15
weeks, where both outcome variables are measured over the benefit
year. These estimates are obtained for all workers assigned to the Claim
ant Experiment, whether or not they agreed to participate, and whether
or not they actually received bonus payments. When the average $158
reduction in UI benefits is multiplied by the over 4,000 Claimant Ex
periment assignees, Illinois saved roughtly $660,000 relative to what
its UI benefit expenditures would have been in the absence of the pro
gram. Bonus payments to eligible claimants amounted to $285,000, so
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that unemployment benefits were reduced by a striking $2.32 for every
$1 in bonuses paid out to claimants by the state.
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987:527) also point out that if the Clai
mant Experiment were implemented in a full-scale program, the takeup rate would undoubtedly be higher than it was in the experiment. The
experiment©s take-up rate of 0.545 is calculated by dividing the pro
portion of claimants receiving a bonus (0.136) by the proportion quali
fying for a bonus (0.250). A higher take-up rate would have the effect
of reducing the benefit-cost ratio for the program. But even in the unlikely
event of a 100 percent take-up rate, the benefit-cost ratio would fall
to only 1.26, which implies that the Claimant Experiment would reduce
UI benefit expenditures by considerably more than the bonus costs
incurred.
4. A possible explanation of the effect of the Claimant Experiment
in reducing length of unemployment is that program participants may
have accepted a less favorable match between worker and job (thereby
sacrificing earnings) in order to qualify for the $500 bonus. A com
parison of postprogram earnings across the treatment and control groups
indicates, however, that this is not the case. More consistent with the
evidence is the hypothesis that the faster reemployment resulted from
more intense job search effort by Claimant Experiment participants.
The Reemployment Bonus Treatment in the
New Jersey Demonstration Project
The encouraging response of UI claimants to the Illinois Claimant
Experiment program suggests that it might be useful to explore further
the potential of the reemployment bonus concept. A desirable exten
sion of the Illinois experiment would be to make the size of the bonus
conditional on the length of job search. Treatment 3 of the New Jersey
UI Reemployment Demonstration Project is a reemployment bonus the
size of which hinges on a claimant©s remaining UI "entitlement." Re
maining entitlement is defined as the lump-sum payment representing
the stream of benefit payments to be received over the remaining weeks
of UI eligibility.
The New Jersey reemployment bonus treatment works as follows.
Treatment group members pass through the sequence of JSA services
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(orientation, testing, and a job search workshop) to the assess
ment/counseling interview which occurs in the seventh week of the
benefit period. In the course of their interviews, claimants selected for
this treatment are informed of the specifics of the bonus program. If
they decide to participate, they can collect the maximum bonus by
locating and accepting a job during the next two weeks. The maximum
bonus is specified to be one-half of the claimant©s total entitlement. After
the two-week period has passed, the size of the bonus will decrease
by 10 percent per week, reaching zero at the end of the eleventh week
after the assessment/counseling interview (the eighteenth week of the
entitlement period).
A concern of program designers was that the bonus be structured so
that it would not encourage claimants to take minimum wage or very
short-term jobs. The Illinois experiment dealt with this problem, as noted,
by requiring full-time employment lasting at least four months. Treat
ment 3 participants in New Jersey are required to obtain full-time
employment lasting four weeks in order to qualify for a bonus.
Moreover, two additional provisions are built into the program to en
courage participants to seek "appropriate" employment. First,
counselors are to inform participants in the assessment/counseling in
terview of the potential long-term earnings loss that would result from
accepting a low-wage job just to get the bonus. Second, the bonus pay
ment is divided into two lump-sums, with receipt of the second lumpsum contingent on continued employment for 12 weeks.
Corson and Kerachsky (1987:18) report that the bonus receipt rate
is about 20 percent. 5 About one-quarter of those who earned the bonus
received the maximum of $1,600, and most others received over 60
percent of the maximum (the mean expected bonus is about $1,300).
Given the limited experience to date, the authors indicate that the average
job for which the bonus is claimed starts about four weeks after the
assessment/counseling interview.
Returning to the estimates shown for the New Jersey demonstration
in table 3.1, the incremental effects of the reemployment bonus are a
reduction in the average duration of insured unemployment by 0.10 of
a week and a decrease in UI benefit expenditures of $84.17. These
estimates are substantially smaller than the corresponding estimates of
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1.15 weeks and $158 obtained for the Illinois Claimant Bonus Experi
ment. Since the average bonus payment is more than twice that paid
out in Illinois, the cost effectiveness of the Illinois claimant bonus pro
gram does not appear to carry over to the New Jersey experiment. The
New Jersey program pays out $260 (=.20 x $1,300) to save about $84
in UI payments. Nevertheless, as argued by Corson and Kerachsky
(1987:21), the truncation of the observation period means that the
estimates presented in the table are likely to underestimate the ultimate
effect of the reemployment bonus (as well as that of the other two
treatments).
As a final comment on the reemployment bonus concept, Woodbury
and Spiegelman (1987) make the point that the bonus paid to workers
can be viewed in the context of either a job search model or an incomeleisure model of labor supply. In the labor supply context, the bonus
raises the opportunity cost of leisure consumed during the time period
immediately following the initial claim, thus creating an incentive to
substitute income for leisure. From this perspective, a reemployment
bonus represents a wage-subsidy to workers which should help to over
come their reluctance to move to jobs paying lower wages but offering
superior career opportunities.
Programs to Monitor Job Search
In addition to paying bonuses to stimulate job search intensity, the
incentive to engage in active job search may also be increased by rais
ing the probability that claimants who fail to meet the UI work test will
be detected and their names removed from UI benefit rolls. This sec
tion discusses two demonstration projects intended to test the effec
tiveness of alternative approaches to monitoring and directing the search
activity of UI claimants.
The Charleston Claimant Placement
and Work Test Demonstration
Carried out during the period from February through December 1983,
this demonstration project involved over 5,000 UI claimants in the
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Charleston, South Carolina area who were randomly assigned to three
treatment groups and a control group. All three treatment groups received
a "strengthened work test" implemented by sending a call-in notice
to claimants at the time their first UI check was issued requiring them
to register at a local Job Service office within one week or face a possi
ble loss of benefits. This delayed registration requirement represented
a change from standard procedures in several ways. First, it exempted
from registration ineligible and job-attached claimants, thereby allow
ing the ES to focus its attention on those who might benefit most from
its services. Second, it provided a definite date by which registration
was to occur. Third, the registration requirement was explicitly
monitored by a computerized matching of UI call-ins and ES registra
tion files. Finally, when a match was not found, the claimant was sent
a notice to report for a fact-finding interview, and no benefits were paid
until he or she had reported. Treatment Group 3 received only the
strengthened work test, as well as the same services provided all other
ES applicants.
Treatment Group 2 differed from Group 3 in that, in addition to the
strengthened work test, its members received more intensive job place
ment services than those customarily provided. In particular, Group
2 claimants were offered a placement interview during which they were
placed in the job-matching system. After the placement interview,
claimants considered job-ready could also expect to receive either a job
referral or a job development attempt. Those claimants who were still
unemployed nine weeks later were sent a second call-in notice requir
ing a return visit to the ES. Enhanced placement services were also
provided during this second visit.
Treatment Group 1 claimants were offered the same services as pro
vided Group 2, with the addition of an opportunity to participate in a
three-hour job search workshop. The workshops were offered to
claimants who had been collecting UI benefits for four weeks. The special
call-ins involved in Groups 1 and 2 services also increased the ability
of the ES to provide information to enforce the UI work test. Group
4, the control group, was told about the services available at ES offices
but not required to report.
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The main results of the Charleston demonstration are described in
Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985) and summarized in table 3.3.
Relative to the experience of the control group, the strengthened work
test applied to claimants in Group 3 reduced length of UI benefits by
slightly over half a week and the amount of benefits by about $53. The
ISA activities provided to claimants in Groups 1 and 2 further reduced
per claimant UI expenditures, particularly the addition of the job search
workshop for Group 1 claimants.
Table 3.3
Estimated Treatment Effects and Costs
for the Charleston Demonstration Project
Treatment Group8
Outcome measure
Reduction in mean UI benefits
Weeks collected
Dollars collected
Net additional administrative
cost per claimant

123
0.76
$73.14

0.61
$58.71

0.55
$52.93

$17.58

$13.17

$4.72

SOURCE: Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985: Table V.I, p. 104).
a. Treatment Group 3 received only the strengthened work test. Group 2 received enhanced job
placement services plus the strengthened work test. Group 1 was offered a job search workshop
in addition to enhanced job placement services and the strengthened work test.

Taking account of administrative costs, the final row of the table in
dicates that for each dollar spent on administering the strengthened work
test, UI expenditures were reduced by an amazing $11.21. The addi
tion of enhanced job placement services for Group 2 claimants increas
ed administrative costs by more than its small impact in reducing UI
benefits. On the other hand, the job search workshop added for Group
1 claimants decreased UI payments by more than the associated increase
in administrative costs. Treatment 1 is therefore cost effective relative
to Treatment 2.
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Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985:106-108) interpret their results
as suggesting that there is no strong evidence that the treatments af
fected the reemployment success of claimants, either by encouraging
more active job search or by helping claimants to find jobs more rapid
ly than they would have otherwise. Rather, it appears that the report
ing requirements, coupled with the cessation of UI payments for failure
to report, were the most important reasons why the treatments led to
a reduction-in UI expenditures. Claimants tended to leave the UI rolls
either because they were formally denied benefits or they simply stop
ped claiming benefits. From an overall policy perspective, the Charleston
demonstration indicates that the manner in which the UI work test is
monitored does matter.
The Washington Alternative Work Search Project
The second demonstration project examined in this section is similar
in design and orientation to the Charleston demonstration, but it places
less emphasis on work test monitoring and more emphasis on alternatives
for structuring UI claimants© work search effort. Located in Tacoma,
Washington, the demonstration began on July 1, 1986 and was to con
tinue for five quarters through the end of September 1987. Results are
as yet unavailable.
Like the Charleston project, claimants in the Tacoma demonstration
are randomly distributed across three treatment groups and a control
group. Treatment 1 represents a radical departure from current policy.
Claimants are instructed that they are expected to conduct an active
search for work, but there is no monitoring of their search by the local
Job Service office. The only requirement for continued UI benefit
eligibility is that claimants call in whenever there is a change in their
eligibility status (e.g., positive earnings or employment, ceasing to look
for employment, or unavailability for work). The basic question ad
dressed by this treatment is whether current monitoring and reporting
requirements affect the motivation to seek work and the duration of
unemployment.
Treatment 2 the control group subjects claimants to current work
search policy. That is, following ES registration compliance with the
UI work test is implemented by requiring all claimants, excluding those
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on temporary layoffs, to make three employer contacts per week.
Claimants© self-reported search activity is monitored by local Job Ser
vice officials on a weekly basis. The only reemployment service pro
vided claimants is an Eligibility Review Interview (ERI) conducted dur
ing the thirteenth week of unemployment (which is the average dura
tion of unemployment for the state). The intent of the ERI is to advise
claimants of continued eligibility requirements and to discuss work search
techniques. Underlying this treatment is the premise that intervention
in the search process is a low priority use of scarce resources in com
parison to the timely payment of benefits. In meeting the specific needs
of displaced workers, it is perhaps worth noting that the Secretary of
Labor©s Task Force (1986:33) recommends that the ES be restructured
to more effectively and efficiently deliver labor market adjustment
services.
Treatment 3 represents a more activist approach to assisting the return
to work. The main change from current policy is to tailor search re
quirements to the needs of individual claimants and to local labor market
conditions. In particular, the required number of contacts per week is
made more flexible depending on the claimant©s occupation and par
ticular reemployment problems. The work search requirement expressed
in terms of contacts per week becomes more intensive, however, as
length of unemployment increases. The ERI is also moved up in the
claim period to as early as the fourth week for claimants in high-demand
occupations.
Treatment 4 is similar to Treatment 3 except that instead of the earlier
ERI, its main form of intervention is an intensive two-day job search
workshop scheduled for the fourth week of unemployment. Interven
tion in the fourth week is based on the presumption that if unemploy
ment lasts more than a few weeks, the claimant is probably in need
of JSA services. Workshop services include skill assessment, interview
ing and marketing techniques, telephone canvassing, and job develop
ment. The workshop is followed by three weeks of telephoning
employers using the facilities of resource centers.
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Summary

Following a description of individual job search assistance services,
this chapter focused on three types of JSA programs. A common ob
jective of all three types is to speed up reemployment in order to reduce
UI benefit expenditures. The different categories of programs are
distinguished by the problem perceived as causing the reemployment
process to be delayed. The most noteworthy feature of the evaluation
evidence presented in the chapter is that the three types of JSA pro
grams have all been subjected to evaluation using controlled experiments
with random assignment.
The first type of JSA program is directed at the problem that displac
ed workers may possess the vocational training but lack the job search
skills necessary to locate new employment expeditiously. Programs in
tended to enhance job search skills typically include a mix of services
including orientation, assessment and testing, a job search workshop,
counseling, and job development and job matching. Such JSA programs
are widely available under Title HI of the Job Training Partnership Act.
Described in detail in this chapter are the JSA experiments carried out
in Delaware, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington state.
The evidence produced from the Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Texas
experiments indicates substantial program effects measured in terms
of reducing weeks of unemployment and level of UI benefits paid out.
For the other two programs, the size of the sample available for the
Delaware pilot project is probably insufficient for drawing reliable
statistical inferences, and quantitative evidence is not available for the
Washington project. It should be noted, however, that both the Delaware
and Washington experiments have led to permanent state-funded
programs.
A second type of JSA program is directed at the problem that
reemployment is delayed because UI claimants lack the motivation to
actively engage in job search. An innovative approach to stimulating
the intensity of job search is the reemployment bonus. Examined in this
chapter are two experimental programs designed to test the effectiveness
of the reemployment bonus concept. Results from the completed ex
periment in Illinois and preliminary results from the New Jersey
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experiment indicate that a reemployment bonus paid to workers (although
not to employers) can reduce the length of unemployment and associated
UI outlays. A striking finding from the Illinois experiment is that UI
benefits were reduced by $2.32 for every $1 in bonuses paid out to
claimants by the state.
The third type of ISA program is based on the hypothesis that alter
native procedures for monitoring and directing the search activityof UI
claimants would increase, relative to current practices, the intensity of
job search. A test of this hypothesis has been carried out in Charleston,
South Carolina and is currently being conducted in Tacoma, Washington.
The Charleston demonstration project suggests that strengthening and
regularizing the way initial ES registration is handled can make a substan
tial difference in UI benefit expenditures. Rather than speeding up
reemployment, however, the saving in UI expenditures appears to have
been mostly due to an increase in the denial of benefits because of
claimants© failure to satisfy the UI work test and to persons failing to
continue to apply for benefits in the early weeks of their claims.
A common theme in the experimental results reported for all three
types of programs is the significant impact of ISA in reducing UI benefit
expenditures. Reinforcing these favorable results are ISA impact
estimates on short-term earnings and reemployment opportunities ob
tained from the federally-funded Downriver and Buffalo demonstration
projects. In the case of the Buffalo project, for instance, Corson, Long,
and Maynard (1985:112) report that program participants who receiv
ed ISA services earned $134 more in the first six months after the pro
gram ended than did members of the control group. Since ISA services
are relatively inexpensive to provide, their favorable impact on UI benefit
expenditures means that ISA programs are quite likely to be cost
effective.

NOTES
1. The second and third treatments are, respectively, ISA plus an offer of either train
ing or relocation assistance and ISA plus an offer of a reemployment bonus.
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2. ERP stands for "Eligibility Review Process," a term used in federal UI regula
tions to refer to the process of promoting active job search by UI claimants. Because
the job search workshops were viewed as assisting claimants in their job search, UI
funds could be used to underwrite the cost of employing ES staff to conduct the
workshops.
3. Corson and Kerachsky (1987:15) note, consistent with other evidence, that fewer
than 1 percent of those offered relocation assistance used it.
4. The $500 figure represented a balance between the budget constraint of the ex
periment and an arbitrary judgment about how small a bonus could still be expected
to elicit a response. For the average UI claimant, $500 was approximately 5 percent
of annual wage and salary earnings, and represented about four weeks of UI payments.
5. An additional 10 percent of Treatment 3 claimants stopped collecting UI but fail
ed to collect a bonus. Claimants falling into this 10 percent are likely to have been
ineligible for a bonus because they either returned to their former employer or they
obtained part-time or seasonal work.

4
Advance Notice and On-Site
Delivery of Services

Chapters 2 and 3 discussed, respectively, state initiatives in voca
tional training and job search assistance (ISA) programs. Relatively little
attention in those chapters was devoted to the questions of where the
programs should be physically located and when the services should
be offered. This chapter examines these two questions in the context
of on-site delivery of reemployment services. On-site programs are
generally of short duration and are timed to either precede or closely
follow the announcement of a layoff or plant closure.
Concerning the location in which reemployment services are provid
ed, the Office of Technology Assessment report (1986:234) makes the
following argument favoring on-site programs:
Some of the best-run displaced worker projects are those
centered in plants that are closing or undergoing large layoffs,
and are operated by people who work at the plant on both
the labor and management sides. Plant-centered projects have
several advantages in their favor: the people who run them
have a personal stake in the outcome, know many of the in
dividual workers involved, and are acquainted with the local
business community where the hidden job market (openings
that are never publicly announced) is found.
Although it is not explicit in this quotation, the author of this section
of the OTA report almost certainly had in mind the operation of on-site
programs sponsored by the Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service
(LAS). The LAS program serves as a model for the state rapid-response
team initiatives discussed later in the chapter.
Before leaving the location question, it should be noted that, despite
this chapter©s focus on site-specific programs, the great majority of
81
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displaced worker programs in the U.S. are neither located at the plant
nor temporary. Programs operated beyond plant gates by continuing
outside organizations are necessary because a large layoff or plant closing
typically has a ripple effect in the community causing other firms,
especially suppliers to the closed plant and local retail and service outlets,
to terminate employees.
Regarding the timing of adjustment assistance, most analysts suggest
that policy intervention is most effective if it is in place before layoffs
begin (see, for example, Fedrau 1984:86). Although not all displaced
workers will opt for immediate program participation, making reemployment services available early offers several advantages. First, displac
ed workers can be identified and offered program services before they
disperse following layoffs. Second, program staff members are given
an opportunity to counsel workers on the need to adjust to the new labor
market realities they face and to assist them in planning a systematic
job search strategy. In addition to minimizing the loss of earnings and
benefits associated with layoffs, the early formulation of a job search
strategy helps to avoid the bitterness and breakdown in self-respect that
often accompanies the unexpected loss of a long-held job and the resulting
period of inactivity. Finally, early intervention provides workers who
choose to enroll in a retraining program the full 26 weeks of income
maintenance furnished by UI. l It is also worth emphasizing that JTPA
Title HI funds can only be used to assist workers who have already
received a termination notice. Thus state-funded programs fill an im
portant gap in assisting displaced workers before they are laid off.
A precondition for effective early intervention is that policymakers
are aware of the imminence of a mass layoff or plant closure. This
chapter begins with a discussion of advance notice legislation and ear
ly warning systems. After describing state advance notice laws and the
new federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, the
first section examines the limited number of empirical studies of the
effectiveness of prenotification.
The next section provides an overview of the rapid-response programs
in place in many states to deliver reemployment services on-site to
displaced workers. Included is a discussion of the highly regarded Cana
dian IAS program. A final section summarizes the chapter.
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Advance Notice and Early Warnings Systems
Early warning of a planned plant closure or mass layoff can be ob
tained in either of two ways. 2 First, employers can be asked (voluntary
advance notice) or mandated (required advance notice) to inform
policymakers in advance of the date of a planned layoff or plant clos
ing. Alternatively, a state may develop its own early warning system
for identifying troubled firms. This section begins with an examination
of the advance notice issue. Then state early warning systems are briefly
discussed.

Advance Notification
Current and proposed legislation. During the past 20 years the states
of Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii have enacted mandatory advance
notice laws. In addition, at least two other states have legislation en
couraging employers to voluntarily give advance notice of layoffs and
plant closings, 3 and a number of other states are considering advance
notice legislation. The first state plant closing law was adopted in Maine
in 1971. As originally passed, the Maine law covered all firms with
more than 100 employees and required that employees be given one
month©s notice of an intended closing. The penalty levied against
employers for failure to give notice was one week©s pay for every year
worked (up to a maximum of one month©s pay) for every employee
with at least one year of seniority. During the years that followed, the
law was amended several times. From 1974 to 1982 the employee
notification provision was dropped, and employers were only required
to notify the director of the state©s Bureau of Labor. The law currently
requires that an employer relocating outside the state must give 60 days©
advance notice to employees and to the director of the Bureau of Labor.
Also included in the law is a provision requiring one week©s severance
pay per year of service for displaced workers with more than three years
of seniority. 4
In Wisconsin, plant closing legislation was passed in 1976 and amend
ed in 1984. The law currently requires 60 days© notice of a plant closure
affecting at least 10 employees by any firm with 100 or more employees
in the state. Notification must be received by affected workers, their
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collective bargaining representative, local community officials, and the
state©s Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations. Employers
who fail to comply with the notification requirement are subject to a
fine of $50 per employee laid off.
The most recent piece of state plant closing legislation was signed
into law by the Governor of Hawaii on July 7, 1987. This law requires
employers with 50 or more workers to give 45 days© advance notice
of a planned layoff. Notice must be provided in writing to all affected
employees and to the state©s director of Labor and Industrial Relations.
Penalties for noncompliance are twofold: (1) affected employees have
the right to sue the employer for damages and (2) the employer is sub
ject to a fine equal in value to three months© wages and benefits for
each laid-off employee.
Turning to the national level, Hamermesh (1987) reports that an ad
vance notice bill the Labor-Management Notification and Consulta
tion Act of 1985 came within five votes of passage in the House of
Representatives. This bill would have mandated at least 90 days© prior
notification of a permanent layoff or plant closing involving more than
50 employees. Dropped on the House floor from the final version of
the bill was a provision requiring employers to consult© ©in good faith©©
with representatives of employees on alternatives to a scheduled clos
ing or layoff.
More recently, the highly controversial advance notice provision
originally attached to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 required that firms employing 100 or more workers must give
60 days© notice of a plant closing. In the case of a layoff, the bill re
quired the 60 days© notice if the layoff involves 50 or more workers
representing at least one-third of the workforce at a place of employ
ment. Firms violating the advance notification requirement would be
obligated to provide back pay to employees for each day of notice not
given (up to a maximum of 60 days of wages) and to pay fines of up
to $500 per day to their local governments. It is interesting to note that
the final version of the bill approved by a House-Senate conference com
mittee omitted a House provision requiring employers, after giving
notification, to consult with unions on proposals to forestall closures
or large layoffs.
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In addition to exempting small firms from the notification require
ment, the 1988 act specified a number of other situations in which an
employer scheduling a shutdown would not be required to give advance
notice. Specifically, exemptions from the notification period would be
permitted in the event of unforeseeable business circumstances or in
cases in which a "faltering" employer was actively seeking additional
capital or new orders to avoid or postpone shutting down. Other ex
emptions included plant closings caused by the sale of the business,
relocations within a community if workers were offered new positions,
and closing of temporary facilities or completions of particular projects.
In May 1988, President Reagan vetoed the entire trade bill, principally
because of his opposition to the mandatory advance notice provision.
The House voted immediately to override the veto, but the 61 to 37
vote in the Senate fell short of the two-thirds majority needed to over
ride. Subsequently, however, prenotification became a hot issue dur
ing the 1988 presidential campaign; and political pressure for the passage
of some form of advance notice legislation was overwhelming. In July
1988, Congress passed the conference committee version of the bill under
the title, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN)
Act. The act finally became law in early August when President Reagan
decided against vetoing the trade bill a second time.
Empirical studies. Despite the recent intense policy interest in plant
closing regulation, relatively little has been done in attempting to em
pirically measure the relationship between advance notice and the subse
quent unemployment and earnings experience of displaced workers.
There are four major studies available at this time.
In the earliest of these studies, Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984)
examine the plant closing legislation adopted in Maine. Although the
Maine law currently makes advance notice mandatory, during the
1974-82 time period examined by the authors the law required employers
only to notify the director of the Bureau of Labor of a closing. Since
the director treated as confidential the notifications he received, whether
or not affected workers received advance notice was at the option of
the employer. The resulting voluntary notification of workers permits
a comparison to be made of the effects of notified and unnotified plant
closings on local unemployment rates.
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The methodology applied by Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick involves
regressing local unemployment rates on three sets of explanatory
variables: (1) the number of workers laid off in major plant closings
expressed as a percentage of the local labor force (current and seven
lagged values of this variable are included); (2) a dummy variable
representing advance notice of at least one month prior to a plant clos
ing interacted with the layoff rates; and (3) control variables, including
the state unemployment rate and a set of dummy variables measuring
area-specific factors (other than plant closings), that might affect
unemployment rates. The advance notice-layoff rate interaction terms
permit the impact of advance notification to be measured conditional
on the level of the layoff rate. The empirical analysis uses a pooled
time-series/cross-section data set which includes monthly data for the
1974-82 period measured across 15 labor market areas in Maine.
The regression results reported by Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick
indicate that advance notice significantly diminishes the unemployment
impact of layoffs in the month of the plant closing. Specifically, ad
vance notice is estimated to reduce the effect of layoffs from 0.8 to
0.3 unemployed workers in the local labor market area for every worker
laid off in that month. The effect of advance notice on total unemploy
ment measured over a six-month period can also be obtained by sum
ming the estimated coefficients on the current and lagged values of the
layoff variables and the advance notice-layoff rate interaction variables.
Carrying out this calculation, the authors find that advance notice lowers
total unemployment from five to four worker-months for every worker
laid off. (It should be emphasized that these six-month estimates in
clude the ripple effect of a layoff so that what is measured is aggregate
worker-months of unemployment per worker laid off and not average
months of unemployment experienced by a laid-off worker.)
In interpreting their results, an important point made by Folbre,
Leighton, and Roderick is that the effect of advance notice on unemploy
ment rates need not occur through the more rapid reemployment of
displaced workers. It is also possible that a decrease in unemployment
may occur via migration from the local labor market or complete
withdrawal from the labor force. The authors report results from an
auxiliary analysis showing that advance notice does decrease the size of
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the local labor force, but they are unable to distinguish between labor
force withdrawal and outmigration (and possible reemployment
elsewhere).
The provocative, if tentative, findings of Folbre, Leighton, and
Roderick receive support from a study of individual-specific data by
Addison and Portugal (1987b). The 1984 DWS data set discussed in
chapter 1 includes a question that asked displaced workers whether or
not they received advance notice or otherwise expected to be laid off.
Addison and Portugal make use of this key piece of information in ex
amining the effect of advance notice on the length of unemployment
spells of workers laid off because of a plant closing or relocation. Serv
ing as control variables in their regression analysis are a varietyof in
dividual worker attributes including years of schooling, sex, race,
predisplacement wage and years of tenure, and receipt of UI benefits.
The main results of the Addison-Portugal study are the following:
1. Advance notification of an impending layoff is strongly and in
versely related to weeks of unemployment. Advance notice is found
to reduce the average length of unemployment spells by about four weeks
or nearly 28 percent.
2. The relationship between advance notice and unemployment hinges
on the receipt of UI benefits, with benefits sharply reducing the effect
of advance notice. Hence, the negative relationship between advance
notice and unemployment duration holds mainly for those who did not
receive benefits. This result can be best understood by noting that a
worker who is eligible for UI by virtue of being unemployed has not
been able to exploit the information conveyed in advance notification
by locating a new job prior to the announced date of plant closure. In
other words, the notified displaced worker receiving UI benefits is in
much the same position as one who did not receive notification
3. The impact of advance notice on unemployment is also found to
be significantly affected by a dummy variable measuring, for those who
received advance notice of a layoff, the effect of quitting prior to the
plant closing date. Inclusion of the "early leaver" variable reduces the
estimated effect of advance notification by about 45 percent. This result
reinforces the conclusion that the driving force behind the negative
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advance notice-unemployment relationship is the impact of prenotification in stimulating early job leaving.
Addison and Portugal point out three qualifications that should be
kept in mind in interpreting their results. First, DWS data provide no
information on the length of advance notification. To the extent that
the period of advance notice is short, the effect of a policy-induced
lengthening of the notification period will be understated. A recent
USGAO study (1987b:34-35) points out that the usual period of notice
is indeed quite short. Based on a survey of business firms that experienc
ed a plant closure or made permanent layoffs, the USGAO reports that
about one-third of the employers surveyed provided no notice at all and
less than 20 percent provided notice of more than 30 days. The median
length of notice was seven days.
A second qualification is that the DWS does not contain information
on ISA services often offered in conjunction with advance notice. The
same USGAO report (1987b: 46-47) notes that about one-third of the
firms surveyed offered job search assistance, and about 20 percent of
fered career and personal counseling. 5 If, as expected, ISA services
speed up the reemployment process, the omission of these services has
the impact of upwardly biasing the estimated effect of advance notice
on unemployment duration.
The final qualification of the Addison-Portugal results is that, as noted,
the advance notice measure available in the DWS includes respondents
expecting to be laid off in addition to those who received advance notice
of a layoff. Thus, the "treatment group" is contaminated by the inclu
sion of an unknown number of respondents who did not actually receive
notice but who instead accurately predicted the closing of their plants.
Swaim and Podgursky (1988:11) argue; reasonably that workers receiving
formal advance notice are likely to be more aggressive in their
predisplacement search than those who merely expected to be laid off.
If this is the case, measurement error in the notification variable will
tend to bias downward the estimated impact of advance notice.
The third major study is the examination by Swaim and Podgursky
(1988) of the impact of advance notice on duration of joblessness using
a pooled sample of displaced workers from both the 1984 DWS and
the 1986 DWS. 6 The conventional treatment of advance notice as a
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dummy variable implicitly assumes that notification only has an effect
on postlayoff search. The main innovation of the Swaim-Podgursky study
is the specification of an empirical model that explicitly allows job search
to commence prior to layoff for workers receiving advance notice. The
modeling of predisplacement search as qualitatively different from
postdisplacement search makes sense for two reasons: (1) the financial
pressure to engage in search is lower before the layoff date than after,
and (2) continued employment between the dates of notification and
layoff absorbs time that potentially could be invested in search activities.
The empirical results obtained by Swaim and Podgursky indicate that
advance notice significantly accelerates reemployment for males in bluecollar and white-collar (including service) jobs and for white-collar
females. This effect is primarily due to the fact that notified workers
are more likely to find a new job before layoff and thus report zero
weeks without work. By way of contrast, it is interesting to note that
in an earlier study, the same authors report a significant effect of ad
vance notice only for white-collar women (see Podgursky and Swaim
1987c). Also worth noting is the Swaim-Podgursky finding that the rate
of reemployment falls sharply as jobless spells increase in length. This
negative "duration dependence" implies that although many displaced
workers become reemployed with little or no joblessness, a substantial
minority have severe adjustment problems and suffer prolonged spells
of unemployment. Demographic groups at high risk of long jobless spells
are found to include older workers, blacks, workers with little school
ing, and single men. Labor market characteristics associated with lengthy
spells include long job tenure, industry unionization rate, and area
unemployment rate.
Swaim and Podgursky next use their results to simulate the effect on
jobless duration of varying lengths of advance notice. For blue-collar
males (by far the largest of the four groups examined), eight weeks
of advance notice compared to no notice reduces the expected length
of a jobless spell from 51.0 weeks to 48.1 weeks. Using market wage
levels to measure the foregone earnings associated with joblessness,
benefits for blue-collar males rise from $539 for four weeks of advance
notice to $1,572 for twelve weeks of notice.
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The final empirical study, by Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988), takes
advantage of detailed industry and slate information available for 1984
DWS respondents to create a merged data set containing an extensive
list of industry- and area-specific variables. These variables include area
unemployment rates, percent unionization by area, estimated three-digit
industry wage premiums, and industry employment growth rates. Among
the major findings of the study are the following:
1. There is little support for the hypothesis that workers who receiv
ed advance notice paid for it by accepting lower predisplacement wages.
Nor were the authors successful in explaining the incidence of
prenotification using data on individual and industry characteristics and
on employment growth and unemployment rates. In analyses such as
the four studies reviewed here, it appears that advance notice can
legitimately be treated as exogenously determined.
2. Advance notice did significantly increase the probability that a
displaced worker would not experience any unemployment. Once
unemployment is experienced, however, receipt of notification does not
appear to affect the ultimate duration of joblessness. This result rein
forces the Addison-Portugal and Swaim-Podgursky conclusion that ad
vance notice primarily operates by stimulating early job leaving, thus
moderating increases in local unemployment rates.
3. There is no evidence that receipt of advance notice has any signifi
cant impact on postdisplacement weekly earnings measured as of the
January 1984 survey date for workers displaced during the 1979-83
period. Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) report the same result for workers
displaced from full-time jobs.
4. For DWS respondents who received advance notice, the authors
were unable to find evidence indicating that variables that might serve
as proxies for productivity (such as job tenure, schooling, or previous
earnings) were systematically associated with the probability that a
worker might quit prior to the date of his or her displacement. Thus,
there is essentially no support based on DWS data for the hypothesis
that prenotification would lead the firm©s most productive workers to
quit their jobs prior to the plant closure.
Benefits and costs of advance notice. Subject to the qualifications
noted, particularly with respect to DWS data, the available empirical
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studies provide limited evidence supporting what is probably the most
important benefit of advance notification legislation. This is the point
that by speeding up the reemployment process, advance notice reduces
the adjustment costs of displacement discussed in chapter I. 7 The
resulting cost reduction represents both a private benefit to workers and
a social benefit from the viewpoint of society.
The empirical evidence does not provide sufficient detail to offer a
behavioral explanation of how the reemployment process is expedited.
But a closely related benefit is that advance notice provides lead time
prior to a layoff or plant closing for policymakers to plan and put into
place a program of worker adjustment assistance. In this connection,
the recent GAO report (1987b:32-33) notes that in Canada, comprehen
sive advance notice laws require between 56 and 112 days of notice,
and that officials of the Canadian IAS program argue that it takes the
bulk of the required time to effectively prepare for a plant closing.
Evidence summarized in the National Academy of Sciences study in
dicates further that workers are more likely to enroll for reemployment
assistance if the programs have the cooperation of management and are
available prior to layoff (see Cyert and Mowery 1987:155-56). One
other policy-related benefit is that advance notice provides time for
government officials to search out new owners for facilities slated for
closure and to assist employee groups in organizing a buyout attempt.
Given the probable benefits of advance notice legislation, the key
policy issue is whether these benefits outweigh the costs imposed on
employers when the government mandates a period of notice that dif
fers from the notice agreed to voluntarily by workers and employers
as part of the compensation package. One factor representing a private
cost to employers is that by reducing the firm©s flexibility in making
layoffs, advance notification increases the fixed costs of employment.
Greater fixed costs affect the demand for labor by causing employers
to hold back on hiring commitments until they can be reasonably sure
that workers hired can be kept on the payroll long enough to recoup
the fixed costs. Workers just worth hiring are now priced out of the
market.
A series of recent editorials in The Wall Street Journal make the argu
ment that the much higher rate of employment growth in the U.S. than
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in Western Europe since 1970 is due, at least in part, to a difference
in the cost of hiring and laying off workers. For example, Drouin (1986)
writes that in Common Market countries:
[R]igid dismissals legislation has transformed labor costs into
fixed costs. The ensuing inflexibility increases overall
business costs and risks. Again most countries, notably
France, are introducing measures to facilitate hiring and fir
ing. Most countries are allowing increased use of fixed-term
contracts. Italy is relaxing recruitment regulations. But,
generally, layoffs continue to require discretionary decisions
by government and lengthy negotiations. The cost of dismissal
remains steep.
Lazear (1987) also concludes from his reading of the European ex
perience that legislation that protects a worker©s right to a job will benefit
some individuals at the expense of others. Incumbent job holders are
likely to benefit from job security policies, while the young and the
unemployed will be hurt. In his view, the record indicates that the number
of jobs lost far outweighs those retained.
A second cost-side consideration mentioned in connection with the
Ehrenberg-Jakubson study is a possible negative effect of advance notice
on worker productivity. One reason is that a termination notice may
reduce employee morale and encourage shirking during the notifica
tion period. Also contributing to lower worker productivity is the possible
effect of advance notice in encouraging early quits, thereby risking the
loss of crucial employees and potentially crippling reductions in the size
of the workforce.
Finally, employers frequently make the third cost-side argument that
advance notice invites contentious efforts by unions and other employee
groups to alter the decision to close a plant. White (1988) provides an
interesting description of the backlash that has occurred when parent
companies try to close plants after having earlier accepted tax conces
sions and subsidized loans offered by states and local communities to
preserve jobs. Actions taken by local government officials to keep plants
in their communities from closing include breach-of-contract suits, prod
uct boycotts, and court injunctions preventing the transfer of capital
equipment to other plants.
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The balance of opinion among labor economists and policymakers
appears to favor requiring employers to provide advance notice of plant
closings or permanent layoffs. On the benefit side, the empirical ar
ticles surveyed in this section indicate that advance notice does facilitate
the adjustment of workers into new jobs prior to their date of displace
ment. On the cost side, in contrast, the fragmentary evidence currently
available fails to suggest that advance notice requirements impose
substantial private costs on employers. Regarding the argument of higher
fixed costs, Abraham and Houseman (1988) conclude from their analysis
of time-series manufacturing data for Germany and the U.S. that there
is no strong evidence that the quite restrictive and controversial dismissal
legislation passed in Germany in the early 1970s affected subsequent
adjustment practices. 8
Concerning workers© productivity and morale, the EhrenbergJakubson findings confirm the results of an early case study by Weber
and Taylor (1963) of 32 plant shutdowns which shows that there was
no perceptible decrease in productivity following the announcement of
a plant closing. Weber and Taylor suggest, in fact, that the spread of
rumors concerning an impending plant closure may be more destruc
tive to morale and productivity than a formal announcement of the shut
down. More recently, the National Academy of Sciences report (see
Cyert and Mowery 1987:157) concludes that
[T]he productivity and quality improvements that occur [dur
ing the advance notice period] appear to reflect the reaction
of employees to the evidence that management is concerned
about their welfare, the operation of counseling and job search
programs that begin prior to layoff, the resolution of anx
ieties and uncertainties, and the desire of workers concern
ed about reemployment to demonstrate to new employers that
the quality of the work force in the closed plant was high.
[Emphasis added.]
Fedrau (1984:84) and the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force (1986:22-23)
reach similar conclusions.
It should also be mentioned that there is a conceptual counterargu
ment to the cost-side point that advance notice has the effect of increasing
fixed costs of employment. The counterargument is that while
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advance notice may increase the private costs borne by employers, failure
to provide advance notice imposes substantial costs (or "externalities")
on workers and communities not shared by the firms closing plants or
laying off workers. Advance notification requirements may thus be view
ed as a mechanism for ensuring that employers bear (or "internalize")
a portion of the costs they impose upon others. In other words, such
requirements help to cushion workers from the mil adverse consequences
of free market decisions, making it politically possible to avoid the sort
of heavy government intervention often practiced abroad.
Given the widespread support for some form of plant closing regula
tion, it is interesting to speculate on the reasons underlying the intense
opposition of many business groups to the modest advance notice re
quirement enacted in the 1988 WARN bill. Addison (1988) suggests
that this opposition has less to do with the specifics of the notification
requirement than with the fear that this piece of legislation represents
an opening wedge for the introduction of far more coercive and costly
forms of government intervention. His argument is that the federal budget
deficit and taxpayer resistance to tax increases severely constrain federal
policymakers from directly providing such widely discussed employ
ment benefits as universal health insurance, parental leave, and child
care. Thus the natural response of those who seek to extend worker
entitlements is to mandate employers to foot the bill for such services.
State Early Warning Systems
A number of states have also proceeded independently of employers
in developing their own early warning systems to identify firms exper
iencing financial difficulty and to indicate needed changes in state
economic policies. To date, no assessments of these systems have been
carried out, and little is known about the importance the states themselves
attach to internally generated early warning signals. This section con
tains a brief overview of the early warning programs of a few selected
states and some associated empirical evidence.
Balderston (1986) describes the early warning systems in place in
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Arizona. In Connecticut, the Depart
ment of Economic Development has attempted to piece together a
historical record of every company that closed in the state and the
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reasons for each failure. A predictive model based on these data is then
used to provide forecasts of which existing firms and plants may be
at risk of shutting down, and field staff members are assigned to work
with these employers to increase their chances of survival. Balderston
notes that the business failure data have also been found useful in con
tributing information on needed adjustments in state policies.
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that the thrust of economic develop
ment programs in some states has shifted from attracting new firms to
retaining existing firms. In the geographically small state of Rhode
Island, the Department of Economic Development surveys each
employer in the state on an annual basis as part of its business retention
program. The purpose of the interviews is to gauge the attitude of the
business community toward the state©s economic climate and to deter
mine how state government can assist in lowering operating costs and
expanding markets. In Arizona, similarly, a Governor©s Task Force
recently surveyed existing firms as well as employers who left the state
or chose not to locate in Arizona in an attempt to assess the effectiveness
of current state economic policies.
Beyond these three states, still other states have recently taken ac
tion to establish early warning systems. In Massachusetts, the Mature
Industries Act passed in 1984 provides for an early warning system in
tended ". . .to identify industries and businesses likely to experience
large losses in employment or plant closures. . . ." In carrying out this
objective, the Act directs a designated state agency the Massachusetts
Industrial Service Program to collect and analyze information on prod
uct markets experiencing declining growth rates and on industries sub
ject to competition from Third-World countries. This agency is also
given the responsibility to monitor changes in patterns of company
ownership, employment, and layoffs; of UI contributions; and of state
corporate tax payments. Since 1984, Nelson (1986; 1987) reports that
Missouri and New Jersey have both established commissions charged
with developing early warning signals to identify industries beginning
to decline and firms in danger of closing.
Recent research by Rowland (1988) helps in our understanding of
what factors are important determinants of plant closures ^nd reloca
tions. Using Dun and Bradstreet©s Dun Market Identifiers file, she
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merged into a single data set time-series observations for 1973, 1975,
1979, and 1982 for each of approximately 54,000 establishments in three
narrowly defined manufacturing industries (metal working machinery,
electronic components, and motor vehicles). Among her major findings
are the following:
1. The most important predictor of whether a plant will close is the
plant©s status as a branch, subsidiary, headquarters, or independent
(single-plant operation). Branches and subsidiaries are found to close
at much higher rates than headquarters and independents. An implica
tion of this finding is that economic development strategies should em
phasize the promotion of start-ups and expansions of locally owned firms.
In addition, Rowland suggests that local takeovers of marginally pro
fitable branches and subsidiaries provide largely untapped opportunities
to keep these plants operating.
2. Local economic conditions including relative wage levels, utility
costs, taxes, and rate of unionization do not strongly influence the prob
ability of a plant closure. This finding implies that local public policies,
including lowering tax rates, curbing utility costs, and discouraging
unionization, will not be effective in retaining jobs. Such policies may
even be counterproductive if they reduce the level of local income and
tax revenues.
In addition to Dun and Bradstreet data, a potentially quite important
source of information on plant closures is the Permanent Mass Layoff
and Plant Closing (PMLPC) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This federal-state program, initially established in 1984 for eight states,
uses data from each state©s UI data base to identify and track workers
affected by major plant closings and layoffs. In 1987, the survey covered
29 states and included information on 1,687 establishments that reported
2,020 major layoffs affecting 406,887 workers. It is expected that the
program will become nationwide during 1988.
The way the PMLPC program works is that state UI data bases are
used to identify establishments with at least 50 initial claims filed against
them during a three-week period. Within each state, these establishments
are then contacted by telephone by the state©s employment security agen
cy to determine the total number of persons separated, the reasons for
these separations, whether the separations are permanent or temporary,
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and whether or not the establishment is remaining open. The resulting
PMLPC data set merges information collected from two different
sources: (1) state UI data bases which supply information on the per
sonal attributes of individual claimants such as sex, age, race, ethnici
ty, and residence, and (2) telephone contacts with employers which pro
vide information on establishment characteristics including location and
industry. Until regular UI benefits are exhausted, the continuing im
pact of a permanent layoff or plant closing can be tracked by matching
affected initial claimants with continued claims filed under regular state
UI programs.
On-Site Delivery of Services
On the presumption that policymakers are informed of an imminent
plant closing, the next question is the most effective way to deliver
reemployment services to workers scheduled to be displaced from their
jobs. The OTA report (1986:238) points out that the value of advance
notification is greatly diminished if high-quality reemployment services
are not offered during the lead time notification provides. An impor
tant aspect of policy intervention during the notification period is that
affected workers are given a structure on which they can pattern their
job search activities. The idea is that displaced workers who are engaged
in active job search are less likely to lapse into a destructive loss of
self-confidence that may otherwise accompany a permanent job loss.
Before proceeding further, it is important to make a distinction be
tween two types of on-site programs. The first involves the on-site
delivery of formal vocational training programs to workers who have
not received notice of termination but who cannot expect to retain their
present jobs if their skills are not upgraded. An example of this type
of on-site initiative is the computer numerical control machining pro
gram provided by California©s ETP program (see Arthur Young
1985:16-17). 9 Serving employees of three large aerospace firms in
southern California, this program brings a mobile training facility (i.e.,
a training trailer) to the site of each participating company. In contrast,
the second type of on-site program is intended to provide predominantly
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ISA services to workers who have received notice of a permanent separa
tion from their jobs. It is the second type of program which will be
discussed here.
Recent discussions of on-site JSA programs have featured prominently
the Canadian IAS program. For example, one of the major recommen
dations of the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force (1986) is to create a
worker adjustment service in each state modeled along the lines of the
IAS. The examination of the IAS program is followed by a description
of existing state rapid-response team programs.

The Canadian IAS Program
Established in 1963, the IAS is a federally-funded agency intended
to serve as a catalyst in bringing together local labor and management
officials to locate job oppportunities for workers displaced by economic
and technological change. The IAS is very small in terms of number
of employees and size of budget. Its staff consists of 60 experienced
professionals, with only three persons located in its headquarters of
fices in Ottawa and the rest assigned to regional field offices. Its an
nual budget in recent years has been between $6 and $8 million (in Cana
dian dollars).
As described in the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force report (1986:21),
the IAS program operates on five premises.
1. Reemployment services should be offered in advance of, rather
than after, a plant closing or mass layoff.
2. Advance warning is essential to allow time for planning and im
plementing appropriate reemployment services.
3. Worker adjustment to displacement is best accomplished by the
joint action of the parties directly involved.
4. The role of government is to encourage and support, not to sup
plant, the efforts of management and labor.
5. Program participation should be voluntary.
After learning that a plant closing is imminent, the IAS acts immediate
ly to meet with labor and management representatives at the highest
possible level and to offer its assistance in finding new jobs for laid-off
workers. Early warning of a layoff is quite likely because six of the
ten Canadian provinces have plant closing laws that require 8 to 16
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weeks© advance notice of layoffs affecting 50 or more workers. In ad
dition, a national advance notice law applies to government-owned enter
prises such as airlines and railroads.
If the lAS©s offer of assistance is accepted, which is nearly always
the case, the agency negotiates a brief formal agreement which pro
vides for the establishment of an ad hoc labor-management adjustment
committee consisting of an equal number of labor and management
representatives. Labor representatives include prospective job losers
wherever possible. The purpose of the agreement is to obtain from both
the employer and the union (if a union is present) a commitment of time
and financial resources to the adjustment process. The IAS also pro
vides a chairman, whom the adjustment committee may select from a
roster of experienced people. In addition, it pays half of the commit
tee©s costs, with the company usually picking up the other half. Com
mittees typically finish their work and disband in about one year. The
IAS arranges from 400 to 600 labor-management agreements per year.
The basic strategy of the IAS is to place unemployed workers in jobs
that are never publicly announced, but instead are filled by word-ofmouth. From this strategy follow several of the important features of
the program. One of these is an emphasis on prompt placement rather
than retraining, relocation, or counseling. Adjustment committees not
only undertake to uncover job openings, but they also attempt to make
it easier for prospective employers to consider client workers by assisting
in the screening process. Workers who cannot be placed because of
a need for retraining are referred to Canada©s extensive adult vocational
training system.
A second feature of the lAS©s strategy is recognition that it is people
with extensive experience in the industry and community that is, the
labor and management representatives on an adjustment committee
who are in the best position to use their informal contacts to engage
in job development. Thus the LAS advisor to an adjustment committee
keeps a low profile, and the committees themselves are flexible enough
to look at the individual needs of each worker. Worth emphasizing is
the basic philosophy of the IAS that displaced workers are to be assisted
individually by persons who know them personally.
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The OTA (1986:23-24, 55, and 167) and the Secretary of Labor©s
Task Force (1986: Appendix A) comment favorably on the operation
of the IAS. Noted in particular are the program©s modest cost (about
$171 per year for every worker served), reasonably good placement
rates (about two-thirds of workers affected by plant closings are placed
within a year), absence of bureaucratic red tape, and contribution to
improved labor-management relations. The Task Force report also men
tions that a survey of displaced workers served during the 1982-83 fiscal
year indicated that IAS assistance reduced the length of unemployment
spells by an average of two weeks, with the resulting saving in unemploy
ment insurance benefits.
One other indication of the interest of U.S. policy makers in the LAS
program is the implementation in January 1987 of a demonstration
program the Canadian-American Plant Closing Demonstration
Project to help determine whether the Canadian model can be transfer
red to the U.S. Jointly sponsored by the USDOL and the National Gover
nors© Association, six states including Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, and Vermont, were selected to participate in the proj
ect. In each state, at least two sites have been selected to test the im
pact of adjustment committees in assisting the reemployment of displaced
workers in a variety of different settings. Salzman (1987) reports that
the project has already caused several states to rethink the administra
tion and operation of their displaced worker programs.
State Rapid-Response Teams
Of existing labor market initiatives in this country, the one that prob
ably comes closest to the IAS is the state rapid-response team concept.
Balderston (1986:39) reports that over 20 states have established rapidresponse teams to coordinate the delivery of services on-site to displaced
workers. A representative example of this coordination is the New Jersey
Labor Response Team program established in December 1984. The pro
gram is operated by the state©s Department of Labor.
Following notification of a plant closure or mass layoff, represen
tatives of relevant state agencies arrange for a meeting with manage
ment officials to discuss the economic status of the company. If a plant
closure or layoff is determined to be unavoidable, the range of available
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state reemployment services is reviewed, and the meeting concludes
with an agreement on the plan of action to be taken and the date for
a response team to make an on-site presentation to affected workers.
A response team consists of staff members of New Jersey©s ES and
UI divisions, the Division of Employment and Training, and the local
Service Delivery Area of the Title HI JTPA program. A variety of topics
are discussed by teams in the on-site sessions. These include an ex
pedited process for registering for UI benefits, the requirements for con
tinued eligibility for UI coverage, an ES-sponsored job search workshop,
and the retraining opportunities available in Title HI programs. The job
search workshop, in particular, is sold as a service especially designed
for people who have not been obliged to look for a job in recent years
because they have been continuously employed. 10 Two themes emphasiz
ed in the sessions are that (1) a displaced worker should not feel that
he or she is alone, since the phenomenon of permanent mass layoffs
and plant closings is a common one in New Jersey and across the na
tion; and (2) it is important to take prompt advantage of the adjustment
services offered.
The available evidence indicates that employer awareness of the New
Jersey program is growing and that more firms involved in curtailing
operations or shutting down plants are contacting the state©s Depart
ment of Labor and providing time and space on-site for team presenta
tions. For the period between July 1, 1986 and March 31, 1987, the
program estimates that 11,461 potentially displaced workers were of
fered adjustment assistance services.
Other state rapid-response team programs place somewhat more em
phasis than New Jersey on employer involvement. In the case of the
Arizona Pre-Layoff Assistance Coordination Team (PACT) program,
an employer planning a layoff or plant closure initiates the process by
alerting state UI or JTPA officials. A PACT team is then assembled,
consisting of staff members from the state©s JTPA, UI, and ES offices
plus representatives from Arizona©s regional system of Dislocated
Worker Assistance Centers. The employer is asked to designate a lead
official to serve as the company©s primary contact for the PACT team,
to supply an on-site facility for the prelayoff sessions, and to provide
two to four hours of paid time off for workers to attend the sessions.
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In addition, companies are encouraged to use their informal contacts
to help in the placement of affected workers with other employers in
the local labor market and to cooperate with the PACT team in putting
on a Job Fair. Once a plant has been closed, remaining displaced workers
are transferred to the regional Dislocated Worker Assistance Center
for additional reemployment services. Information provided by the state
indicates that the PACT program of on-site prelayoff assistance has
achieved a placement rate of 89 percent.
The South Carolina Rapid Response Team program differs from both
the New Jersey and Arizona programs in its strong economic develop
ment focus (see OTA 1986:212). As is the case for the other programs,
South Carolina©s rapid response teams arrange a site visit following
notification of a probable or actual plant closing. What is different about
the South Carolina program is that if the team©s assessment indicates
that closure is avoidable, a strategy is formulated that commits the state
to providing assistance directly to the employer. Forms of assistance
include loan and tax incentive packages; aid in financial management,
marketing, and research and development; and programs to retrain
workers for jobs using automated equipment. If the closing is deemed
inevitable, on the other hand, the team works to find an alternative owner
for the plant and to convert the workforce to new employment.
As a final example of the rapid-response team concept, the "outplace
ment team©© initiative of Rhode Island©s Dislocated Workers Program per
haps comes the closest to the LAS model of joint labor-management
cooperation. To explain the operation of this initiative, Dislocated Work
ers Program officials have developed a case study of the closing of a plant
in Cranston, Rhode Island owned by the Swiss-based Ciba-Geigy Chem
ical Corporation. The following discussion is based on the case study. n
Following the announcement in January 1984 that the Ciba-Geigy
plant would be closed by the end of 1985, a joint labor-management
outplacement team was formed, consisting of representatives of the Oil,
Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, the company, and state govern
ment. The team adopted the following goals for dealing with the ad
justments required by the plant closure:
1. company participation in the adjustment process;
2. sensitivity to the company©s production obligations;
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3. awareness of the relationship between job loss and workers© feel
ings of disbelief, despair, and, sometimes, depression;
4. understanding by individual workers of their employment options
in the context of a career and life plan; and
5. minimizing the time between jobs.
Given the promise of company resources and the pledge of coopera
tion by the union, state officials on the team played the role of a con
sultant to company and union team members who jointly had the final
say on the services to be offered.
With the luxury of two years of advance notice, the outplacement
team was able to plan and implement a sequence of reemployment ac
tivities timed to roughly correspond to the phased shutdown of the plant.
During the first year, the team sponsored retirement seminars for poten
tial retirees and a series of workshops for workers not contemplating
retirement. The workshops included assistance in financial planning,
establishing a job objective, conducting job search, and forming job
clubs. The team also developed a listing of workers classified by skill
to alert other area employers to the availability of Ciba-Geigy employees
and conducted individual and group counseling sessions. It is interesting
to note that feedback from the counseling sessions indicated a high level
of worker interest in the possibility of self-employment. The team
responded to this interest by sponsoring an entrepreneurship seminar
which led to a contractual arrangement with the state©s Small Business
Development Center to provide customized assistance to those for whom
starting their own business was still a viable option.
The outplacement team continued to operate during 1985 with the
initiation of four additional reemployment activities. The first was a
two-day "options fair" designed to acquaint workers with available
career counseling and retraining options. The team also acknowledged
the relatively low levels of formal schooling of many of the older CibaGeigy employees by developing a high school equivalency program of
fered on-site with the cooperation of the Community College of Rhode
Island. Later in the year, the team organized workers into job clubs
to better equip them to find jobs on their own. The final activity was
a two-day Job Fair which brought together 35 potential employers to
meet with Ciba-Geigy workers.
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The South Carolina and Rhode Island rapid-response team programs
pose two important policy questions not yet considered in this
monograph. A question raised by the South Carolina program is the
desirability of supplying assistance directly to distressed employers to
keep existing facilities open and retain jobs, as opposed to the alter
native policy of offering reemployment services to workers laid off when
a plant closes. The further question posed by the Rhode Island program
is the wisdom of assisting unemployed workers to establish their own
small businesses. The next chapter briefly treats state economic develop
ment initiatives which take the form of packages of financial and other
types of assistance to attract new employers, retain old employers, and
find new owners for idled facilities. Also considered in chapter 5 are
worker ownership initiatives, including employee buyout assistance and
British and French experience with unemployed entrepreneur programs.

Summary
Ruth Fedrau, a noted manpower analyst who was instrumental in
establishing the California©s rapid-response program (the California
Economic Adjustment Team), lists seven principles for developing a
successful worker reemployment program (see Fedrau 1984). The prin
ciples stress the desirability of (1) early notification of layoffs,
(2) straightforward communication with employees and union represen
tatives on planned plant closures and available reemployment services,
(3) temporary but intensive services preferably located on-site,
(4) providing an assistance center on-site, (5) pooling the resources of
community organizations and government agencies, (6) providing a wide
range of services, and (7) joint management-labor sponsorship of
assistance.
This chapter discussed how these principles are implemented in exist
ing reemployment initiatives. The first half of the chapter dealt with
the issue of advance notification. Included is an overview of advance
notice laws on the books in three states and the federal Worker Adjust
ment and Retraining Notification Act. The limited empirical evidence
currently available on the impact of advance notice on the subsequent
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unemployment experience of displaced workers is also examined. The
empirical evidence suggests that advance notice is effective in speeding
up the transition of displaced workers to new jobs, primarily by en
couraging workers to locate employment prior to scheduled termina
tion dates. Thus advance notification appears to reduce both the private
and social costs of adjustment associated with worker displacement.
What makes advance notice legislation controversial is the question
of whether this benefit to workers and to society as a whole is suffi
cient to offset the private cost to employers of higher fixed costs of
employment and the possible negative effect on worker productivity
created by such laws. In the absence of evidence demonstrating an
adverse effect on employers, most analysts take the position that, on
balance, advance notification requirements represent sound social policy.
The latter half of the chapter considered the temporary on-site
reemployment programs suggested by the third through seventh of
Fedrau©s principles. Included in the discussion was the highly regard
ed Canadian Industrial Assistance Service program. The main strength
of the LAS is its encouragement of the active participation by employers
in using their informal networks to place workers in jobs that are never
publicly announced. The closest U.S. initiative to the IAS is the rapidresponse team concept, and the operation of several rapid-response team
programs was examined.
In comparison with the LAS, state rapid-response programs differ
substantially among themselves in the emphasis placed on employer in
volvement in minimizing the disruptive effects of displacement. At one
end of the spectrum, teams consisting of representatives of relevant state
agencies are the dominant players in programs intended to deliver a
wide range of reemployment services. Employer participation in these
programs tends to be limited to providing time and a place for the onsite delivery of services. At the other extreme, state programs emphasize
the joint involvement of management and, where present, unions in
locating jobs for displaced workers. In these programs, state officials
typically play the more subordinate role of a consultant to the company
and union representatives on the team.
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NOTES
1. Federal law permits the waiver of the UI work test if the claimant is enrolled in
a training program approved by the Employment Security Commissioner of his or her
state.
2. The provisions in privately negotiated collective bargaining agreements that pro
vide for advance notice of plant shutdowns are excluded from this discussion.
3. The voluntary Maryland advance notice law passed in 1985 requests that employers
of 50 or more workers provide 90 days© notification of permanent layoffs. In addition,
employers are requested to continue employee pension and health insurance benefits,
and a Quick Response Program to provide on-site assistance to displaced workers was
established. As part of its Mature Industries Act, Massachusetts requests employers
to give 90 days© advance notification of large layoffs and plant closings and to extend
group health insurance coverage to laid-off workers. The Mature Industries Act is
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
4. In a recent decision announced in June 1987 (Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
No. 86-340), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Maine©s law requiring one-time
severance pay for plant closings does not conflict with federal labor law regulating
the administration of employee benefit plans.
5. More common than placement assistance is the offer of either income maintenance
of continuation of health insurance. About 45 percent of firms surveyed offered the
former, and about 37 percent offered the latter.
6. The 1986 DWS questionnaire poses exactly the same advance notice question as
the 1984 questionnaire. This question, as noted in the text, has the serious limitation
of confounding the responses of workers who expected to be laid off with the responses
of workers who actually received notice of layoff. In the 1988 DWS, the sequence
of questions on advance notice is changed so that those who received written notice
can be distinguished from those who merely expected to be laid off. A second improve
ment in the 1988 DWS is access to information on the length of time between the dates
of notification and layoff.
7. Hamermesh (1987) notes, however, that the relatively short period of advance
notice required in state laws is unlikely to reduce by much the amount of firm-specific
investment that is rendered worthless by a plant closing. Indeed, he argues (1987:72)
that "[W]hether employers can even be cognizant of impending doings sufficiently
far in advance to allow for provision of that information to reduce the costs of adjust
ment is itself not clear."
8. This legislation added to existing notification requirements the obligation that
employers making layoffs must negotiate with employee representatives a "social plan"
that specifies compensation to laid-off workers. Moreover, in the event that the two
parties cannot agree on the provisions of the social plan, the law provides for binding
arbitration.
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9. A related on-site vocational training program is the Alabama Industrial Develop
ment Training program. Begun in 1971, AIDTraining uses a fleet of 36 mobile train
ing units to locate at the sites of manufacturing firms that have expressed interest in
moving to or expanding in Alabama.
10. Topics treated in the job workshops include use of labor market information;
employer expectations; how to fill out job applications, write a resume, and interview;
self-evaluation of skills, abilities, and aptitudes; and learning to sell oneself to a pro
spective employer.
11. Fedrau (1984) provides a similar case study of the response of the California
Economic Adjustment Team to the 1981 closing of a Mack Truck plant in Hayward,
California. State officials chose the Mack Truck closure to define the roles state agen
cies should play in meeting the needs of displaced workers and to develop a model
for local communities to follow. In addition to the cooperation of the United Auto
Workers and Mack Truck management, Fedrau points out that noteworthy features
of the program included (1) the involvement of local business leaders in helping displaced
workers with debt, credit, and mortgage problems, and (2) the opening of an assess
ment/placement center from which reemployment services were provided.

5
Other Initiatives

Most of the programs discussed in chapters 2 through 4 are primari
ly intended to ease the transition of workers displaced by a plant clos
ing or mass layoff to new jobs in established enterprises. Chapter 4,
in particular, began with a quotation which stressed the advantages of
on-site programs in assisting this transition. The same passage from
the OTA report (1986:234) goes on to suggest that
. . . such [on-site] programs fill a special need, which is to
serve large numbers of workers with similar skills and work
histories who are all dumped on the labor market at once.
Even in good times, it is difficult for local labor markets to
absorb a great many similar workers at the same time.
Even more difficult than absorbing a large number of displaced
workers in good times is the absorption problem when times are bad.
Results provided by Podgursky and Swaim (1987c) indicate that local
labor market conditions significantly affect duration of joblessness, and
it is not uncommon for a major plant closure or mass layoff to take
place in a depressed labor market so that few local firms are hiring and
those jobs that are available are low-wage positions with little oppor
tunity for advancement. In these circumstances, state policymakers have
quite naturally shown an interest in developing economic alternatives
to plant closures.
Broadly speaking, state-level initiatives to save jobs by retaining ex
isting employers or attracting new ones fall into one or more of the
following categories:
1. customized training programs;
2. grants, low-interest loans, and tax concessions to employers located
in depressed communities or other specific geographic areas; and
3. assistance to encourage employee buyouts of existing facilities and
start-ups of new small businesses by unemployed workers.
109
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Among these three categories, customized training programs have
already been discussed in chapter 2. Initiatives falling under the other
two headings are the subject of this chapter. Because several of these
initiatives are incorporated in the sweeping displaced worker program
provided by Massachusetts, the chapter begins with a discussion of that
state©s Mature Industries Act. Included is a consideration of state
assistance to businesses located in depressed geographic areas termed
"enterprise zones." The second major section concerns initiatives in
tended to stimulate employment growth by encouraging the formation
of worker-owned enterprises. A brief summary section concludes the
chapter.
Massachusetts© Mature Industries Act
In 1983, the Governor of Massachusetts, Michael S. Dukakis, ap
pointed a blue-ribbon commission to develop a cooperative strategy in
volving business, labor, and government for stabilizing and possibly
expanding the state©s manufacturing sector. Based on the report of the
commission, the Governor proposed and the Massachusetts legislature
passed in 1984 a comprehensive law known as the Mature Industries
Act. At the heart of this legislation is a voluntary "social compact"
between business and government to work together to cushion the im
pact of plant closings while attempting to stimulate the growth of
manufacturing firms. As part of the social compact, employers are ex
pected to conform to certain voluntary standards of corporate behavior.
Specifically, employers are to make a good-faith effort to provide at
least 90 days© advance notice of large layoffs and plant closings and
to supply health insurance coverage to laid-off workers. In exchange,
Massachusetts provides access to state programs offering a variety of
forms of assistance to displaced employees and financially troubled firms.
The presidential campaign of Governor Dukakis served to focus na
tional attention on the contribution of programs established by the Mature
Industries Act to the state©s impressive performance in creating new
jobs and its very low unemployment rate. As described by Nelson (1987),
the Act is currently serving as a model for legislation being considered
by other states.
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An Overview of the Act1
Probably the most important agency created by the Mature Industries
Act is the Massachusetts Industrial Service Program, and a good way
to get an overview of the Act©s provisions is to examine the broad scope
of this umbrella organization. In addition to marketing to employers
the Act©s social compact, the Program©s responsibilities include the
following:
1. Overseeing an early warning system.
2. At an employer©s request, providing assistance to alleviate the con
ditions that threaten to cause a large layoff, plant closure, or business
failure. Examples of such conditions stated in the Act are outmoded
production technologies, loss of markets, and poor management.
3. On the request of a local community adversely affected by a ma
jor plant closure or business failure, assisting in finding new uses for
idled plants and in fostering job creation in the community.
4. If a mass layoff or plant closure is deemed inevitable, assisting
in the effort to secure alternative employment and retraining opportunities
for displaced employees. This assistance includes coordinating the
delivery of available state and federal reemployment services.
Beginning with the first of these responsibilities, the purpose of the
early warning system, as described in chapter 4, is to identify industries
and particular firms that are likely to experience large losses in employ
ment, plant closures, or bankruptcy. As part of the social compact be
tween the state and employers, moreover, a firm planning a large layoff
or plant closure is to notify the director of the state©s Division of Employ
ment Security promptly in order to qualify affected workers for
reemployment services. The director©s responsibility is to certify that
a plant closing or partial closing has or will occur. The Act defines
a plant closing as the permanent shutting down of a facility which results
in at least 90 percent of the employees being permanently separated
within a six-month period prior to the date of certification (the anticipated
date of plant closure). A partial closing is the permanent cessation of
a "major discrete part of the business" which results in the layoff of
a "significant" number of employees and which affects workers and
communities in a manner similar to that of a plant closing. Notice of
certification is given to the employer as well as to any union or unions
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representing the employees, and an appeal procedure is available to any
party wishing to challenge the certification decision.
Turning to the second and third of the four duties listed, the Act gives
a separate quasi-public agency, titled the Economic Stabilization Trust,
the responsibility for providing financial assistance to existing or
reorganized enterprises in mature industries. The Trust has its own board
of trustees, but the director of the Industrial Service Program serves
as its chief executive officer; and the Trust is physically located in the
central office of the Program. In the language of the Act, "[T]he pur
pose of the economic stabilization trust shall be to provide flexible high
risk financing necessary to implement a change of ownership, a cor
porate restructuring, or a turnaround plan for an economically viable,
but troubled, business. ..." The Trust is designed to supplement the
credit available through private financial institutions and public economic
development agencies, but it is specifically instructed not to apply the
loan loss standards of private commercial lenders. Rather, the Trust
is to consider the social costs of a plant closure or business failure and
the tax revenues generated by an ongoing business enterprise.
In addition to the Economic Stabilization Trust, the Act established
a second quasi-public funding agency the Massachusetts Product
Development Corporation intended to operate independently of the In
dustrial Service Program. The role of the Corporation is to assist
economically viable existing firms to increase their market share and
expand employment opportunities. More specifically, the Corporation©s
legal mandate is to provide financial assistance to encourage the develop
ment and marketing of new products in situations where such assistance
would not otherwise be reasonably available from private lending
institutions.
Established by a separate piece of legislation, a third quasi-public fund
ing agency called the Massachusetts Technology Development Corpora
tion specializes in providing seed money and early-stage financing to
entrepreneurs in high-technology areas. (In contrast, the Product
Development Corporation is a potential source of funds to any
Massachusetts firm.) As recently described by Gupta (1987), en
trepreneurs use state grants to get high-tech projects off the ground.
Once technical feasibility has been demonstrated, the entrepreneur is
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in a position to raise additional funds from the private venture capital
market.
Besides Massachusetts, a number of other states have created pro
grams to supply entrepreneurs with seed and early-stage financing.
Among the best known of these are Pennsylvania©s Ben Franklin Part
nership, Ohio©s Thomas Edison Program, and Michigan©s comprehen
sive network of venture capital and seed capital funds. The Ben Franklin
and Thomas Edison programs offer fledgling entrepreneurs grants and
a link to scientists and engineers employed in major research centers
at state universities. A notable feature of Michigan©s venture capital
program is its enabling legislation passed in 1983 which allows the pro
gram to invest in new enterprises up to 5 percent of the state©s public
employee pension funds. These pension funds were valued at $15 billion
in 1988.
Beyond the three programs providing financial assistance, the direc
tor of the Industrial Service Program in Massachusetts is authorized
under certain conditions to contract with private consultants to (1) assess
the viability of an employer in financial difficulty and develop an ad
justment strategy that would allow the business to survive or (2) assist
in securing new ownership or new management to keep the business
in operation. If the decision is made to seek new ownership, priority
is given to selling the business either to its employees or to a resident
of the state. With respect to a potential employee buyout, the Act directs
that ". . .the director shall inform the employees that the business is
for sale, inform the employees of their opportunity to purchase the
business, and provide the employees with the same assistance in pur
chasing said business for which other interested buyers may be eligible."
The fourth responsibility of the Industrial Service Program is to assist
in providing reemployment services to workers displaced from their
jobs by a certified plant closure. Three forms of assistance are specified
in the Act. The first of these the Reemployment Assistance Programoffers a variety of reemployment services, including counseling, place
ment assistance, and retraining. Combining state funding with federal
JTPA Title in funds, the Reemployment Assistance Program operates
out of two types of service centers located across the state. "Emergen
cy assistance centers" provide temporary services on-site to workers
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displaced by a certified plant closing or large layoff. These emergency
assistance centers are Massachusetts© version of the state rapid-response
team programs discussed in chapter 4. "Worker assistance centers,"
in contrast, are designed to serve workers in economically distressed
areas of the state, particularly areas affected by long-term unemployment
problems. Because of their longer-term, community-based focus, the
worker assistance centers attempt to reach workers who remain
unemployed for lengthy periods of time after the date of a plant closing
or mass layoff.
Displaced workers participating in the Reemployment Assistance Pro
gram are eligible for two additional benefits: (1) up to 13 weeks of sup
plemental Reemployment Assistance Benefits and (2) a maximum of
three months of health insurance benefits. The Reemployment Assistance
Benefits are intended, when added to regular UI benefits, to bring the
individual up to 75 percent of his or her previous weekly wage. Benefits
are currently subject to a cap of $108 per week, and the benefit period
is reduced by one week for each week of advance notification and/or
separation pay. The twofold purpose of the supplemental benefits is to
help individual workers and their families adjust to a sudden income
loss and to put a floor under aggregate purchasing power in communities
adversely affected by the loss of large numbers of jobs.
The third form of assistance is a health insurance program which urges,
as part of the Act©s social compact, that employers extend group health
insurance coverage for up to 90 days to workers who would otherwise
be ineligible for coverage because of a partial or complete plant shut
down. In the event of a certified plant closing caused by bankruptcy,
however, the insurance premium that would have been borne by the
employer is paid by a health insurance benefit fund established by the
Act. As would be expected, eligibility for the health insurance program
is restricted to displaced individuals not covered by the health insurance
carried by another family member. 2
Innovative Features of the Act
There are at least four features of the Massachusetts Mature Industries
Act that warrant further examination. This section continues with a discus
sion of three of these features. They are supplemental unemployment
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benefits, continuation of health insurance coverage, and assistance to
firms located in depressed sections of the state. The fourth innovative
feature encouragement of employee buyouts is examined in the next
section of the chapter.
Supplemental and extended unemployment benefits. Massachusetts ap
pears to be unique among the states in offering unemployed workers
a program that supplements UI payments. Among federal programs,
the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program described in chapter
2 supplemented regular UI payments during the 1974-81 period to boost
the level of income support to 70 percent of the previous weekly earn
ings of eligible claimants. As noted in that chapter, TAA legislation
passed in 1981 cut back income support to the level of UI payments.
Labor economists have extensively analyzed the relationship between
the level of weekly UI benefits and duration of unemployment. In a
survey of the literature, Hamermesh (1977:37) reports that his "best"
point estimate of the relationship is that a 10 percentage point increase
in the gross wage-replacement ratio (the ratio of UI benefits to wages
unadjusted by the then nontaxable status of UI benefits) lengthens the
duration of insured unemployment by about half a week. A more re
cent and widely cited study by Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) similarly
finds that a 10 percent increase in the net replacement ratio results in
an increase of about 0.4 of a week in length of unemployment spells
for a sample containing a disproportionate number of exhaustees, and
an increase of about 0.8 to 1.0 week for more representative samples.
While Massachusetts is alone in supplementing the level of UI benefits,
several states, including California, Connecticut, Alaska, Hawaii, and
Puerto Rico, provide state-funded programs extending the length of UI
payments. Historically, the maximum duration of UI payments has also
varied over time in response to special congressional action and to federal
legislation that includes "trigger" mechanisms based on state-insured
unemployment rates. The purpose of extended benefits is to provide
the income support necessary to allow qualified displaced workers to
take advantage of longer, more intensive training courses that cannot
readily be squeezed into the usual 26-week maximum duration of UI
payments. The main disadvantage of extended benefits is the potential
disincentive to return to work. Moffitt and Nicholson report that an
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increase in maximum duration of one week results in a 0.1 week in
crease in average weeks unemployed.
Health insurance coverage. Most Americans with health insurance
are covered by a group plan for which the employer pays the premium.
When a worker©s job ends, therefore, insurance coverage generally also
terminates, usually within 30 to 60 days. The OTA report (1986:118)
points out that individual policies may cost more than twice as much
as the group plans they replace.
In a recent article, Podgursky and Swaim (1987a) use 1984 DWS
data to examine the extent to which displaced workers are likely to be
without health insurance coverage for an extended period of time. They
find that for displaced workers who enjoyed group health coverage on
their previous jobs, 57.9 percent of blue-collar and 70.1 percent of whitecollar and service workers reported that they were currently covered
by some sort of group policy. Not surprisingly, the incidence of coverage
is strongly associated with employment status. But even for reemployed
workers, only 71.0 percent of blue-collar workers and 79.6 percent of
white-collar and service workers were covered by a group plan.
Podgursky and Swaim also utilize a second survey administered in
1984 the Work Experience Survey to examine the extent to which
displaced workers who had earlier lost employer group health insurance
are covered by other types of health insurance. Their results indicate
that many of these workers were able to fall back on coverage from
another family member©s group policy or on a government health in
surance program such as medicaid. Nevertheless, 23.2 percent of bluecollar workers and 16.2 percent of white-collar workers are found to
have had no health insurance coverage whatsoever. Worth noting is the
fact that these estimates do not include a sizable fraction of workers
(8.5 percent and 12.3 percent of blue-collar and white-collar workers,
respectively) who reported coverage by some other unspecified type
of health insurance policy. The authors note that the comprehensiveness
and quality of insurance programs that fall into this residual category
are open to question.
In contrast to the provision of supplemental unemployment benefits,
the lead taken by Massachusetts in the area of health insurance coverage
has been followed by other states. The annual surveys of new state labor
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legislation provided by Nelson (1984; 1985; 1986; and 1987) suggest
that states are taking three different approaches in attempting to extend
health insurance coverage to displaced workers. The first approach is
to request that employers continue to provide health insurance coverage
to displaced workers. This approach is followed in Massachusetts© social
compact and in the voluntary guidelines included in Maryland©s
Economic Stabilization Act.
The second approach taken in recent legislation passed by several
other states permits displaced workers, at their own expense, to con
tinue participating in a group health insurance program. Clearly the
strongest health insurance provision, however, is that taken in a third
approach followed by Connecticut. Connecticut employers of 100 or
more workers, who close or relocate, must pay for the continuation
of existing group health insurance for affected employees and their
dependents for up to 120 days. An Iowa law also spells out specific
circumstances under which an employer remains liable for the continua
tion of benefits to displaced workers.
Enterprise zones. Many states have recently enacted legislation similar
to the provisions of the Mature Industries Act intended to stimulate
economic development and create jobs in severely depressed areas. The
selected depressed areas are commonly known as "enterprise zones."
Enterprise zones within a state are geographic areas identified by such
factors as high unemployment, a concentration of low-income
households, and decreases in population. Within cities, enterprise zones
typically include blighted inner-city neighborhoods. Once a zone has
been identified, special state services are provided to employers and
workers located or residing within the zone. Bendick and Rasmussen
(1986) report that 21 states have some form of enterprise zone legisla
tion on their books.
The original formulation of the enterprise zone approach to economic
development was modeled after the highly successful experiment in
unfettered capitalism in Hong Kong. Advocates of this approach argue
that the rapid growth exhibited in a low-income nation like Hong Kong
can be attributed, at least in part, to an absence of government regula
tion and low tax rates. With minimal government presence in the
marketplace, individual entrepreneurs enjoy both a strong incentive to
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work hard and invest and an an opportunity to adapt flexibly to chang
ing economic circumstances. Thus the expected outcome of an enter
prise zone policy is a high birth rate of new, small business firms.
The enterprise zone concept was congenial to the supply-side
economics approach to economic policy during the early years of the
Reagan administration, and President Reagan sent a federal enterprise
zone proposal to Congress in 1983. Although the proposed Enterprise
Zone Employment and Development Act did not receive Congressional
approval, the 1983 legislation is useful in illustrating the specific forms
that an enterprise zone policy might take. As described in Weiner (1984),
major provisions of the proposed Act are the following:
1. A general payroll tax credit for employers increasing net employ
ment in a zone equal to 10 percent of each additional employee©s wage
up to a maximum credit per employee of $1,750.
2. A nonrefundable special tax credit equal to 50 percent of the
employee©s earnings (with no upper limit) for employers hiring disadvantaged individuals in a zone. Disadvantaged workers are defined to
include welfare and general assistance recipients.
3. A nonrefundable tax credit for employees working in the zone of
5 percent of the employee©s earnings up to a maximum credit per
employee of $525.
4. A nonrefundable 3 or 5 percent investment tax credit, over and
above the regular investment tax credit, on capital investment in a zone,
and a 10 percent credit for the construction or reconstruction of buildings
in a zone.
5. Elimination of all long-term capital gains taxes on business prop
erty in a zone.
6. Preservation in zones of the use of tax-exempt, small-issue industrial
development bonds.
7. Increased regulatory flexibility in zones, whereby federal agen
cies and regulatory bodies could relax, upon request of state and local
authorities, any regulatory requirement except requirements provided
by statute or affecting civil rights, safety, or public health.
8. A requirement that state and local governments commit themselves
to specific actions to enhance development of a zone, including tax and
regulatory relief, improved services, and community involvement.
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The employment tax credits included in the first through the third
of these provisions represent a wage subsidy intended to encourage
employers to supply more OJT opportunities. Because the tax credits
are mainly nonrefundable and capital-raising provisions are largely ab
sent, Weiner points out that the proposal would be expected to be ef
fective in inducing existing zone firms to expand and nonzone firms
to open new branches in the zone, but relatively less effective in pro
moting the birth of small businesses. The major reasons are that (1) small
firms are unlikely to be profitable enough to benefit from the nonrefun
dable tax credits, and (2) one of the chief obstacles facing potential en
trepreneurs is the need to raise capital. As will be described in more
detail in the next section, small business creation is often seen as a crucial
factor in encouraging economic development and growth in employ
ment opportunities. Also worth noting in connection with the seventh
provision is the meager attempt at achieving greater regulatory flexibility.
With the defeat of President Reagan©s enterprise zone proposal in
Congress, Bendick and Rasmussen (1986:114-18) point out that the role
of the states has become central to the implementation of the zone idea.
Their summary of existing state programs indicates the following general
patterns. First, most states focus on tax incentive efforts with little more
than a nod in the direction of regulatory flexibility. Second, most of
the tax incentives are straightforward reductions of total tax burdens,
as opposed to reductions in marginal tax rates designed to increase work
effort or entrepreneurial initiative. Finally, most states are supplemen
ting their tax incentives with extensive government activity within zones.
Examples of these activities are land use planning, infrastructure develop
ment, improvement of public services, loan funds, technical assistance,
and the training of disadvantaged workers.
Because of problems including inadequate or inappropriate incentives,
lack of coordination with other state programs, and excessive red tape,
Bendick and Rasmussen also note that a number of states are planning
to seek major revisions of their initial enterprise zone legislation. These
revisions may well embody a return to the original enterprise zone con
cept with its emphasis on the birth and development of small, indigenous
firms.
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In this connection, state-funded "incubator" programs represent an
initiative already in operation in a number of states which is specifical
ly intended to "hatch" new small businesses. Incubators are generally
defined as multi-tenant buildings offering affordable space and a varie
ty of support systems to start-up companies. Describing the 31 small
business incubators located in Pennsylvania, former Governor Richard
Thornburgh (1988:5) writes that the buildings housing the start-ups
. . . range from an empty apparel manufacturing facility, now
housing two fledgling electronic businesses previously
operating out of the proverbial basement and garage, to the
former Bethlehem Steel Homer Research Center in the Lehigh
Valley. The latter has been crammed with over 20 new and
diversified small businesses (including one that operated for
a time out of the facility©s former coat closet).
Support systems typically provided in incubators include shared office
services such as telephone answering and word processing; the profes
sional assistance of lawyers, accountants, and management consultants;
and access to capital. The objective of an incubator is to nurture the
growth of fledgling companies by making it possible for entrepreneurs
to concentrate their energies on producing the product or service on
which the survival of the business depends. Also important to the growth
of incubator firms is the informal support system that often develops
as tenants overcome early crises and become familiar with each other©s
operations.

Worker Ownership Initiatives
The overview of the enterprise zone concept in the previous section
emphasized policy initiatives designed to provide an environment in
which employers located in depressed areas are encouraged to main
tain or even expand the employment opportunities they offer. This sec
tion shifts to a discussion of initiatives directed at stimulating employ
ment growth by encouraging the formation of worker-owned enterprises.
Two types of initiatives are considered. The first includes programs
providing assistance to enable employee groups to save their jobs by
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purchasing companies or facilities that might otherwise close. The sec
ond includes assistance to individual unemployed workers to help them
start up their own small businesses.

Employee Buyout Programs
Returning for a moment to the Massachusetts Mature Industries Act,
the director of the Division of Employment Security is instructed, in
the case of a plant closure, to inform affected employees that the business
is for sale and that they have an opportunity to purchase the facility
with the same assistance that would be offered to any other potential
buyer. As described earlier, financial assistance provided by the
Economic Stabilization Trust is available for implementing a change
in ownership of a business that is financially troubled but is nevertheless
considered economically viable.
Over the 1981-85 period, Balderston (1986:24) reports that a total
of 14 states, including Massachusetts, enacted legislation specifically
promoting employee ownership. More recently, Nelson (1986; 1987)
indicates that three additional states have passed laws to assist the
development of employee-owned firms. Most of these laws authorize
programs that offer a combination of technical and financial assistance
to employee groups seeking to purchase a business that would other
wise close. One example is the 1984 Pennsylvania Employee-Ownership
Assistance Program, which appropriated $15 million over three years
to promote the restructuring of existing businesses, including those facing
layoffs or closings, into employee-owned enterprises. Approximately
$3 million of this total was to be spent in providing technical assistance
to employee groups considering the employee buyout option, and the
remaining $12 million was intended to assist in the financing of employee
buyouts.
A second example the 1986 Michigan Employee-Owned Corpora
tion Act is interesting in terms of the specificity of the services pro
vided employee groups wishing to develop an employee-owned cor
poration. As described in Nelson (1987), the state©s Labor Department
is directed to assist in the formation or operation of employee-owned
corporations by (1) developing and disseminating information on pro
cedures for carrying out an employee buyout; (2) evaluating the feasi-
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bility and economic viability of proposed employee-owned corporations;
(3) providing technical assistance and counseling services; (4) assisting
in obtaining financing; (5) coordinating local, state, federal, and private
agency assistance; and (6) recommending appropriate legislative or ex
ecutive action to enhance opportunities for such corporations. With
respect to financing, the law specifically states that employee-owned
corporations are to be considered eligible for grants and loans provid
ed by the state©s Public Economic Development Corporation to assist
businesses to locate and expand in Michigan. 3
As a final example, the New Jersey Employee Stock Ownership Plan
Act of 1984 is worth noting because it spells out a methodology to be
used in determining whether an enterprise is economically viable. The
Act directs that when a plant closure is anticipated or actually takes
place in an already economically distressed municipality, the Commis
sioner of Commerce and Economic Development may fund the prepara
tion of a cost-benefit analysis of the potential profitability of an employee
buyout. After a review of the results of the analysis, financial assistance
including loan guarantees or low-interest loans is to be provided to
employee purchasers if the benefits are judged to exceed the costs and
funds are available.
State initiatives designed to encourage employee buyouts of troubled
firms reflect the general interest in employee ownership which has
developed over the past 10 to 15 years. It appears that this interest,
in turn, largely stems from two factors: (1) the series of tax incentives
embodied in Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), and
(2) evidence from case studies of a favorable impact on labor produc
tivity and profits of greater worker participation in decisionmaking.
Focusing on the first of these factors, an ESOP is a corporate finance
strategy used to provide company stock to employees on a tax-favored
basis. The way it works is that the company sets up a special trust similar
to a pension or profit-sharing trust to which it contributes shares of its
own stock. Stock held in the trust is allocated to the accounts of individ
ual employees, making them partial owners of the company. In a typical
ESOP, employees receive an amount of stock equivalent to 5 to 15 per
cent of their annual compensation. Thus while employees may make
wage and benefit concessions to permit a failing firm to survive (in-
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eluding, in some cases, giving up their pension plans in return for an
equity stake in the company), only rarely do employees groups direct
ly borrow to purchase company stock.
A major tax advantage of the formation of an ESOP is that the value
of stock contributions made by the employer is tax deductible from the
company©s income. In 1984, Congress made ESOPs even more attrac
tive when it permitted lenders to deduct from taxable income 50 per
cent of the interest earned on ESOP loans, thus making it possible for
lenders to profit while lending to ESOPs at below-market rates. Tax
reform legislation passed in 1986 also permits an ESOP using stock
dividends to repay debt to deduct the dividends from its tax liability.
Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986:15) point out that as of 1984 there
were over 7,000 ESOP plans in existence, covering over 10 million
employees. As they note, ESOPs are established for a variety of reasons.
These reasons include improving employee benefits, raising capital
cheaply, making a market for the sale of the equity position of a depart
ing owner, implementing a participatory management philosophy, car
rying out a leveraged buyout (i.e., a buyout in which management or
outside investors borrow enough money to buy a controlling interest
in the firm), and enabling employees to buy out a firm that would other
wise close. Employee buyouts of failing companies represent the most
publicized of the uses of ESOPs, even though it is one of the least com
mon. Most companies become employee-owned as part of a business
strategy to restructure the ownership of an ongoing firm. Indeed, Kuttner (1985a:20) remarks that"... most examples of ©employee owner
ship© are still cases of traditional corporate management recognizing
the value of making the workplace a bit less alienating, rather than
workers effectively organizing production."
Turning to the case study evidence, probably the best known exam
ple of a favorable impact of worker ownership on productivity and profits
is the case of Weirton Steel. In March 1982, Weirton©s then parent,
the National Steel Corporation, announced that it planned to close its
mill located in the small town of Weirton, West Virginia. The mill was
only marginally profitable, and National Steel was rapidly diversifying
away from primary metals. The closing of the mill would have meant
the loss of over 7,000 jobs and the possible death of the community.
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Following a year and a half of negotiations and exhaustive preparation
based on an ESOP master plan developed by a well-known consulting
firm, an employee buyout of the mill was worked out in which workers
agreed to a 20 percent reduction in wages and benefits. Moreover,
worker compensation was frozen at the new lower level for six years
and employees had to wait five years to receive full voting rights.
Since the buyout was completed in January 1984, Weirton Steel has
survived and even prospered to the extent that the company has reported
13 consecutive profitable quarters and has hired back all 3,000 workers
formerly on layoff. While worker wage and benefit concessions clear
ly played a role in Weirton©s success, O©Boyle and Roth (1985) also
emphasize the importance of breaking down old antagonisms between
management and labor, increasing employee participation at all levels
of decisionmaking within the firm, and establishing a profit-sharing plan.
It must be pointed out, however, that the success thus far of Weirton
Steel is not necessarily representative of all attempts at employee buyouts.
A case in point is the failure of worker ownership at the Rath Packing
Company, a meat-packing firm located in Waterloo, Iowa. Hammer
and Stern (1986) describe how the threat of Rath©s closure in 1978 led
the local union to negotiate an employee buyout effected in 1980.
Through an ESOP, employees gained 60 percent of the company©s stock
and majority representation on the board of directors, as well as a com
mitment from the firm to give workers at all levels involvement in deci
sionmaking. For their part, workers agreed to defer improvements in
wages and benefits called for by the packing industry©s master contract.
While the shop-floor productivity committees established by the ESOP
initially appeared to work well, pressures exerted by a traditionally adver
sarial labor-management relationship and continued financial losses led
to management demands for further worker wage and benefit conces
sions and to union demands for personnel changes in top management.
By the spring of 1983, union leaders had abandoned the system of shopfloor committees, and open conflict was breaking out over conditions
of work and company finances. The company ultimately filed in
November 1983 for protection under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code.
The Rath Packing Company experience highlights some of the risks
involved in an employee buyout of a failing firm. Recent discussions
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of the use of ESOPs as a financing tool (see, for example, Kotlowitz
and Bean 1987) also raise questions about the actual benefits to workers.
One problem is that ESOPs have to be highly leveraged to take full
advantage of tax breaks, since these breaks are debt-related. This makes
ESOPs especially vulnerable to an economic downturn. Other concerns
are that workers often receive only a passive role in company decisionmaking and that workers are obliged to shoulder greater risk when stock
ownership is substituted for conventional pension plans. 4
In addition to case study evidence, there are also a limited number
of empirical studies relating to the effect of employee ownership on
labor productivity and the job creation performance of firms. Rosen
and Klein (1983) report on a survey carried out by the National Center
for Employee Ownership (NCEO) of the structural characteristics and
employment growth of majority employee-owned companies. Over the
1977-82 period, the 43 employee-owned firms included in the survey
are found to have averaged an annual employment growth rate 2.78
percentage points higher than that of conventional firms in the same
economic sectors. The authors point out that over a 10-year period this
difference means that employee-owned firms would generate 31 per
cent more jobs than comparable conventional firms.
A subsequent NCEO survey described by Rosen, Klein, and Young
(1986) collected data for 37 ESOP companies and 2,804 employees.
The purpose of the survey was to investigate the relationship between
employees© satisfaction with their jobs and their employers and such
ESOP characteristics as the percentage of company stock owned by the
ESOP, worker voting rights, and the reason the company established
its ESOP. The authors find that ESOPs can function effectively to
motivate workers and increase job satisfaction if employers (1) are will
ing to make significant financial contributions to the plan, (2) are strongly
committed to the philosophy of employee ownership, and (3) are ready
to develop an active program to educate employees about the ESOP.
It is interesting to note from the Rosen, Klein, and Young study that
the reason a company established its ESOP appears to have no effect
on the employee satisfaction variables.
Besides ESOPs, worker cooperatives are the other major form of
employee ownership. A recent empirical study by Jones (1987) uses
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data for a 1978 sample of 50 British retail cooperatives to obtain
econometric estimates of the effect on labor productivity of worker finan
cial participation and employee involvement in decisionmaking through
representation on boards of directors. His results indicate that board
representation has a positive impact on productivity, especially the
presence of worker-directors who currently are employed or once were
employed in the same co-op. On the other hand, financial participation
by employees negatively impacts productivity. Jones notes that the lat
ter finding is the opposite of what is typically found for producer co
ops. For example, Jones and Svejnar (1985) report for a large sample
of Italian producer cooperatives that profit-sharing and worker owner
ship of assets as well as worker participation in management tend to
increase productivity. Jones (1987) notes that this difference may reflect
the low level of financial participation by employees in retail co-ops
as compared to producer co-ops. For retail co-ops, the net impact on
labor productivity of both forms of worker participation is small but
positive.
Unemployed Entrepreneur Programs
Although initiatives to assist unemployed workers to become selfemployed have yet to be implemented in permanent programs in this
country, U.S. policy makers are presently showing a strong interest in
the unemployed entrepreneur concept. An example is the useful USDOL
(1986) report prepared at the request of Senators Gary Hart, Bob
Packwood, and Lloyd Bentsen, who expressed a particular interest in
the potential for allowing UI benefits to be used to help support
unemployed workers in the start-up phase of establishing their own small
businesses.
Following up on this interest, the USDOL entered into a cooperative
agreement with Washington state in the fall of 1987 to fund a demonstra
tion project to test the effectiveness of making UI benefits available to
claimants who establish small businesses. Approximately 400 laid-off
workers were to be provided an incentive to start their own business
by the offer of lump-sum payments of up to $6,000. Since the demonstra
tion project was to be funded by the federal government, it would not
violate the federal ban restricting states from paying UI benefits to

Other Initiatives

127

unemployed workers not actively engaged in job search. Galante (1987)
also notes that the states of Michigan, New Jersey, and Massachusetts
are studying ways of using UI benefits to help unemployed workers
in launching new businesses.
Support for unemployed entrepreneur programs appears to represent
the convergence of two considerations. The first is evidence initially
presented by Birch (1981) showing that small firms create many more
jobs than large companies. A widely cited finding of his study is that
of all the net new jobs created between 1969 and 1976, two-thirds were
generated by firms with 20 or fewer employees, and about 80 percent
were created by firms with 100 or fewer employees. These proportions
are far higher than the share of total employment represented by small
businesses. 5 At the same time, the USDOL report (1986:58) presents
evidence to show that many independent small businesses are successful
attempts at self-employment. The second consideration is the persis
tent argument that, given the adjustment problems faced by displaced
workers, expenditure of UI funds for programs other than its traditional
income maintenance role ought to be explored.
Several major European countries have established programs permit
ting the diversion of transfer payments to unemployed workers who
commit themselves to starting their own small businesses. Two of the
best known of these programs were established in France in 1979 and
in the United Kingdom in 1982. 6 The French Unemployed Entrepreneurs
Program provides a lump-sum payment to be received about two months
after the new firm has been registered. (Benefits may also be used to
buy an existing business.) The size of the payment was initially deter
mined by the worker©s previous unemployment insurance contributions
subject to a cap of six months of unemployment benefits. Since April
1984, the range of payments has been narrowed by making payment
size vary only according to the length of unemployment (the sooner
after losing a job the worker starts his or her business, the larger the
benefits) and the type of benefit the recipient was previously receiv
ing. Bendick and Egan (1987:530) report that payments currently range
in dollar terms between $1,398 and $5,590. In addition to the lumpsum payment, program participants receive a payment for each job
created beyond that occupied by the proprietor. Before April 1984,
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the French program was funded through the unemployment insurance
trust fund, and since then it has been funded by general tax revenues.
Rather than a lump-sum payment, the British Enterprise Allowance
Scheme provided a taxable allowance equivalent to $61 per week in
1983 for a maximum of 52 weeks. Program participants must have been
without work for at least eight weeks, must be willing to work at the
business full time, and must demonstrate that they have at least 1000
British pounds ($1,520 in 1983) to invest in the business. Only new
businesses are eligible for assistance. As is the case for the French pro
gram, an assessment of the viability of the proposed business is not part
of the application review process,7 and the program is funded by general
tax revenues. Both programs also provide limited training and technical
assistance to would-be entrepreneurs.
The fact that the programs in both France and Britain have survived
for a number of years is an important measure of success for this type
of initiative. Nevertheless, recent evaluations by Bendick and Egan
(1987) and the USDOL (1986) raise several questions regarding the
potential of unemployed entrepreneur programs for returning the
unemployed to work and creating additional jobs. These questions in
clude the following:
1. How many new firms would have been created in the absence of
assistance?
2. Might the subsidized firms compete against and displace existing
firms in the same local markets?
3. How good are the jobs self-employment provides?
4. How many jobs do these firms generate in addition to those held
by their proprietors?
Beginning with the first question, by the end of 1985 about 235,000
persons had participated in the French program and about 139,000 in
the British. The programs involve only a fraction of 1 percent of the
annual flow of unemployment in both countries, yet 20 to 30 percent
of new business starts are program-generated. Without a formal evalua
tion including a control group comparison, it is difficult to say how
many of the business starts would have taken place in the absence of
the programs. The only available evidence on this question is a 1985
survey of Enterprise Allowance Scheme participants. As described by
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Bendick and Egan (1987:530-31), 33.5 percent of participants surveyed
reported that they would have established their businesses at the same
time without the program, and an additional 17.2 percent said that they
would have gone ahead but with some delay. Thus about half of the
new firms formed in the U.K. might have occurred without program
assistance.
The absence of formal evaluation also makes it difficult to provide
a definitive answer to the second question. Nevertheless, it does ap
pear likely that displacement of existing firms by subsidized firms will
occur. One piece of evidence comes from the 1985 survey of British
program participants. The relevant question asked proprietors of sub
sidized firms for an estimate of the extent to which their firm©s sales
took business from other firms, as opposed to offering products or ser
vices not previously available. Two-thirds of the responding proprietors
said that displacement accounted for less than 10 percent of their sales.
The remaining one-third reported that displacement accounted for 11
to 100 percent of sales. Based on this survey, Bendick and Egan
(1987:535) note that the British government©s estimate of worker
displacement is that one worker is thrown into unemployment for every
two employed.
Also related to the displacement question is a consideration of the
location and product lines of newly established businesses. The fact that
most proprietors are able to make only a modest front-end financial
investment in their businesses limits the choice of activity undertaken.
Thus subsidized firms are predominantly involved in the services and
retail trade industries, so that they are dependent on local consumers
and the level of local income. Both of these industries tend to be highly
competitive, with the product or service of one firm a close substitute
for that of other firms. To the extent that prospective entrepreneurs reside
in depressed areas and communities, in addition, the local demand for
goods and services is likely to be quite limited.
Turning to the question of the quality of jobs that self-employment
provides, summary statistics indicate for the British program that me
dian earnings (about $8,000 annually) and the distribution of earnings
for program participants are about the same as their market alternatives
would have provided. These statistics are calculated for firms that sur
vived three years. But how likely are small enterprises to survive this
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long? The experience in Europe as well as in the U.S. is that small
businesses generally have a high failure rate. For the French program
specifically, about one-third of newly formed firms ceased operation
within their first three years. A similar failure rate is estimated for Enter
prise Allowance Scheme firms.
Even if a subsidized business should fail, it might be argued that the
program is still worthwhile if it increases the probability that former
proprietors will find jobs with existing employers. For the British pro
gram, however, Bendick and Egan (1987:536) conclude that the flow
into employment of proprietors of failed businesses is not observably
higher than the flow estimated for all male unemployed workers.
Strengthening their conclusion is the fact that program participants have
somewhat better credentials, and therefore a better chance of reemployment, than the average unemployed workers.
The final question concerns the job-creating performance of subsidized
small businesses. Does their performance live up to the high rate of
job creation said to be characteristic of new small firms? The answer
seems to be that only a small subset of subsidized firms are likely to
provide employment opportunities in addition to the job held by the
proprietor. For the British program, 62 percent of businesses still
operating after three years supplied employment only for the proprietor,
and only 5 percent employed more than six persons. Parallel results
are reported for the Unemployed Entrepreneurs Program. It should be
noted, moreover, that these percentages include part-time workers and
family members who may or may not be paid.
In summary, both the USDOL and Bendick-Egan studies offer a lessthan-enthusiastic recommendation for transferring the unemployed en
trepreneur initiative to this country. The USDOL report (1986:63) ex
presses two main concerns. The first is that given the higher incidence
of self-employment in the U.S. than in Europe, payments to program
participants are likely to represent a windfall in the sense that benefits
are paid to persons who would have taken the desired action in the
absence of the program. The second concern is that subsidies that in
duce start-ups by unemployed persons with no previous entrepreneurial
experience and little initial capital to invest may exacerbate the already
high rate of small business failure.
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For similar reasons, Bendick and Egan (1987:541) conclude that
". . . grant diversion for small business development should be at most
a minor component of the spectrum of efforts to promote employment
opportunities for the hard-to-employ." A minor role for grant diver
sion follows from the widespread agreement that the forms of assistance
most needed by newly created small businesses are counseling and finan
cial assistance. Moreover, Bendick and Egan point out that unemployed
entrepreneur programs are subject to the same trade-off as that facing
traditional reemployment initiatives; namely, the trade-off between serv
ing the hardest-to-employ and achieving high success rates for program
participants.
Reinforcing the recommendation of a limited role for unemployed
entrepreneur programs is the experience gained from a small pilot proj
ect in Ohio designed to test the effectiveness of self-employment train
ing. This project was operated during the 1985-86 period by the Ohio
Bureau of Employment Services using JTPA Title ffl funds. All 200
displaced workers participating in the project received formal training
in skills thought to be related to entrepreneurial success as well as postprogram support services. Across the seven program providers, pro
gram content ranged from courses in basic business skills such as ac
counting, market research, and personnel selection to seminars stress
ing motivation and esteem building.
The analysis of the Ohio pilot project by Mangum and Tansky (1987)
indicates that 31 percent of participants actually started a small business,
but less than 10 percent of all participants successfully created businesses
that offered much chance of generating employment opportunities for
others and of providing predisplacement levels of earnings. Average
program cost per small business start-up was $6,767. The authors con
clude that displaced workers most likely to start businesses with a
reasonable probability of survival had substantial savings or equity in
their homes, possessed some managerial experience from previous
employment, and had been displaced for a relatively short time. Selfemployment training thus appears to be a viable option for only a very
select group within the displaced worker population.
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Summary
In contrast to the vocational training and ISA programs discussed in
earlier chapters, this chapter described a number of less conventional
initiatives for assisting displaced workers by developing economic alter
natives to plant closures and by encouraging small business start-ups.
Since several of these initiatives are incorporated in the comprehen
sive Massachusetts Mature Industries Act, the chapter began with an
outline of the Act, including the voluntary "social compact" it establishes
between business and government to cushion the adverse employment
impacts of plant closings. A unique feature of the Massachusetts displac
ed worker program is the provision of supplemental unemployment
benefits for a period not to exceed 13 weeks. Other adjustment assistance
initiatives offered by Massachusetts, as well as by other states, include
continuation of health insurance coverage for displaced workers and
"enterprise zone" programs providing special government assistance
and tax relief to employers located in distressed areas of the state.

The second half of the chapter dealt with programs intended to re
tain jobs and stimulate employment growth by encouraging the forma
tion of employee-owned enterprises. These programs typically take one
of two forms: (1) assisting employee groups to purchase facilities that
would otherwise be closed, and (2) assistance to enable individual
unemployed workers to start up their own small businesses. The discus
sion of the first type of program focused on case studies of Weirton
Steel and the Rath Packing Company and on a handful of empirical
studies relating to the impact of ESOPs on worker productivity and job
creation. While the available evidence is not terribly persuasive one
way or the other, it does appear that under certain conditions a case
can be made for public assistance in worker buyout attempts.
The second type of worker-ownership program was primarily discuss
ed in terms of the experience in Britain and France with national
unemployed entrepreneur programs.Programs in both countries have
been viewed as sufficiently successful that their funding has been con
tinued over time. In neither case, however, is quantitative evidence
available allowing a comparison of the performance of program par
ticipants with that of a control group. Even in the absence of experimental
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data, however, important questions were raised from the available
evidence regarding the ability of most displaced workers to start up a
viable small business and the limited potential for job creation in addi
tion to the job of the proprietor. Caution is thus warranted in recom
mending the extension of this type of program to the U.S.

NOTES
1. This discussion is primarily based on the enabling legislation for the Mature In
dustries Act and the legislative report of the state Division of Employment Security
(1987).
2. An interesting third case covered by the Act is that the state health insurance benefit
fund will pay for continued coverage by health insurance policies individually pur
chased by workers displaced by a certified plant closing.
3. As described in Trolin and Randall (1987), another interesting funding initiative,
included in the proposed Oregon Employee Ownership Act, would allow employees
to use their UI benefits to purchase shares in companies that would otherwise close down.
4. On the other hand, Miller (1988) points out that, as shareholders, workers may
enjoy substantial windfall gains when an ESOP-owned firm is taken public or sells
out in a transaction that eventually reduces or eliminates employee ownership. Ironically,
this outcome flouts congressional intent (i.e., the encouragement of worker owner
ship) in giving tax-favored treatment to ESOPs.
5. Wessel and Brown (1988) offer an interesting discussion of various criticisms of
the thesis that small businesses generate nearly all of U.S. job growth and report Birch©s
response to his critics.
6. The discussion of these two programs relies heavily on the data presented and
analyzed in Bendick and Egan (1987).
7. While a screening of business proposals would be likely to decrease failures, pro
gram officials in both countries have been reluctant to adopt a policy of extensive screen
ing. One reason is the additional program cost and complexity associated with screen
ing. A second factor is a reluctance to substitute the judgment of agency personnel
for that of the entrepreneur and the market.

6
Summary and Policy Implications

The introductory chapter of this study posed six major questions in
volving the provision of effective labor market adjustment assistance
to displaced workers. Chapters 2 through 5 then described a variety
of specific initiatives through which assistance is or could be supplied.
The focus in these chapters was on contemporary, innovative, statelevel programs. Available quantitative and qualitative evidence on these
programs was also presented in detail.
The first section of this concluding chapter attempts to answer each
of the six questions. The purpose of the question-and-answer format
is to be as concrete as possible in spelling out what can be learned from
state, federal, and, in a few cases, foreign government experience about
how best to cope with the adjustment problems faced by displaced
workers. A second section briefly outlines what appears to be the best
mix of displaced worker programs.

Major Policy Questions
Question 1: How do displaced workers differ from other unemployed
workers ?
Adjustment assistance programs directed specifically toward displaced
workers are based on the premise that the displaced are different from
other unemployed workers in ways that require special services. Not
all analysts agree on exactly how to define displaced workers. Nor is
there unanimity on the proposition that the displaced worker problem
has recently become more serious. Nevertheless, most observers seem
to agree that relative to other unemployed workers, displaced workers
(1) possess a stable employment history with their predisplacement
135
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employers, (2) have little chance of being recalled to jobs with their
old employer or in their old industry, and (3) may face poor reemployment prospects in their local labor markets.
An implication of the first difference is that the job search skills of
many displaced workers have grown rusty because they had not been
obliged to seek alternative employment for a number of years. The length
of their unemployment spells is thus likely to be longer than otherwise
would be the case. Output foregone because of unnecessary delays in
the reemployment process represents a social loss which must be con
sidered in addition to the private losses borne by individual displaced
workers and their families.
Evidence from the 1984 Displaced Worker Survey reported in table
1.1 indicates that about 40 percent of workers displaced from their jobs
between 1979 and 1984 were unemployed or no longer in the labor force
at the end of the survey period, and that nearly half of the displaced
workers who drew UI benefits during the 1979-84 period exhausted
their eligibility for benefits (i.e., they were unemployed for longer than
26 weeks). The 1986 DWS shows that even with the cyclical upswing
in the economy between 1984 and 1986, fully one-third of workers
displaced during the 1981-86 period were without employment in
January 1986.
The further analysis of 1984 DWS data by Podgursky and Swaim
(1987c) shows that the distribution of completed spells of joblessness
is highly skewed to the right. While nearly half of respondents in their
sample found jobs within 14 weeks of displacement, a substantial minori
ty of displaced workers faced a high risk of being jobless for a year
or more. The highly skewed distribution of completed spells makes the
average length of unemployment substantially longer than can be
reasonably accounted for by cyclical phenomenon or by job search fac
tors such as an unrealistically high initial reservation wage. It also sug
gests that reemployment programs should be targeted to the minority
of workers facing the most severe adjustment problems. Drawing on
the Podgursky-Swaim regression results, these individuals include
workers displaced from blue-collar occupations, workers with belowaverage levels of education, minorities and women, and residents of
communities with above-average unemployment rates.
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The second difference between displaced and other unemployed
workers implies that the reemployment of the displaced is likely to in
volve a change in occupation, industry, or both. Such changes, in turn,
often imply lower earnings upon reemployment, which compound the
private costs associated with a spell of unemployment. As emphasized
in chapter 1, lower earnings arise because a displaced worker
(1) received an economic rent on his or her predisplacement job or
(2) was forced to forego the opportunity to earn a return on investments
previously made in firm-specific human capital. Data compiled from
the 1984 DWS and the 1986 DWS indicate that about 30 percent of
those reemployed in full-time wage and salary jobs suffered pay cuts
of 20 percent or more (see table 1.1). Losses in the form of group health
insurance coverage and vested pension plans add to the private costs
borne by displaced workers.
In an effort to distinguish between these two explanations of earn
ings losses, Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) use industry unionization
coverage of last job as a proxy measure of the possibility that the
predisplacement job provided a significant economic rent. Controlling
for this measure as well as predisplacement earnings, the authors find
for blue-collar males that a change in industry significantly depresses
reemployment earnings, thus providing support for the specific train
ing explanation. Greater tenure on the old job and the area unemploy
ment rate also significantly increase the earnings loss estimated for bluecollar men. On the other hand, years of schooling completed which
can be interpreted as a measure of general training is found to have
a strong positive effect on postdisplacement earnings. Hamermesh (1987)
provides further evidence indicating that displacement is not typically
anticipated by affected workers and that the value of workers© share
of lost returns on firm-specific training can be substantial.
Uncompensated losses on specific training result in a social loss if
risk-averse workers and their employers are discouraged from making
optimal levels of investment in specific human capital. Even evidence
of losses of economic rents can be used to justify special assistance to
displaced workers on the grounds that such assistance is politically
necessary for the maintenance of a dynamic and open domestic economy.
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The third difference between displaced workers and other unemployed
workers recognizes that a major plant closure or permanent layoff has
a serious impact on employment opportunities in the community. The
ripple effect of a closure generates displacement in smaller firms that
service the closed establishment and in retail outlets that depend on the
purchasing power of laid-off workers. This increases the competition
for those jobs that are still available in the local labor market, even though
many of them are likely to be low-wage positions offering little oppor
tunity for advancement. Moreover, declining property values and an
eroding tax base leaves schools and other public services underfunded,
making it even more difficult to attract new employers to the community.
Question 2: Which forms of adjustment assistance © ©work© ©for displac
ed workers?
Just as displaced workers can conceptually be distinguished from other
unemployed workers, displaced workers are themselves a heterogeneous
population with different backgrounds and skills and with a variety of
needs for adjustment assistance. The most highly publicized segment
of the displaced worker population includes workers laid off from
unionized, high-wage jobs in the manufacturing sector. Many of these
workers have made substantial investments in firm-specific training
which now must be written off. Others undoubtedly enjoyed sizable
rents on their predisplacement jobs.
In spite of the common denominator of having been laid off from
a high-paying job in manufacturing, appropriate forms of adjustment
assistance may differ substantially for different individuals, even within
this group of displaced workers. Some workers may require retraining
to qualify for jobs in expanding industries. Many others will benefit
from counseling and other types of job search assistance to help them
realize that their chances of recall are low but that employment options
offering greater career opportunities do exist, albeit at lower wages,
in other industries or occupations. For still others in this group, remedial
education is a prerequisite before they can be either retrained or assisted
in formulating a job search strategy.
It is also important to recognize that the population of displaced
workers includes nonunion workers laid off from low-wage jobs in
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industries other than manufacturing. This group of displaced workers
includes individuals who are poorly educated, female, and black or
Hispanic. Since these individuals may never have had a chance to ac
cumulate specific human capital, appropriate adjustment services in
clude remedial education and retraining programs intended to provide
basic and job-related skills. These programs accompanied by job search
assistance offer the potential for enhancing workers© employment op
portunities in better-paying occupations.
In response to the variety of needs of displaced workers, states have
established a broad spectrum of reemployment assistance programs. As
described in chapters 2 through 4, these programs include a number
of variants of retraining and job search assistance programs. Still other
state programs described in chapter 5 are aimed at maintaining employ
ment opportunities in the local labor market either by enabling current
owners to stay in business or by helping to find new owners (including
employee groups) to keep existing facilities from closing. Also con
sidered in chapter 5 is the European experience with programs that assist
unemployed workers to start their own small businesses. The most im
portant single gap in the spectrum of state programs appears to be in
the area of remedial education, a not surprising result given the em
phasis of most states on economic development rather than human capital
investment.
The rich set of state-level programs provides an opportunity for
researchers to pull together and analyze an enormous amount of infor
mation about the design and effectiveness of adjustment assistance ser
vices. Such information should be invaluable to decisionmakers charg
ed with allocating funds across existing programs, initiating new
programs, and terminating old programs. Unfortunately, relatively few
state programs have been designed to allow the kind of evaluation which
would allow their effectiveness to be measured quantitatively by a com
parison of the behavior of individuals randomly assigned to treatment
and control groups. Fortunately, there are a few key random-assignment
experiments that represent exceptions to this statement.
One of the most important of these exceptions is the Worker Adjust
ment Demonstration, involving about 2,250 Title HI JTPA program par
ticipants at three sites located in Houston and El Paso, Texas. Reemploy-
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ment services randomly assigned to participants in two treatment groups
are job search assistance (ISA) and ISA plus referral, where necessary,
to a retraining program. Also randomly assigned were the members
of a control group who received all available non-Title III services. As
described by Bloom and Kulik (1986), WAD participants are found to
experience a short-run positive impact on earnings and likelihood of
employment, and a corresponding negative impact on UI benefits receiv
ed. The primary program effect for men is to expedite their reemployment, while for women it appears that wages as well are positively af
fected by program participation. A surprising result is that the extra
cost of retraining services provided to male participants in Houston did
not result in additional labor market benefits. The authors suggest that
the most realistic explanation for this finding is that a mismatch occur
red between the training opportunities offered by the Houston program
and the interests and backgrounds of program participants.
The findings of the WAD projects regarding the relative effectiveness
of ISA and retraining services are buttressed by results obtained from
two federally-funded projects the Downriver dislocated worker pro
ject and the Buffalo project of the national Dislocated Worker
Demonstration. Both projects permit a comparison of the outcomes for
treatment and control groups, although neither involved random
assignment.
All participants in the Downriver project were required to participate
in a ISA program and about 60 percent of participants also were enrolled
in classroom training. The evaluation report by Kulik, Smith, and
Stromsdorfer (1984) indicates that the program significantly improved
workers© reemployment rates and postlayoff weekly earnings. It also
increased their access to retraining opportunities. However, program
training is not found to yield a significant incremental gain in participants©
employment prospects above that resulting from ISA services only.
Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer qualify this negative finding by noting
problems of small sample sizes and the absence of random assignment
of workers to training as opposed to ISA.
Like the Downriver project, all participants in the Buffalo program
were provided ISA services and about 45 percent also went through
a classroom training or OJT program. Despite the low rate of participa-
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tion (less than 20 percent of displaced workers recruited for the pro
gram chose to participate), Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985) report
that the program had a favorable effect on the proportion of time spent
in the labor force, the proportion of time employed, and average weekly
earnings. Among the three main program services, ISA and classroom
training are estimated to have impacts of about the same size on workers©
labor market experience. In view of the substantially higher cost of
classroom training, only ISA services thus appear to be cost effective.
Corson, Long, and Maynard note, however, that many classroom train
ing participants completed their training near the end of the demonstration
period and consequently received relatively little placement assistance.
Interestingly, on-the-job training is not found by the authors to have
a discernible impact on employment.
The reemployment bonus concept is another important labor market
initiative for which evidence is available from random-assignment ex
periments. As discussed in chapter 3, results from the completed ex
periments in Illinois indicate that a $500 reemployment bonus paid to
workers (but not to employers) has the effect of reducing the length
of unemployment spells and associated UI outlays. Woodbury and
Spiegelman (1987) calculate a benefit-cost ratio for the Claimant Bonus
Experiment with the very favorable result that state regular UI benefit
payments are reduced by $2.32 for each $1.00 of bonus payments made.
Preliminary findings of the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstra
tion Project also provide evidence on the effectiveness of a reemploy
ment bonus program as well as of ISA and retraining services. Corson
and Kerachsky (1987) report that the ISA-only treatment reduces length
of UI benefits by slightly over half a week and the amount of benefits
by nearly $88. Adding the reemployment bonus to JSA services fur
ther decreases both length and amount of benefits. In view of the size
of the average bonus payment (about $1,300), however, the incremen
tal effect of the bonus program does not appear to be large enough to
make this treatment cost effective.
Consistent with the results of the Texas WAD projects and the
Downriver and Buffalo demonstrations, the New Jersey experiment in
dicates that the incremental impact of retraining (above that of JSA ser
vices only) on length and amount of UI benefits is essentially zero.
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In interpreting this result, Corson and Kerachsky stress that their
estimates are likely to understate the true impact of retraining since in
dividuals enrolled in training programs continue to collect UI. The
benefits of training in terms of reducing UI expenditures are thus ex
pected to occur in the longer run as retrained workers enjoy more stable
employment.
In summary, the available quantitative evidence strongly supports the
inclusion of JSA in the spectrum of reemployment services that should
be offered to displaced workers. The evidence is not nearly as strong
concerning the net impact of training programs; and, given their relative
ly high cost, the cost effectiveness of retraining is open to question.
Nevertheless, the authors of the evaluation reports reviewed are
unanimous in cautioning that the impact of training programs may be
understated in their empirical analyses.
Because of the limited number of quantitative evaluations available
and the uncertainties in interpreting the results of those that do exist,
particularly with respect to retraining, this study has devoted considerable
attention to a "process analysis" of the initiatives examined. Rather
than attempting to measure program outcomes, process analysis involves
a qualitative evaluation of how well the program is operating. The opera
tion of a particular program, in turn, is determined to a substantial ex
tent by its design; and the discussion now turns to a consideration of
several important design issues.
Question 3: How should particular adjustment assistance services be
provided?
Chapter 2 introduced two related design issues involved in the pro
vision of retraining services. The first of these concerns the use of
performance-based contracting, and the second involves the extent of
employer participation in reemployment programs. The main advan
tage of performance-based contracting is that program planners, once
they have established their performance standards, can shift to training
providers the burden of making sure that trainees acquire marketable
skills. Performance-based contracting thus eliminates, at least for pro
gram planners, the necessity of forecasting the occupational demand
for labor in order to select retraining curricula appropriately.

Summary & Policy Implications

143

Among the state-level programs considered, California©s Employment
Training Panel program has gone the furthest in establishing stringent
performance standards and in basing the reimbursement of training ven
dors solely on their performance in satisfactorily meeting these stan
dards. As described in chapter 2, the Panel withholds the full negotiated
payment per person until trainees have completed their training pro
grams, are placed in training-related jobs at wage rates stipulated in
the contract, and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days.
An assessment of the California ETP program reveals, nonetheless,
certain disadvantages of insisting on high performance standards. One
of these is the incentive for training vendors to cream off the most able
of those eligible for retraining assistance in order to satisfy placement
rate requirements. A second disadvantage is that by withholding pay
ment until after trainees have been placed in jobs for 90 days, external
training providers such as community colleges and vocational-technical
institutes may be discouraged from program participation (see Cyert
and Mowery 1987:152). To the extent that educational institutions opt
not to participate, Panel officials are restricted to employers for pro
viding training; and employers have a natural incentive to seek pro
gram funding for the retraining of current employees. If in the absence
of the program these employees would have been retrained anyway,
there is no net increase in the delivery of training services and employers
receive a windfall gain at the expense of taxpayers.
Although employers may serve as training providers in the ETP pro
gram, their broader role includes initiating the retraining process by
requesting funding for a particular project. Once a project has received
ETP approval, in addition, the employer determines criteria for select
ing trainees, helps to select the curricula, and sets performance stan
dards. In return, participating employers must make a good-faith com
mitment to hire program graduates. Tailoring retraining programs in
this way clearly helps to solve the problem of workers being trained
in skills not in demand. Moreover, tailored retraining is also important
in meeting the twin goals of most states of encouraging economic
development and reducing UI expenditures.
From a social perspective, the disavantages of tailored training pro
grams, as noted, include creaming in the trainee-selection process and
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committing public funds to retraining individuals who might otherwise
have been retrained at the employer©s own expense. The discussion of
the Minnesota Employment and Economic Development wage-subsidy
program indicated that it is possible to take the opposite approach of
targeting assistance to specific groups of hard-to-employ persons and
still enjoy widespread business support. MEED offers employers who
hire targeted workers a subsidy of up to $4 per hour in wages and up
to $1 per hour in fringe benefits for a period not to exceed six months.
In return, Minnesota employers agree to retain program participants
on their payrolls for at least 12 months beyond the subsidy period. The
support of the business community enjoyed by the MEED program is
particularly interesting in view of unfavorable evidence from the Dayton
wage-subsidy experiment showing that the placement rates of the two
treatment groups are lower than the placement rate of the control group.
Burtless© (1985) explanation for this unexpected result is that program
vouchers were primarily viewed by employers as a signal of potential
ly poor job performance.
While chapter 2 emphasized that it is critical for a retraining pro
gram to enjoy the support of employers, chapters 3 and 4 brought out
that employers© approval is equally important in the provision of other
reemployment services. A case in point is the delivery of services at
the site of facilities slated for a mass layoff or closure.
Question 4: What are the best time and place to provide assistance?
Most analysts take the position that reemployment assistance programs
are most successful if they are located on-site and are in place before
workers lose their jobs. Workers can be readily contacted at the
workplace, and early adjustment assistance helps to avoid the discourage
ment and loss of self-respect that often goes along with an unexpected
job loss. The involvement of employers in such on-site programs in
cludes, at a minimum, supplying advance notice of planned layoffs and
plant closures, making space available to program staff members within
plant gates, and providing workers time off to attend presentations detail
ing available services.
Beginning with the issue of advance notification, chapter 4 provided
an overview of mandatory advance notice laws on the books in three
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states, federal plant closing regulation enacted in the Worker Adjust
ment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, and the limited empirical
evidence currently available on the effect of notification on length of
unemployment spells and subsequent earnings upon reemployment.
Although the empirical evidence discussed is subject to a number of
qualifications, it does seem to indicate that advance notice is effective
in speeding up the transition of displaced workers to new jobs, primarily
by encouraging workers to locate employment prior to scheduled ter
mination dates. Thus advance notice appears to reduce both the private
and social costs of adjustment associated with worker displacement.
What makes mandatory advance notice legislation controversial is the
question of whether the benefit to workers and to society as a whole
is sufficient to offset the private costs to employers. These private costs
include increased inflexibility in adjusting workforce size and a possi
ble negative effect on worker productivity. The inflexibility argument
is usually made by associating the much slower rate of employment
growth in Western Europe than in the U.S. since 1970 to restrictions
many European countries place on firms© ability to carry out layoffs.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it should be noted that the failure
of employers to provide advance notice imposes costs (or "externalities")
on workers and communities that are not shared by the firms making
the layoffs. Regarding the impact on labor productivity, what evidence
is available does not support the argument that productivity is adverse
ly affected during the period of notification.
The most common on-site assistance program in this country takes
the form of rapid-response teams. As implemented by various states,
employer involvement in rapid-response team programs ranges from
a minimum level of cooperation (i.e., giving advance notice, providing
space, and offering workers time off) to active participation in helping
to place workers in new jobs. At the extreme of minimal employer in
volvement, the rapid-response team consists of representatives of rele
vant state agencies; team members make on-site presentations to af
fected workers on the details of registering for UI benefits, requirements
for continued UI eligibility, and available ES and Tide HI JTPA retrain
ing and job search assistance services.

146

Summary & Policy Implications

At the other extreme of employer involvement, the model usually
pointed to is the Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service program. The
thrust of the LAS is to encourage the employer and, where present, the
union or unions representing the displaced workers to utilize their in
formal labor market contacts to place workers in suitable job openings.
Placement rather than retraining, relocation, or counseling is emphasized.
The primary role of the LAS is a limited one of securing from the par
ties a commitment of time and financial resources in the formation of
a joint labor-management adjustment committee. It is the adjustment
committee©s job to organize and put into effect the placement process.
Worth noting in the recent report of the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force
on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation (1986:28-33) is the
recommendation that state-level Displaced Worker Units be formed to
play an LAS-like role in mobilizing the resources of labor and manage
ment to respond rapidly to worker displacement.
An important advantage of on-site adjustment assistance is that pro
grams can be appropriately targeted to workers displaced by a plant
closing or permanent layoff. As noted earlier in this chapter, however,
the ripple effect of the closing of a large plant will generate additional
displacement among employees of suppliers to the closed plant and local
retail and service outlets. The question then arises whether workers
displaced by the secondary effects of a plant closure can be distinguished
from other unemployed workers in the local labor market. From a policy
perspective, the answer to this question is important to avoid providing
reemployment services to unemployed workers expected to experience
little difficulty in finding new jobs or likely to return to their previous
employers.
Chapter 3 pointed out that one of the two main objectives of the New
Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration is to determine whether it is
possible to identify by the fifth week of the claim period unemployed
workers who are likely to exhaust UI benefits but are unlikely to return
to their old or similar jobs. (The other main objective, as noted earlier,
is to measure the effectiveness of alternative reemployment services,
including the reemployment bonus.) The methodological approach taken
in the demonstration is to screen UI claimants using five eligibility re
quirements, the most important of which are three years of tenure with
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the pre-UI employer and absence of a definite recall date. Preliminary
results provided by Corson and Kerachsky (1987) indicate that the five
screens do seem to restrict the demonstration-eligible population to per
sons whose attributes are usually associated with displaced workers and
reemployment difficulty. Nevertheless, the eligible population is also
found to include claimants previously employed in growing sectors of
the economy, such as the service industry, as well as claimants who
eventually returned to their former employers.
Question 5: Is there a role for initiatives designed to keep existing
plants open?
In the case of a plant closing or mass layoff, most of the initiatives
discussed in this monograph are designed to ease the adjustment of laidoff workers into jobs with new employers. The main question raised
in chapter 5, in contrast, is the appropriateness of policy intervention
to enable existing firms or plants to remain open in local labor markets
that are sufficiently depressed that alternative employment opportunities
are limited to low-wage jobs offering little potential for advancement.
Possible forms of intervention are (1) assistance to allow current owners
to continue operating or to attract new owners from outside the firm,
(2) assistance to encourage employee buyouts of existing facilities, and
(3) assistance to enable displaced workers to start up their own small
businesses. Unfortunately, the available evidence on these categories
of assistance is limited to a handful of qualitative studies.
Assistance to current or new owners of established facilities is com
monly embodied in "enterprise zone" programs, and 21 states have
passed some form of enterprise zone legislation. The basic idea underly
ing enterprise zones is to target special opportunities and benefits to
firms and residents of distressed areas within the state (including blighted
inner-city neighborhoods). As originally conceived, the enterprise zone
was envisioned as a tool to stimulate economic development by lifting
the twin burdens of government regulation and high tax rates, both of
which serve to reduce individual work effort and entrepreneurial
initiative.
As described by Bendick and Rasmussen (1986), however, state enter
prise zone laws have little to do with creating islands of unfettered free
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enterprise. Rather, the major features of zone programs are (1) a reduc
tion in total tax burdens, as opposed to reduced marginal tax rates, and
(2) extensive government activity within zones. The latter feature in
cludes such activities as land-use planning, infrastructure development,
improvements in public services, provision of loans and technical
assistance to businesses, and training programs directed toward disadvantaged workers. The high level of government activity within zones
often imposes on businessmen excessively burdensome red tape and
operating requirements as conditions for receiving benefits. Bendick
and Rasmussen (1986:118-19) note that a number of states are likely
soon to revise their legislation, and that future zone programs will prob
ably reflect a greater awareness of the needs of small and indigenous
firms, as opposed to those of large in-migrants. Key problems general
ly thought to adversely affect the survival of small businesses are lack
of access to affordable financing, lack of experience in running a
business, and lack of predictable demand for the goods or services pro
duced. State support to small business incubator programs represents
one approach to dealing with the first and second of these problems.
Turning to the topic of employee buyouts, about one-third of the states
have on their books legislation specifically promoting employee owner
ship of troubled enterprises. The interest of policymakers in employeeownership initiatives appears to stem largely from two factors: (1) the
series of tax incentives embodied in Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOPs), and (2) reports of a favorable impact on labor productivity
and profits of giving workers a stake in their companies and participa
tion in decisionmaking. Case studies of particular companies (e.g., Weirton Steel) suggest that employee buyout programs may indeed increase
labor productivity to an extent permitting the survival of firms that would
otherwise have closed. Surveys carried out by the National Center for
Employee Ownership also indicate that ESOP firms exhibit faster sales
and employment growth than conventional firms.
Nevertheless, current discussions of ESOPs emphasize their role as
a low-cost strategy used by existing managements to finance corporate
restructurings and to fend off corporate raiders. Relatively uncommon
is the use of ESOPs to save jobs that would otherwise be lost to plant
closings. In addition, employee ownership is often found to involve little
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participation in decisionmaking; and employees shoulder increased risk
in those cases in which company stock is substituted for diversified sav
ings and pension plans. It seems reasonable to conclude, as do Rosen,
Klein, and Young (1986), that ESOPs can operate to motivate workers
and increase job satisfaction only if employers are (1) willing to make
significant financial contributions to the plan, (2) strongly committed
to the philosophy of employee ownership, and (3) ready to develop an
active program to educate employees about the ESOP.
Although programs to assist unemployed workers to become selfemployed have yet to be implemented in this country, both state and
federal policymakers are currently exhibiting a strong interest in the
unemployed entrepreneur concept. Accounting for this interest is
evidence showing that small firms contribute disproportionately to
creating new jobs, and that many independent small businesses are suc
cessful attempts at self-employment. Also important is the belief of pro
gram advocates that many displaced workers possess marketable skills
and entrepreneurial talent that can be effectively utilized in their own
small businesses once they have received assistance in getting started.
Several European countries have established programs that provide
financial and limited training assistance to would-be entrepreneurs. The
best known of these initiatives are the French Unemployed Entrepreneurs
Program and the British Enterprise Allowance Scheme. While the French
program provides participants with a lump-sum payment, the British
program supplies monthly payments for a maximum of 52 weeks. Both
programs are currently funded by general tax revenues. In France,
however, funding was obtained prior to April 1984 from the unemploy
ment insurance trust fund.
Although neither the French nor the British program has been sub
jected to a formal evaluation involving a control group comparison, re
cent studies of the two programs by Bendick and Egan (1987) and the
USDOL (1986) are helpful in assessing the potential of the unemployed
entrepreneur concept for returning the unemployed to work and creating
additional jobs. Both studies reach pessimistic conclusions. The major
concerns about the concept are threefold. The first is the question of
whether new businesses started by program participants would have taken
place in the absence of the program. If the answer is "yes," participants
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receive a windfall gain at the expense of taxpayers. The available
evidence suggests that about 50 percent of British program participants
would have set up their businesses without program assistance.
A second concern is the possibility that subsidized firms will com
pete against and possibly displace existing firms in the same local pro
duct markets. British government estimates reported by Bendick and
Egan (1987:535) suggest that because of displacement, about one worker
is thrown into unemployment for every two workers employed. It might
be noted parenthetically that the problem of displacement exists for all
of the initiatives examined in this study, and even the random-assignment
experiments that have been carried out shed little or no light on the severi
ty of the problem.
Finally, there is a concern about how many new jobs self-employment
programs would actually generate. The USDOL report (1986:63) sug
gests that subsidies to encourage start-ups by unemployed workers with
no previous entrepreneurial experience and little initial capital to in
vest may exacerbate already high rates of small business failure. In ad
dition, Bendick and Egan (1987:536-37) indicate for both the British
and French programs that only a small subset of subsidized firms sur
viving three years are likely to provide employment opportunities in
addition to the job held by the proprietor.
Adding to the uncertainty about the wisdom of implementing the
unemployed entrepreneur concept in this country is experience provid
ed by the Entrepreneurial Training Pilot Project carried out in Ohio
in 1985-86. This small-scale project used JTPA Title ffl funds to supply
self-employment training to 200 displaced workers. In their evaluation
of the project, Mangum and Tansky (1987) conclude that entrepreneurial
training is likely to result in viable small businesses only for those displac
ed workers with the rare combination of substantial savings or equity
in their homes, prior management experience obtained from previous
jobs, and a relatively short period of joblessness.
Question 6: How should reemployment asistance to displaced workers
be funded?
Most of the state-level displaced worker programs examined in this
study are funded by state general tax revenues. The main alternative
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source of funding is state UI trust funds. At present, however, federal
UI regulations prohibit the use of trust funds for purposes other than
providing workers a partial replacement of earnings during short spells
of involuntary unemployment. To be eligible for UI income-maintenance
benefits, unemployed workers must meet a "work test;" that is, they
must be available for and actively seeking employment. The one case
in which the work test is waived is when a UI claimant is enrolled in
a training program approved by the state©s employment security agen
cy. States are prohibited from using trust funds to pay directly for the
costs of training.
The underlying premise of the present UI system is that unemploy
ment is basically a temporary experience best dealt with by maintain
ing workers© incomes while they engage in job search or wait to be
recalled. Critics of restricting the use of UI trust funds to incomemaintenance benefits argue, however, that the main reemployment prob
lem faced by many displaced workers is not one of riding out a tem
porary spell of unemployment until a cyclical upturn occurs. These critics
suggest, rather, that what is needed is labor market adjustment assistance
initiatives including retraining to qualify workers for vacant jobs and
programs to subsidize reemployment. The implication that follows is
that UI trust funds should be opened up to fund innovative programs
which are aimed more directly at solving fundamental problems hinder
ing the reemployment of displaced workers.
As an additional indication of the inadequacy of the present UI system,
critics point out that UI benefits are reaching a diminishing percentage
of the jobless. Burtless (1983) reports that the fraction of unemployed
workers receiving regular, extended, and supplemental UI benefits was
lower in the 1981-82 recession than in any other postwar recession.
The possibility of using UI trust funds to pay for adjustment assistance
programs has been considered at two places in this monograph. In chapter
2, the pioneering approach of California to diverting a small part of
regular UI tax revenues to finance its ETP program was examined. A
surplus in California©s trust fund permitted the state©s legislature in 1983
to create an earmarked fund financed by a 0.1 percent payroll tax, while
at the same time employers were given a 0.1 percent reduction in their
regular UI tax rates. Delaware and Washington state have subsequent-
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ly funded permanent retraining and job search assistance programs us
ing the diversion approach.
The second mention of an alternative use of UI trust funds occurred
in chapter 5 in connection with the funding of unemployed entrepreneur
initiatives. Advocates of this concept argue that rather than offering a
subsidy not to work, UI trust funds could be put to better use by sup
plying an incentive for the unemployed to use their skills and en
trepreneurial talent to create jobs for themselves and for others.
It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that the present policy restrict
ing the use of UI trust funds has many adherents. Organized labor and
a number of business organizations have consistently taken the posi
tion that UI trust funds should continue to be used only to fund tem
porary income-maintenance benefits. There are two main arguments
supporting this position. The first is based on the issue of trust fund
solvency, and the second involves conformity to the basic insurance
principles underlying the financing of the UI system. To anticipate the
discussion that follows, these two arguments appear to carry sufficient
weight that any basic departure from the current concept of unemploy
ment insurance should be approached cautiously.
As noted in chapter 1, the UI system has served for over 50 years
as the first line of defense against temporary income losses due to
unemployment. Advocates of the present system express concern that
should UI trust funds be opened up to fund alternative initiatives, the
ability of the system to provide traditional income-maintenance benefits
would be jeopardized. Vroman (1986) documents the series of reces
sions from 1970 through the early 1980s that severely depleted the trust
funds of a number of states, causing them to borrow heavily from the
federal government. Many of these states have been able to reduce their
indebtedness during the improved economic climate of the mid-1980s.
From an actuarial perspective, nevertheless, the condition of the UI
system is still weak; and the onset of a new recession would be likely
to trigger a repetition of heavy borrowing and debt accumulation.
An assessment of just how much of a drain adjustment assistance in
itiatives would impose on trust fund balances is difficult for two reasons.
The first is the uncertainty regarding the longer-run effectiveness of
these initiatives. In principle, short-run trust fund withdrawals might be
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more than offset by longer-run inflows as the initiatives pay off in a
workforce that is less susceptible to unemployment. The available
evidence, however, provides very little insight into the likely trade-off
between initial costs and longer-term benefits.
The second reason, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is that displaced
workers are not easily distinguished from workers unemployed for frictional, seasonal, or cyclical reasons. Thus there is considerable uncer
tainty as to the number of unemployed workers who should be counted
as displaced from their jobs at any particular point in time. This uncer
tainty is important because it is displaced workers who are expected
to benefit from alternative forms of labor market adjustment asistance,
while short-term income maintenance is more appropriate for other
categories of the unemployed. Excessive costs are incurred if services
are provided to unemployed workers who will get their former jobs
back or who can easily locate new jobs when the economy recovers.
Such excessive costs threaten the ability of the UI system to supply tradi
tional wage-replacement benefits, particularly during recessions. On
the other hand, a significant equity problem is raised by the denial of
alternative services to individuals who would benefit from them but who
do not happen to satisfy a particular displaced worker definition.
Next consider the insurance-based argument for remaining faithful
to the present policy of restricting the use of UI trust funds. To under
stand this argument, it should first be emphasized that the UI system
is intended to be fully self-financing by a payroll tax imposed on
employers. The underlying philosophy of this method of financing is
that the individual employer has a responsibility for former employees.
It is this philosophy that gives the program its insurance character.
Employers are assessed insurance "premiums" in the form of payroll
taxes, which are used to create state trust funds. Covered employees
who have been laid off are then eligible to draw on these funds. States
are free to determine the payroll taxes they assess; and tax rate schedules
are said to be "experienced rated," which simply means that tax rates
vary depending on the employer©s layoff rates and on the fraction of
former employees receiving benefits. The "moral hazard" prob
lem associated with the incentive for insured individuals to decide on
a course of action that makes them eligible for insurance benefits is
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dealt with by restricting UI payments to workers who are involuntarily
unemployed and by providing a relatively low replacement rate for lost
earnings.
Hansen and Byers (1986) observe that the payment of incomemaintenance benefits to workers enrolled in training programs represents
a significant weakening of the insurance philosophy underpinning the
UI system because these workers are not actively seeking employment.
The essential point is that the UI system was designed to provide a
minimum number of weekly benefit checks necessary to find a job by
ensuring that eligible unemployed workers will act in their own selfinterest to end their unemployment. The present practice of waiving
the work test for claimants undergoing retraining implies receipt of a
fixed stream of benefits depending on the length of the program. Since
eligible workers may have some choice among retraining options, they
are in effect being given a "right" or "entitlement" to receive the max
imum number of payments allowable under state law. Trust fund financ
ing of adjustment assistance initiatives including directly paying the cost
of training programs, wage subsidies, and unemployed entrepreneur
programs clearly has the impact of expanding worker choice, thereby
further undermining the philosophical basis of the system. With the ex
perience rating of UI taxes, an additional equity issue that arises is
whether it is still reasonable to expect employers hi declining industries
to subsidize the retraining or reemployment of workers who will more
than likely locate jobs in the industries that are expanding.
Among the reemployment initiatives described in this study, ISA is
the one that is conceptually most consistent with the objective of pro
viding assistance for only the minimum period of time necessary to find
a job. Moreover, the available empirical evidence summarized earlier
strongly indicates that ISA programs reduce the length of unemploy
ment spells. The results of the Illinois experiments also suggest that
the reemployment bonus concept offers considerable promise in terms
of stimulating the intensity of job search effort.

Summary & Policy Implications

155

An Ideal Adjustment Assistance System

Drawing on the discussion of the six policy questions just considered,
a final issue that remains to be dealt with involves the ideal mix of ad
justment assistance services to meet the needs of displaced workers.
The point that comes out most strongly from the discussion is that ISA
should be the core service provided in the ideal system. JSA has been
shown empirically to be effective in speeding up the reemployment pro
cess, it allows for quick intervention before workers disperse after layoffs
or plant closings, and it is relatively cheap. In view of the practical
difficulties of distinguishing displaced workers from other unemployed
workers, the low cost of JSA services is particularly attractive because
it makes it feasible to supply assistance even to those unemployed
workers who turn out ex post to have little difficulty in locating new
jobs or are recalled to their old jobs.
The roles of retraining and remedial education programs are not as
clear cut. Vocational training programs are substantially more expen
sive than JSA, and the empirical evidence summarized here indicates
that retraining has little or no impact on labor market outcomes as typical
ly measured. However, there is an important caveat to consider with
respect to this evidence. This is the issue of whether the training pro
grams examined provided workers with skills that were appropriate to
their backgrounds and interests and at the same time were salable in
the marketplace. Process analyses of the California ETP program sug
gest that direct employer involvement in the training process is critical
in supplying marketable skills, and Minnesota©s MEED program in
dicates that employer support can be enlisted even for programs targeted
to hard-to-employ persons. It seems reasonable to conclude, along with
Bloom and Kulik (1986:181), that in the ideal system skill training should
be offered sparingly for well-specified needs and only where adequate
local training resources are present.
Most analysts agree that at least 20 percent of the displaced worker
population is seriously deficient in basic reading and problem-solving
skills. As noted earlier in this chapter, remedial education has received
little attention in this study because of the emphasis of most states on
economic development rather than human capital investment. Never-
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theless, a typical finding in the empirical literature is that displaced
workers with low levels of formal education are much more likely than
other displaced workers to experience lengthy spells of unemployment
and low earnings upon reemployment. In other words, these are precisely
the displaced workers who should be targeted for assistance. Remedial
education thus appears to be an essential service to be offered to the
minority of displaced workers determined in the assessment and testing
phase of ISA programs to lack basic skills.
At the present time, there is simply not enough information available
to justify including in the ideal system initiatives offering direct assistance
to employers in order to retain or replace jobs. The three categories
of employer-assistance programs examined in this study involved aid
to current owners to stay in business, employee buyout assistance, and
aid to unemployed workers to start up their own small businesses.
Perhaps the best qualitative evidence on the effectiveness of these pro
grams is available for unemployed entrepreneur programs. This evidence
suggests quite strongly that the individuals most likely to create and
operate a viable small business successfully possess personal attributes
that exclude them from the minority of displaced workers who face the
most severe adjustment problems.
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